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Abstract	  
 
Today, crude oil remains a vital resource all around the world. This non-
renewable resource powers countries worldwide. Besides serving as an energy source, 
crude oil is also the most important component for different world economies, especially 
in developing countries. Ecuador, a small member of the OPEC oil cartel, presents a case 
where its economy is oil dependent. A great percentage of the country’s GDP and 
government’s budget comes from oil revenues. Ecuador has always been a primary 
exporter of raw materials. In the last centuries, the country experienced three important 
economic booms: cacao, bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. In this sense, the country has 
not been able to fully industrialize and begin to export manufactured goods, i.e., Ecuador 
suffers from the Dutch disease. The latter has deterred Ecuador from achieving broad-
based economic development. 
 Given crude oil’s importance for the Ecuadorian economy, the government has 
always tried to influence the oil industry in search of profits and benefits. Therefore, this 
thesis, explores the question: how and to what extent have political interventions affected 
the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until March 2014? In general, this thesis 
establishes an economic history context during the last twenty-four years, attempting to 
research how political interventions have shaped Ecuador’s oil industry and economy. In 
the analysis, it covers a period where political instability prevailed, until Rafael Correa 
became president. The thesis examines Ecuador’s participation in OPEC, trying to find 
explanations as to why the country voluntarily left the organization in 1992, only to 
rejoin in 2007 when Correa rose to power. During the “Revolución Ciudadana” period, 
 viii 
the thesis researches reforms to the Law of Hydrocarbons, variations in the relations with 
other nations, the controversy surrounding the Yasuní-ITT oil block, and the “Refinería 
del Pacífico” construction. 
 The thesis is an Industrial Organization detailed case study that analyzes, updates, 
and evaluates the intersection of economics and politics in Ecuador’s crude oil industry 
during the last 24 years. In this sense I have consulted past theses, newspaper articles, 
books, and other published data about the petroleum industry, both from a global and 
Ecuadorian perspective. In addition to published sources, I was able to interview 
sociologists, public figures, history and economics academics, and other experts, 
accessing unique unpublished data about Ecuador’s oil industry. I made an effort to 
collect information that shows the private and public side of the industry, i.e., from 
government-related and independent sources.  
I attempted to remain as objective as possible to make conclusions about the 
appropriate Industrial Organization policy for Ecuador’s oil industry, addressing the issue 
from an economic, social, political, and environmental point of view. I found how 
Ecuador’s political instability caused public policy to fail, molding the conduct and 
market structure of the crude oil industry. Throughout history, developed nations have 
benefited from low oil prices, but things shifted since oil prices began to rise, which is 
more beneficial for the developing nations that actually possess and produce the raw 
material. Nevertheless, Ecuador, a victim of the Dutch disease due to its heavy reliance 
on crude oil as a primary product, has not achieved broad-based development. 
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Chapter	  1.	  Introduction	  
 
 Ecuador is a democratic republic in South America. The equator line cuts across 
and gives the country its name. Ecuador has beautiful unique landscapes, globally 
recognized biodiversity, and rich natural resources. Geographically it has four different 
regions: Costa, Sierra, Amazon, and Galápagos; each one with endemic weather, flora, 
and fauna. Yet, Ecuador faces different issues typical of developing nations. Throughout 
history, the nation has been a primary exporter of raw materials, including cacao beans, 
bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. The latter boomed around the 1970s when Texaco 
discovered “Oriente” crude oil in the Lago Agrio oilfield in the province of Sucumbíos.  
 Nowadays, oil is a vital resource all over the world. It remains a principal energy 
source that powers the great economies around the globe. By the same token, other 
countries rely on crude oil exports to sustain their economies. Currently a member of the 
OPEC, Ecuador is one of those countries whose economy is tied to the non-renewable 
resource. Oil exports contribute to at least 40% of the government’s budget and a great 
percentage of Ecuador’s GDP. Especially under the current government, Ecuador’s 
economy is extremely oil dependent.  
 Given the importance of crude oil especially in the government’s budget for 
generating revenues to use in important development programs, the state has always tried 
to influence the industry in one way or another. Through the years, Petroecuador, the 
state owned oil company, has strengthened its position, slowly dominating oil production. 
During the period 1990 to 2007, Ecuador experienced a wave of political instability, 
having ten different presidents in power, when the official term lasts four years. Even 
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though the presidents had diverse ideologies, most were inclined to the center-right of the 
political spectrum. Those presidents who belonged to leftist or populist parties ended up 
taking decisions that had rightist characteristics, except for Correa. Ecuador not only 
exited the OPEC oil cartel in 1992, but also became welcoming to major international 
private oil companies. Things changed in 2007 when President Correa rose to power. 
Being re-elected three times, Correa will be president until 2017, marking the end of the 
stability era. The “Revolución Ciudadana” started signified a complete shift to left-wing 
politics. Under the socialism of the 21st century, Ecuador reentered OPEC, reformed oil 
contracts, changed its relations with developed nations, and began a nationalist tendency. 
The changing political ideologies influence the oil industry, hence, Ecuador’s economy.  
Currently, Ecuador’s oil industry still experiences controversies linked to political 
decisions. The Yasuní National Park located in Ecuador’s Amazon region is one of the 
most unique places in the world with great biodiversity. The rainforest is home to many 
endemic protected species including reptiles, fish, amphibians, birds, insects, bats, trees, 
shrubs, and others. The Park, however, is also rich with black gold; it contains the ITT 
(Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha) oilfields. The block represents approximately 20% of 
Ecuador’s total crude oil reserves. After starting the Yasuní Initiative in 2007 to protect 
the National Park, things changed as the progress of the project was evaluated in 2013. 
Correa announced his intent of exploiting the ITT oilfields. The announcement caused 
huge turmoil locally and international, and if enough signatures were collected 
Ecuadorians would hold a popular vote about it. Experts were skeptical about the 
Initiative’s veracity, given that, at par, a new refinery, Refinería del Pacífico, was under 
construction. Ecuador’s proved reserves don’t justify investing in such an expensive 
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energy project. As a result, experts believe the original plan was to exploit ITT block 
regardless. The political and economic considerations that have led the current 
government to contemplate opening the new refinery and exploiting the ITT oil reserves 
present an ideal case study to examine the complex politics and economics that surround 
the modern oil industry.  
 The present case study attempts to answer this question: how and to what extent 
have political interventions affected the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until March 
2014? The purpose of the thesis, in turn, is to examine in detail how the political 
interventions have affected Ecuador’s oil industry and economy, focusing especially on 
the current government’s decisions regarding usage of the oil reserves. It also investigates 
the history of Ecuador’s membership and participation in the OPEC oil cartel, 
endeavoring to find explanations as to why Ecuador left the organization voluntarily in 
1992, while resuming membership in 2007. In this sense, the thesis establishes a 
historical context for the current state of Ecuador’s oil industry. It revises the era of 
political instability until President Correa came to power in 2007, converting in the 
longest running president in the last two decades. Under the current regime, the thesis 
explores the changes in oil contract law and relations with other nations, the controversial 
drilling of the ITT oilfields, and the construction of a new refinery. 
 The thesis is a detailed case study of the Ecuadorian oil industry, to thoroughly 
review, analyze, update, and evaluate the intersection of politics and economics in the oil 
industry for Ecuador for the last 24 years. Case studies are standard methods in Industrial 
Organizations, allowing the exploration of structural and background conditions that 
produce a given set of industrial outcomes and pricing/production decisions. The case 
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study consists of an extensive review and analysis of past studies, theses and 
dissertations, books, newspaper articles, and international organizations’ published data 
on the oil industry. Sources consulted are specific to Ecuador, OPEC, and the 
international oil industry in general. The information was collected from government and 
non-government related sources, in an effort to remain objective. Additionally, I 
conducted interviews with experts on the different oil fields in Ecuador, including 
politicians, sociologists, Ecuador history and economics professors, and professionals 
knowledgeable about the public and private oil sector and Yasuní National Park. Past 
studies have left gaps in their analyses, specifically excluding environmental and political 
considerations.  By the same token, studies were based on what have proven to be 
incorrect assumptions about the planned usage of the ITT oilfields, given the presidential 
change of decision in August 2013. After the material was been collected, synthesized, 
and analyzed, conclusions were made about the appropriate policy for Ecuador’s oil 
industry based on Industrial Organization theory. The case study is of value because it 
addresses the problem from a political, economic, social, and environmental perspective. 
 At the conclusion of my thesis, my findings include how Ecuador’s public policy 
failure, which derived from the political instability, shaped the market structure of the 
domestic oil industry. Developed nations that buy the crude oil benefit the most from the 
business transaction, not Ecuador, who actually possesses and produces the commodity. 
Crude oil prices present a complete paradox, since high oil prices benefit the developing 
nations that produce this resource by increasing their sales revenues, but adversely affect 
the developed nations that buy the good. In contrast, developed nations are able to profit 
low prices because they can obtain more volume of crude oil for less, but the economies 
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of the developing nations that have the oil are harmed terribly, especially in country as 
Ecuador, where oil is the backbone of the economy. The country’s economic history of 
reliance on primary products, such as cacao and bananas, is repeating itself with crude 
oil, since industrialization has not been reached yet. Ecuador only exports oil as a raw 
material, not any petroleum based processed product, leaving the latter to be produced by 
developed nations, only to be resold to Ecuador and other developing nations. This 
process has deterred the process of industrialization. Ecuador suffers from the Dutch 
disease because of its continual reliance on crude oil, a raw material, which has not 
allowed the country to achieve broad-based development. 
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Chapter	  2.	  OPEC	  and	  the	  Global	  Petroleum	  Industry	  
 
 The following chapter sets a background to the global petroleum industry. It will 
describe how the industry started and highlight main events that lead to the creation of 
OPEC as an organization that colludes for market share and oil prices. Given Ecuador’s 
current and past membership in the oil cartel, the chapter’s purpose is to provide a 
context on OPEC matters that are relevant to my study. In this sense, some parts of the 
general history of the global petroleum industry that Yergin covers, such as the boom of 
the oil industry in the USA during the 1870s, are omitted since they are not very relevant 
to my research. This chapter primarily focuses on the rise of OPEC during the 20th and 
21st centuries. 
Early	  Beginnings	  
 
Petroleum, or black gold, as it has been called, is a valuable natural resource. The 
dark liquid forms “when large quantities of dead organisms, usually zooplankton and 
algae, are buried underneath sedimentary rock and undergo intense heat and pressure”1. 
The resource was present in society since very ancient times. However, it was not until 
the 19th century that petroleum gained importance in economics and politics.  
Around the 1850s in northwestern Pennsylvania, a group led by the chemist 
Benjamin Silliman Jr. envisioned a new use for a substance called rock oil, which had 
been primitively gathered and used in “folk medicines believed to relieve everything 
from headaches, toothaches, and deafness to stomach upsets, worms, rheumatism, and 
                                                
1Jukić, A. (n.d.). Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Processes Presentation. Faculty of Chemical 
Engineering and Technology. Retrieved February 17, 2014, from 
http://www.fkit.unizg.hr/_download/repository/PRPP_2013_Crude_oil_composition.pdf 
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dropsy-and to heal wounds on the backs of horses and mules”2.  The group believed that 
exploiting rock oil on a larger scale could present a cheap, high quality liquid that could 
be burned to light lamps. This motivation led Silliman in 1854 to become the first person 
to distil petroleum. Since that time, the oil rush began and has not ceased. Today, oil is an 
iconic source of political and economic power. 
 
Figure	  2.1	  Real	  Price	  per	  Barrel	  of	  Crude	  oil,	  January	  1970	  –	  December	  2006	  
(2006	  Dollars)	  
	  
Source: Brock, J. W. (2009). The Petroleum Industry. The structure of American industry (12th ed., pp. 
31). Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
 
Crude oil operates in a world market, which can be explained looking at the 
fluctuations in price shown by Figure 2.1, meaning that global demand and other 
exogenous shocks the price of oil. Some of the major political impacts illustrated by the 
graph include the Arab-Israel War of 1973, the fall Iran Revolution in 1979 […], the First 
and Second Gulf Wars, and Hurricane Katrina in 2003.3 The Ecuadorian industry itself 
has been affected by different economic shocks including the nationalization of oil 
companies, the development of new oil fields, the vertical integration of national 
                                                
2 Yergin, D. (1991). The prize: the epic quest for oil, money, and power. (pp. 20) New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
3 Brock, J. W. (2009). The Petroleum Industry. The structure of American industry (12th ed., pp. 30). 
Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
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companies, the presence of multinational oil companies, the implementation of new 
technology, and the drive towards greener energy sources. 
 At the present day, petroleum is critical for thousands of industries and for all 
nations around the world. Worldwide, in 2011, around 89 million barrels of oil and liquid 
fuels were consumed per day, 32 billion barrels per year.4 The largest consumers are 
developed nations. In 2012, the top consumer was the USA with 18.5 millions of barrels 
per day, closely followed by China with 10.3 million barrels a day. Ecuador, on the other 
hand, consumed 210,000 barrels per day, while producing 500,000 barrels per day5.  
Structure	  
 
 The oil industry is one of the largest industries in the world. It includes four stages 
that are vertically related. The stages are not all served by the same companies, but the 
trends lately have been for firms to integrate vertically and perform all four stages, which 
include: 
 
• Production: involving the location, development and extraction of oil from the 
fields. Petroleum might required drilling or may be located close to the surface 
depending on the type of reservoir. 
• Refining: operations that turn the crude petroleum into derivatives that can be 
sold in the market. These include gasoline, fuel, and diesel, among others. 
                                                
4 FAQs: Oil. (n.d.). IEA: International Energy Agency. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from 
http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/oil/ 
5 Countries Oil Consumption. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics 
and Analysis. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=consumption 
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• Marketing: distribution of the petroleum based products to worldwide markets 
where consumers can acquire them. 
• Transportation: connection for all of the previous levels. After crude oil is 
pumped out of the oilfields, the raw material is transported to refineries in a 
system of pipelines and tankers. After the oil is transformed into other products in 
the refineries, it is again transported to the end customers. 
The	  Seven	  Sisters:	  International	  Majors	  	  
 
 After World War II, seven major companies controlled the oil industry. Enrico 
Mattei, an Italian public administrator active in the development of the oil industry in 
Italy, heavily criticized this “cartel”, as he called the group of companies. Mattei is 
attributed with naming this cartel the Seven Sisters. The group dominated at least 95% of 
the world’s oil reserves. Mattei wanted to share the profits of the Middle Eastern 
petroleum. Hence, Mattei wasn’t against the existence of the group, but rather concerned 
that his Italian company was not a part of it. The group was composed of: 
 
• Five USA based firms: Exxon, Texaco, Gulf, Mobil, and Chevron 
• Two UK based firms: Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum (BP) 
 
Oil experts claim that there actually was an eighth sister: the French Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles (CFP), which was also involved in the Iranian consortium along 
with the other Seven Sisters. However, because CFP didn’t fit as “Anglo-Saxon”, Mattie 
didn’t include it in the group. In terms of ownership, most of the companies were private 
 18 
except for BP and CFP that were partially owned by the government, exemplifying the 
public belief that oil is too important to be left to the oil companies.6  
 Mattei argued that the Seven Sisters functioned as a cartel because they 
maintained control through a system of joint ventures that divided the ownership of the 
firms exploiting the oil fields in the Middle East. These joint ventures were formed with 
the aid of the domestic governments of the companies. The US government helped 
reorganize Aramco (Arabian-American Oil Company) that produced oil in Saudi Arabia, 
into a joint venture between Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Chevron. The French 
government setup CFP to exploit their part of the Iraqi concession. The British 
government supervised an agreement to split the Kuwait concession between BP and 
Gulf. The latter was in contradiction to US Antitrust policy, but the Department of State 
claimed it was a matter of national security, so antitrust was disregarded. 
 The international companies were horizontally integrated in a very informal 
manner, where they not only had a common interest, but also shared information among 
them. The companies colluded in such a way that each one knew what the others were 
planning to do in the future, allowing output limitations. For instance, “partners in the 
Iraq Petroleum Company were obliged to file their requirements for crude oil five years 
in advance.”7 The situation allowed them to plan ahead of time, guaranteeing control over 
the exploration, development, marketing, and oil supply. Acting as an oligopolistic cartel, 
companies did not compete for price, but instead for marketing, brand development, and 
access to oil deposits. The interesting fact about this oligopolistic behavior is that it had 
the support of the different domestic governments of each major company. 
                                                
6 Sampson, A. (1991). The seven sisters: the great oil companies and the world they shaped. (pp. 68) 
Toronto: Bantam Books. 
7 Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 33) 
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Emergence	  of	  Independent	  Oil	  Companies	  
 
 The Seven Sisters had much influence over the price levels of oil, but they had no 
control over the entry of new independent firms. The profitable oil industry caught the 
eye of many different firms that sought to take advantage of the surge in demand of oil. 
Several independent oil firms emerged from 1950 until 1973, changing the balance of 
power in the industry. Governments in oil producing countries adopted policies that 
welcomed newcomers. Until then, the industry had been in the hands of the corporate 
oligopoly, but now the governments of the oil producing countries gained more power 
over the market.  
 The growing number of firms in the industry increased oil supply. Even when 
demand was growing at a fast rate, the excess supply adversely affected prices by 
pressuring them downward. The international majors couldn’t sustain the pressure for 
such low prices. On the other hand, governments of oil producing nations sold the oil 
with a tax at unchanging posted prices. The taxes were much higher than the equivalent 
transaction costs, which were actually falling. Altogether, it meant that larger proportions 
of the revenues went to the governments of oil producing countries. As a result, having 
new independent firms decreased the domination of the Seven Sisters over the oil 
industry. 
 The surpluses of oil continued and greater discounts over the posted prices 
followed. The discount on posted prices were a result of more aggressive marketing 
attempts by the Soviet Union, who wanted to increase their sales to the West. On August 
1960, [the Standard Oil of New Jersey cut USD 0.14 (7%) a barrel in posted crude oil 
prices. The announcement triggered a reaction that resulted in a meeting between 
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Abdullah Tariki (1919 – 1997, Saudi politician) and Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo (1939 – 
1979, Venezuelan politician and diplomat) to establish a new organization made up 
solely of oil exporting countries. Pérez Alfonzo had advocated an international 
association for many years, so he became ecstatic when it was actually happening. By 
September 14, the major exporting countries: Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and 
Iran, met and established a new entity: OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries.8 
 Establishing a new organization helped prevent further declines in the posted 
price of oil, but it was not able to recover the losses for the price decreases that had cause 
the formation of the organization. OPEC has received criticism ever since its creation. 
Stephen Martin, in his case study of the petroleum industry, argues, “It was the radical 
states, rather than OPEC, that led the way”9 to the shift in power. Martin’s theory is that 
the control of the world market away from the Seven Sisters and other international 
majors to the oil producing countries would have happened regardless of the creation of 
OPEC.  
 
The	  Organization	  of	  Petroleum	  Exporting	  Countries	  –	  OPEC	  
 
 OPEC was born in 1960 with the intention of defending the price of oil. The 
members constantly asked corporations to consult with the organization before making 
decisions on price that could affect the revenues of oil producing countries. To sustain the 
price levels, OPEC also lobbied for a system to regulate production. Additionally, the 
                                                
8 Yergin, D. (1991). (pp. 521) 
9 Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 36) 
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organization aimed for solidarity among the members in case the international majors 
retaliated against any of them. 
 OPEC’s members at that time, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran, 
were the source of approximately 80% of the world’s oil exports. OPEC Deputy 
Secretary General, Fadhil al-Chalabi, commented that the organization was “the first 
collective act of sovereignty on the part of the oil exporters, the first turning point in the 
international economic relations towards the states’ control over natural resources.”10 
Nevertheless, at the time of its creation, the Seven Sisters didn’t believe it would work 
and didn’t take it seriously. 
 During the first decade of its existence, OPEC did not have many 
accomplishments. It had succeeded at stopping companies from taking abrupt decisions 
about oil without consultation and that the posted price is not cut again. In reality, for a 
long time, most of the member countries had limited control since the ground reserves 
were property of the concessionaries, expect for Iran. The latter combined with the excess 
surplus made it somewhat impossible for nations to alienate the companies, since they 
depended on them for market access. 
OPEC members pursued the same economic goal of increasing their own 
revenues, but their political interests diverged, which gave rise to internal rivalries. For 
this reason, OPEC has had a hard time acting as a monopoly or a perfectly colluding 
cartel. Iraq suspended its membership when Kuwait gained independence from Britain. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia were envious of each other since they were the major producers. 
OPEC was only able to take advantage of demand because of political events rather than 
economic coordination, surrounded by US import quotas, Russian oil exports, and 
                                                
10 Yergin, D. (1991). (pp. 523) 
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competition. OPEC’s founding father, Pérez Alfonzo, grew disappointed and resigned in 
1963, since his mission of bringing together the oil producers was accomplished. In fact, 
he had a complete change of heart and referred to oil as “the excrement of the devil.” 
In 1973, oil-producing nations cut back supply to the international majors and to 
independent corporations. The independent companies turned to bid in the spot market 
for oil, increasing prices, ultimately, driving official OPEC prices up as well. Because 
demand for oil was also on the rise, OPEC revenue “rose from USD13.7 billion in 1972 
to USD 87.2 billion in 1974.”11  
 
Petroleum	  in	  the	  Less	  Developed	  Countries	  
 
 Oil production of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia, has risen over the past years. The international majors lost many of their 
concessions in the Middle East after OPEC was formed, so they searched for oil 
anywhere outside OPEC for the precious black gold. Companies exploited the benefits of 
oil until its development costs are below the spot market price for the resource. 
 In Latin America, oil production has continued to expand since the 1970s. 
According to the American Petroleum Institute, output grew from 1,789 million barrels in 
1974 to 2,487 million barrels in 1990 and 3,926 million in 2005. Martin predicts that this 
trend will continue. Despite its membership in OPEC, Venezuela expanded its oil 
reserves by aggressively acquiring refineries and moving into trade agreements. By the 
same token, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia seek to expand their oil networks and 
industries, either by cooperating with international oil companies or signing joint 
ventures with other oil producing countries.  
                                                
11 Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 39) 
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Most of the LDCs depend on foreign companies for the development of their oil 
reserves. Politicians vouch for the exploitation of oil, even if the development costs are 
greater than the spot market price, because their budgets depend on the revenues from the 
exploitation. This is exactly the case of Ecuador, a country whose economy heavily relies 
on the oil industry. For this reason, international majors will always be welcome in new 
fields all around the world. In this sense, many times oil is exploited more for political 
rather than economic reasons. 
Just as the success of the international majors triggered the entry of new 
independent firms, the birth of OPEC motivated the discovery and development of new 
oil fields in different countries around the globe. International majors sought to profit 
from the newly oil producing countries. The latter weakened OPEC’s power, which 
sparked for the organization to take action. As a result, vertical integration between 
OPEC members and oil companies became the new trend. 
 
Integration	  
 
 Market performance is threatened by the changes in oil supply. Oil firms merge, 
integrate or restructure, hoping to have long-term impacts that reduce their costs. In order 
to compete with the international majors, state owned companies are integrating forward, 
including production, refining, and distribution. Nevertheless, in some states, 
international companies are allowed to return, but with much stricter terms to develop 
new reserves.  
  In the most recent era of the petroleum industry, mergers have become very 
popular. In 1998, Exxon and Mobil proposed and were approved to consolidate their 
operations by the US Federal Trade Commission. At the turn of the century, in 2001, 
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Texaco and Chevron joined to form the third largest US Oil Company. The trend to 
merge between private companies is a result of the vertical integration and diversification 
of state owned companies like Venezuela’s PDVSA and Brazil’s Petrobras. 
 Behind the forward integration and diversification lay a composite of economic 
and political reasons. States want to capitalize their assets and skills by diversifying into 
other activities rather than solely oil exploitation.  Government owned refineries provide 
the countries with a competitive advantage. The real cost of crude oil to the integrated 
refiner is the cost of crude production […]. But the cost of crude oil to an independent, 
nonintegrated refiner is the much higher market price for crude oil.12 
One of the major problems that oil-producing nations are encountering nowadays 
is the exploration and development of new reserves. The procedures are of high risky and 
very expensive, especially for LDCs. In this case, it becomes much more attractive to 
work the international majors. 
Conduct	  
 
 Oil producing nations favor high oil prices. Their argument is based on the 
scarcity of the resource and its impact on future generations. Oil prices have fluctuated 
over the past century. Surplus, the Seven Sisters, OPEC, independent oil firms, and other 
events are just some of the reasons for the high variation in prices. Generally, low prices 
favor the developed nations as they can obtain higher volumes of oil for less money. 
This, however, adversely affects the economies of LDCs, which, in contrast, favor high 
prices to increase their GDP. Oil pricing is antithetical. 
                                                
12 Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 45) 
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“Some analysts have suggested that the world oil industry is driven by a single 
dominant firm: Saudi Arabia.”13 As of 2012, according to the US Energy Information 
Administration, Saudi Arabia had 267,02 billion barrels14 in proven reserves of crude oil, 
around 20% of the world’s reserves. The state could actually dominate the entire market, 
reduce output and have prices increase.  
Despite the fact that OPEC’s individual members don’t have enough power to 
manipulate price, the organization as a whole can behave as a collusive leader. 
Throughout the years, however, OPEC has lost market share, primarily due to the long 
queues implied for the development of new reserves. In the last century, offering lower 
prices, market share has stabilized at around 40%. 
OPEC	  as	  a	  Cartel	  
 
 Headquartered in Vienna (Austria), OPEC is an oil cartel that coordinates policies 
among member countries to secure oil supply to the consumers and rents for its members. 
As of today, OPEC has 12 members: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela15. OPEC 
operates by setting production quotas for its members, controlling oil supply, and, thus, 
setting prices. The cartel is inclined to increase supply when prices increase above the 
production costs. However, it is very difficult to coordinate actions because of the cartel 
nature of the organization. Incentives to cheat, i.e. not adhering to the agreements of 
OPEC are great, since the member states push their profit making interests forward. 
                                                
13 Ibid. (pp. 45) 
14 Countries Proved Reserves. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics 
and Analysis. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=reserves 
15 Member Countries. (n.d.). OPEC. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm 
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LDCs with low GDP per capita, large populations, and small oil reserves lobby for 
economic development through the maximization of their oil profits, with high pressured 
of their local governments. 
 OPEC’s bargaining power comes from the production capacity of each of its 
members. For instance, in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, both nations ceased 
production, but Saudi Arabia was able to fill the missing output because the nation had a 
greater production capacity. Different political and economic conflicts arise between the 
member states. Gabon and Ecuador withdrew from the cartel in the 1990s, but Ecuador 
returned in 2007. The role of Ecuador in OPEC will be addressed in the following 
chapter. 
 OPEC’s quotas have fluctuated throughout the years, hoping to have some type of 
influence over the world price. However, as Martin states, “The price of crude oil is not 
trending upward because OPEC is cutting back the supply of crude oil. The price of crude 
oil is rising because the world demand for energy is increasing.”16 The cartel has not been 
able to control the market, yet it has taken advantage of the different price increases and 
opportunities. OPEC’s lack of dominance comes from imperfect collusion, i.e., the 
inability to adhere to agreements due to self-interest. 
 
Oil:	  The	  Black	  Gold	  or	  Curse?	  
 
 Oil, the black gold, is one of the most important resources in our society today. 
Oil is valuable, hence its nickname of “black gold”. It powers the majority of the 
industrial world and is a source of economic income for many nations and companies. 
However, oil also brings out the worst of civilization, as it is the source for many political 
                                                
16 Brock, J. W. (2009) (pp. 51) 
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disputes, wars, and invasions. One of the most problematic sources of energy, in terms of 
geographic distribution, supply, drive for power, price control, temptation to cheat, etc. 
Over the years, “creativity, dedication, entrepreneurship, ingenuity, and technical 
innovation have coexisted with avarice, corruption, blind political ambition, and brute 
force.”17 It is the age of oil.  
                                                
17 Yergin, D. (1991). (pp. 781) 
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Chapter	  3.	  The	  Oil	  Industry	  in	  Ecuador	  
The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Ecuadorian	  oil	  industry	  
 
In Ecuador, oil is a key resource for the economy and one of its main sources of 
income. Between 1972 and 2006, oil accounted for 48% of the country’s exports, and 
between 1995 and 2004, it generated a third of the government’s income.18 In 2011, the 
income from oil represented 41% of the Government’s budget19. Sánchez (2009) and 
many other experts on the field would have described the nature of Ecuador’s economy 
as being extremely oil dependent. 
As mentioned above, today Ecuador is a member of the OPEC oil cartel. The 
country is one of the smallest members of the cartel, thus, being compelled to agree to 
production quotas and prices determined by the most powerful members, such as Saudi 
Arabia. Ecuador originally joined OPEC in 1973, but withdrew voluntarily in 1992, 
mainly due to political reasons that will be explored below. In 2007, under the leadership 
of President Rafael Correa, Ecuador again joined the OPEC. The latter decision caused 
controversy, given the leftist ideology that the president holds.  
Oil production in Ecuador began in the first quarter of the twentieth century. In 
1925, the British company Anglo began the oil exploitation at the Santa Elena Peninsula 
located in the Coastal region. Nevertheless, the “oil boom” really took off in the 1970s, 
with 1.570 barrels per day. The industry consolidated in 1972 as Ecuador not only 
                                                
18 Sánchez, J. A. (2009). La Iniciativa Yasuní - Ishpingo - Tambococha - Tiputini y su impacto en la 
Economía Ecuatoriana. Tesis para obetenr el título de Maestría en Ciencias Sociales con mención 
en Economía Ecológica, (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales - Sede Ecuador), (pp. 4 
– 5) 
19 Dependencia del crudo se profundiza (2012, June 5). El Comercio. Retrieved September 3, 2013, from 
http://www.elcomercio.com/negocios/Dependencia-crudo-profundiza_0_712728985.html 
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produced oil for national consumption, but also exported it, which allowed the country to 
participate in international trade, increasing the national revenue.20 Many different events 
have occurred in the industry since. In 2012, production increased to 500.60 thousand 
barrels per day. Ecuador has approximately 8.24 million barrels of crude oil reserves, the 
largest ones in South America after Venezuela and Brazil.21 Today, the industry has 
become a source of controversy in different aspects. Recently, President Correa 
announced the decision to exploit the ITT (Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha) oil fields, 
located in the Yasuní National Park. 
Yasuní is located on the eastern side of Ecuador, in the Napo and Pastaza 
provinces of the Amazon region. With an area of 9,820 sq. km, the Park houses the ITT 
oil fields that contain around 20% of Ecuador’s reserves, i.e., 800 million barrels of crude 
oil. The issue relies on the fact that the National Park is one of the most bio-diverse 
places on the planet with incredibly rich flora and fauna, having different species of trees, 
shrubs, reptiles, amphibians, fish, birds, insects, bats, and other endemic protected 
species22. One hectare of the Park contains 644 species of trees, which is as many tree 
species as in North America.23 In June 2007, President Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative, an attempt to protect the park’s oil reserves if the international community 
rewarded Ecuador with compensation. Nevertheless, after an evaluation of the Initiative, 
                                                
20 Naravez, F. (2007). Impacto de la comercialización externa de petróleo y derivados en la economía 
nacional y propuesta de implementación de fuentes energéticas renovables. Tesis presentada 
como requisito para optar al Título de Máster en Seguridad y Desarrollo, -. Retrieved February 
20, 2014, from http://repositorio.iaen.edu.ec/bitstream/24000/88/1/IAEN-030-2007.pdf 
21 Ecuador - Overview. (n.d.). U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and 
Analysis. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EC 
22 Global Conservation Significance of Ecuador's Yasun√≠ National Park. (n.d.). PLOS ONE: accelerating 
the publication of peer-reviewed. Retrieved September 3, 2013, from 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0008767 
23 El Parque Nacional Yasuní. (n.d.). Amazonia por la Vida. Retrieved September 4, 2013, from 
http://www.amazoniaporlavida.org/es/Parque-nacional-Yasuni/el-parque-nacional-yasuni.html 
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President Correa stated on August 16th 2013 in a news conference: “the world has failed 
us,”24 calling the world’s powerful countries “hypocrites”, and stopping the initiative to 
protect Yasuní. The new policy on Ecuador’s ITT reserves will alter the national oil 
industry and ecology.  
Currently, Ecuador has three small and outdated refineries run by Petroecuador 
EP, the state owned oil company: Refinería Esmeraldas, Refinería Libertad, and 
Complejo Industrial Shushufindi. Nevertheless, their capacity is not enough for the 
number of barrels produced per day. For this reason, a project for a new refinery was 
presented and approved under the current presidential regime. On June 2013, the 
government issued an official communication25 announcing “Refinería del Pacífico – 
Eloy Alfaro”, would be completed by 2017 and is to be an emblematic project of the 
country’s energy plan. Creamer (2010) commented on the highly elevated costs of the 
energy project, the most expensive one in Ecuador’s history with an approximate cost of 
USD 12.5 millions. The refinery is being constructed under a joint venture between 
Ecuador and Venezuela’s state oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.). In the joint 
venture, Petroecuador (Ecuador’s state-run oil company) will have a 51% stake in the 
refinery and PDVSA will have the rest. Additionally, Jorge Glas, Ecuador’s Vice 
President, commented in the televised weekly government report: “We've worked to have 
a third partner [...] and this third partner will be no one more and no one less than the 
biggest oil company in the world, China's CNPC (China National Petroleum Corp).”26 
                                                
24 Yasuni: Ecuador abandons plan to stave off Amazon drilling. (2013, August 15). The Guardian. 
Retrieved September 2, 2013, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-
abandons-yasuni-amazon-drilling 
25 Refinería del Pacífico estará lista el 2017. (2013, June 29). Presidencia de la República del Ecuador. 
Retrieved September 4, 2013, from http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/refineria-del-pacifico-estara-
lista-el-2017/ 
26 Valencia, A. (n.d.). Ecuador says China's CNPC joins $12 billion refinery project| Reuters. Business & 
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Both PDVSA and Petroecuador agreed to finance 30% of the project, relying on external 
partners, like CNPC, for the remainder. Opinions vary on the Chinese-Venezuelan 
collaboration and the drilling of the ITT fields to justify the huge investment in the 
refinery. Industry observers have raised questions about whether the refinery is being 
built to utilize the oil to be extracted from the Yasuní fields or whether the plan to extract 
oil from the Yasuní fields is prompting the investment in the new refinery.27    
Problem	  of	  Investigation	  
 
The majority of case studies about petroleum focus on the largest and most 
influential members of OPEC, that is to say, the Middle Eastern countries. However, 
smaller members like Ecuador have been disregarded. The present case study will focus 
on the political interventions that affected Ecuador’s oil industry and economy, especially 
focusing on the current government’s decision about the ITT oil reserves.  
This thesis examines in detail how Ecuador’s shifting political ideologies have 
influenced the oil industry, in turn affecting the country’s economy. Having ten 
presidents in the last twenty years, Ecuador is known for its political instability, which 
has had a large impact on the oil industry. Ecuador’s OPEC participation and 
membership is another area that will be explored, attempting to find connections with 
politics.  
After reviewing the historical context for the current state of Ecuador’s petroleum 
industry, the case study focuses on the current regime, because President Correa is the 
longest running president in the last two decades. Correa’s regime began in 2007 and he 
                                                                                                                                            
Financial News, Breaking US & International News | Reuters.com. Retrieved September 4, 2013, 
from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/06/us-ecuador-refinery-cnpc- 
idUSBRE9650CN20130706 
27 Ibid. 
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is still the president at this moment of writing this thesis. In this sense, the case study also 
analyzes Correa’s decision to drill the ITT oil fields and the construction of the Pacific 
Refinery “Eloy Alfaro” as a partnership with Venezuela and China. Therefore, the case 
study attempts to answer: How and to what extent have political interventions affected 
the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until 2013?  
Ecuador has continually relied on the export of primary products. The country 
exports the raw materials to developed countries that, in turn, transform the products into 
industrialized goods for the development of their economies. My hypothesis for this 
study is that Ecuador suffers from the Dutch disease because of the country’s reliance on 
crude oil, a primary raw product, which, together with its political instability, has 
impeded broad-based economic development. The Dutch disease is an economic 
phenomenon that affects small resource-rich countries; the increased reliance on the 
exploitation of one natural resource, leads to decreased manufacturing and an increasing 
dependence on import for industrialized goods. The latter is Ecuador’s situation with the 
export crude oil and the import of petroleum-based products. 
Based on Scherer and Ross’s Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm displayed 
in Appendix 1, I expect to find that Ecuador’s public policy failed because of the political 
instability, which influenced the market structure of the domestic oil industry. I expect to 
find reasons that explain why consumers in the developed countries benefit more than 
Ecuador a developing nation that produces the oil. Ecuador’s political instability has 
caused an industry conduct where the country’s economy heavily relies on crude oil as a 
raw material. The country, however, has not been able to benefit fully from the export of 
 33 
this primary product, which deters the process industrialization and, hence, economic 
development. 
Method	  
 
 In industrial organization, according to Waldman and Jensen (2007), there are two 
major approaches: the SCP (Structure-Conduct-Performance) approach and the Chicago 
School approach. Case studies in SCP are more empirically oriented. Developed by 
Mason and Bain in the 1940s and 1950s, this method “hypothesized that basic market 
conditions determine market structure, market structure determines conduct, and conduct 
determines performance.”28 Additionally, the government is also a critical component 
influence structure, conduct, and performance. Shepherd and Shepherd point out in The 
Economics of Industrial Organization (2004) that case studies have become a standard 
method for exploring the structural and background conditions that produce a given set of 
industrial outcomes and pricing/production decisions. In studying the oil industry, where 
the structural, political, environmental, and other background factors vary so much from 
country to country, case studies are essential in examining the standard structure / 
conduct / performance trajectory of an industry, in preparation for evaluating the 
important policy considerations and the impact on consumer welfare. As mentioned 
above, the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm 29  demonstrates how political 
actions are key in affecting the structure and conduct of the main players in Ecuador’s oil 
industry. For this reason, this study consists of a detailed case study of the Ecuadorian oil 
                                                
28 Waldman, D. E., & Jensen, E. J. (2007). Two Approaches to the Study of Industrial Organization. 
Industrial organization: theory and practice (3rd ed., pp. 4). Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley. 
29 See Appendix 1 
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industry, thoroughly reviewing, analyzing, updating, and evaluating the intersection of 
politics and economics in the oil industry for Ecuador for the last 24 years.  
 Case studies represent a qualitative research method that requires consulting 
multiple sources of evidence30. Sources are specific to Ecuador and its oil industry, 
OPEC, and, more generally, to the international oil industry. Consequently, my source 
material consists of an extensive review and analysis of past studies, theses and 
dissertations, books, newspaper articles, and international organizations’ published data 
on the oil industry. The information was collected from government and non-government 
related sources, in an effort to compare and contrast both the public and private 
standpoints to be able to analyze the information objectively. Much of this material is 
published in Spanish; as a result, I had to translate the information in order to use it in 
this study. Additional information was gathers from interviews with experts in Ecuador 
from the industry and academia. 
Books	  
 
 Among the books consulted for the elaboration of the case study are Daniel 
Yergin’s The Prize (1991) and James Brock’s The Structure of American Industry (2009) 
for data on the evolution of the oil industry worldwide and OPEC’s role in it. By the 
same token, Breve Historia Económica del Ecuador (2006) by Ecuadorian author Alberto 
Acosta was used as a source to Ecuador’s economic background, the history of the 
various booms of the economy, and the presidential influences in parts of the analyzed 
period. In January 2013, Fernando Villavicencio (researcher, independent journalist, 
author, and political activist and anti-corruption) published Ecuador Made In China. The 
                                                
30 Soy, S. K. (n.d.). The Case Study as a Research Method. University of Texas at Austin. Retrieved 
September 3, 2013, from https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm 
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book gained popularity as it promised to denounce the hidden side of the oil businesses 
with China unknown to the Ecuadorians. Villavicencio “details the direct oil sales 
agreements between Ecuador, China and Venezuela, and denounces the participation of 
several companies and states as intermediaries in these transactions, thus hurting the 
economy of the country.”31 Linking the oil industry with the ITT fields at Yasuní 
National Park, Matthieu Le Quang comments about the Initiative in Dejar el petróleo bajo 
tierra (Leave the oil underground - 2013). On the other hand, Ecuadorian sociologist 
Sergio Vélez Valarezo, whom I had the chance to interview, classifies the Initiative as 
utopian in Yasuní-ITT Situación y Perspectivas (Yasuní-ITT Situation and Perspectives - 
2013). 
Interviews	  
 
Coupled with the published sources of information, I conducted interviews in the 
second week January 2014 in Quito, with experts on Ecuador’s oil industry. The 
interviews were conducted in Spanish; they were recorded and the digital audios files can 
be found on Appendix 7. However, being a Spanish native speaker, I have translated the 
direct quotes into the body of the thesis. The people interviewed were closely selected 
and include experts in Political Science, Law, Economics, Sociology, Petroleum 
Engineering, Consulting, and in the public and private sectors of oil. The experts 
interviewed for this thesis and their background are described next. Their resumes in 
Spanish and interview guides are attached in Appendix 2. 
                                                
31 EcuadorTimes. (2013, January 30). Fernando Villavicencio presents his revealing book “Ecuador: Made 
in China”. EcuadorTimes. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from 
http://www.ecuadortimes.net/2013/01/30/fernando-villavicencio-presents-his-revealing-book-
ecuador-made-in-china-2/ 
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• Luis Alfredo García, MS. Economist García obtained his Bachelors Degree in 
Economics at Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1975. After specializing in the 
Elaboration and Evaluation of Investment Projects at the Inter-American Bank for 
Development in 1976, he obtained a Master of Science in Petroleum Economics 
at Colorado School of Mines in 1979. Economist García has worked for the 
Ministry of Energy in Ecuador, Petroecuador, Tripetrol Oil Trading, and Anglo. 
Currently, he is a commercial agent and adviser for Shell Trading Co. and Shell 
Western Supply and Trading. In his interview, I discussed the oil industry from 
the perspective of the private sector, the economics of the industry, and demand 
trends for the energy resource.  
• Pablo Lucio Paredes, Ph.D. Doctor in Economics with 28 years of experience in 
the academic, consulting, entrepreneur, and communications areas. He has also 
been the author of many books and articles along the years. In 1981, he obtained 
his Masters and DEA in Nuclear Physics at the Université Paris. Later, in 1985, 
Dr. Paredes got his Doctorate in Applied Economics at the Institut d’Études 
Politiques Paris. He was the Planning Secretary for the Government of President 
Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1993). As a consultant, he has worked for the Inter-
American Bank for Development, World Bank, CAF, Central Bank of Ecuador, 
and other national and international organisms. He has also been involved in the 
realm of politics as a member of the National Assembly. Currently, he is the 
Director of the Institute of Economics and a professor at Universidad San 
Francisco de Quito. Dr. Paredes discussed the economics involved in the oil 
industry and how the shifts in political ideologies influenced the industry as a 
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whole. Additionally, he commented on the evolution of the relationships with 
different oil producing countries. 
• Segundo Rodríguez Acosta, MBA. BE. Petroleum engineering graduate from 
Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1976. In 2001, he obtained his MBA at 
Universidad Central del Ecuador. He began to work in the public sector in 1978 at 
the Gas Plant at Complejo Industrial Shushufindi. He has worked primarily for 
the state-owned oil company Petroproducción and Petroecuador. He is a professor 
at Universidad Central del Ecuador for Operations Research, Project Design and 
Evaluation, Process Management, and Mathematics. Segundo Rodríguez was able 
to discuss about the dynamics of the industry from the perspective of the public 
sector, especially about the changes there have been in the company and how 
decisions and projects are managed.  
• Esteban Santos, L.M.A. LL.M. obtained his Law Bachelors Degree at 
Universidad San Francisco de Quito in 2008. In 2009, Dr. Santos obtained his 
Master of Arts in Integration with a mention in International Economic                                   
Negotiations. Later on, in 2010, he completed his Master of Law at the Graduate 
Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) and Law Faculty at 
the University of Geneva. Currently, he is a civil litigation specialized lawyer at 
Izurieta Mora Bowen Law Firm and a professor of Contemporary Political 
Theory, Negotiation II, and International Organisms at Universidad de las 
Américas – Quito. Dr. Santos discussed the new legislation affecting the oil 
industry, the trade relationships with the international majors, OPEC membership, 
Ecuador’s politics, and the future of the oil industry in the country. 
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• Fernando Santos Alvite, Doctor in Law, graduated from Universidad Central 
del Ecuador in 1968. Dr. Santos has worked for the oil industry in the private and 
public sectors. In the private realm, he has performed advising for Amoco, 
Occidental Petroleum Company (OXY), Santa Fe, CNPC, and BHP for their 
operations in Ecuador. In the public sector, he worked for OPEC in Vienna from 
1976 to 1984 as the Chief of the unit for Legal Studies. In 1984, Dr. Santos 
returned to Ecuador to be the Vice Minister of Energy and Mines; in 1986 he was 
promoted to Minister, position he held until 1987. He has performed consulting 
for the World Bank for the energy reform in Ecuador. Dr. Santos is also involved 
in academics, being an Economic Law professor at Universidad de las Américas. 
Aside from teaching and being a lawyer, starting in 2005, Dr. Santos is the 
director of LAFARGE CEMENTOS S.A., an important Ecuadorian cement 
company.  Additionally, he is an arbitrator at the Centers of Arbitration of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Quito and the American Ecuadorian Chamber of 
Commerce. During his interview, we discussed how each government has 
approached the oil industries and what changes have been made throughout the 
years, the controversial Yasuní-ITT oil fields, as well as the future of the industry. 
• Sergio Vélez Valarezo, Ph.D. Sociologist and Political Scientist, graduated from 
Universidad Central del Ecuador in 1973. Later on, he specialized in Strategic 
Planning, and Scientific and Technology Policies at the University of Brasilia 
(Ministry of Science and Technology of Brazil). In 1989, Dr. Vélez obtained his 
Masters in Philosophy at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, and in 
2009, obtained a Doctorate in Philosophy at the same University. He has 
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experience in the private and the public sector. Also, he authored different books 
and publications. His most recent work published in October 2013: Yasuní-ITT 
Sitaución y Perspectivas is directly related to the topic of this thesis. In the 
interview with Dr. Vélez we discussed relevant historical, political, and social 
events in the oil industry. We also talked about his opinion of the current 
government and different aspects covered in his most recently published book. 
Given the importance of interviews for my thesis, it is also relevant to discuss 
how the above experts were selected and contact to ask for their collaboration. During the 
early stages of the thesis, I knew I had to select a group of people that would have 
different backgrounds and knowledge about the oil industry. In Ecuador, I have family 
connections in the private sector academia. After talking to a couple of faculty members 
at UDLA’s (Universidad de las Américas) campus in Quito, through networking, I was 
able to establish connections with Luis Alfredo García, Segundo Rodríguez, Esteban 
Santos, and Fernando Santos Alvite who, after reading my proposal, agreed to collaborate 
with my thesis. Contacting Economist Paredes, however, was different. In June 2013, I 
assisted to a cycle of Economics conferences where Economist Paredes was one of the 
main presenters. He is a very renowned economist and I had always admired him. For 
this reason, when I started working on my thesis, I contacted him seeking for his 
collaboration, and, fortunately, he agreed. All the interviewed experts were carefully 
selected so that I would be able to get broad and objective perspective about Ecuador’s 
oil industry. 
My	  Contribution	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 Oil is a very important resource for my country, as the evidence clearly suggests. 
Due to its relevance, it has always been in the public eye and regulated by the state. For 
this reason, political interventions have made the industry very dynamic. Studies in the 
past have left gaps in the analysis, especially in respect to the environmental and political 
considerations. Also, the studies were under the assumption that President Correa’s 
Yasuní’s Initiative was going to be respected, but after the announcement in August 
2013, many things will change. The decision to exploit the ITT fields is a great source of 
controversy, turmoil, and concern for Ecuadorians and for the International community. 
In Ecuador, many protests and signature collection events have taken place so far. The 
present case study would serve as a source of information for other researchers interested 
in the topic. The case study is of special interest because it synthesizes and combines 
data, from published sources and unpublished interview information that I gathered, 
concerning the political, economic, social, and environmental aspects of the oil industry 
in Ecuador. 
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Chapter	  4.	  The	  case	  of	  Ecuador	  1990	  –	  2014	  
 
 Ecuador is a small democratic republic in northwest South America, between 
Colombia and Peru. As of 2012, in an area of 283,561 sq. km.32, the nation houses 15.49 
million inhabitants.33 UNESCO declared Quito, the capital, a World Heritage site in 
1978. The country’s name comes from the equator line, which cuts it unevenly, leaving 
most of it in the Southern Hemisphere. From north to south, the Andes mountain range 
divides continental Ecuador in three regions: Costa, Sierra, and Amazonía (Coast, 
Highlands, and Amazon). The Galápagos Islands comprise a fourth region located in the 
Pacific Ocean, west of the continent. According to the Fourth National Report of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Ecuador is the most biodiverse country in the world 
per unit area, housing many endemic species in flora and fauna. The country is also rich 
in natural resources, oil being the most important one for the Ecuadorian economy. 
Nevertheless, it has been plagued with political instability, causing the office to change 
frequently throughout history. Ten different presidents have governed Ecuador in the last 
twenty-three years. Correa has been in power ever since implementing the “Revolución 
Ciudadana” (Citizens’ Revolution) as part of the Socialism of the 21st Century political 
ideology that currently dominates South American.  
This particular chapter will give a brief background on Ecuador’s economic 
history as an exporter of cacao, bananas, and oil. The purpose is to get a better 
understanding of the country’s general context, based on published sources of 
                                                
32 Ecuador. (n.d.). CIA The World Factbook. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html 
33 Ecuador. (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved March 8, 2014, from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador 
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information. Later, I combine the data with unpublished sources, i.e., interviews, to 
investigate the last two decades of the Ecuadorian oil industry. 
Brief	  History	  of	  Economic	  “Booms”	  in	  Ecuador	  
 
 Ecuador is a country rich in natural resources. Having natural resources is 
regarded as positive for any country. Nevertheless, the counterpart, i.e., the negative 
aspect, is always forgotten. In my interview with Eco. Paredes, he reassured that Ecuador 
and many other LDCs suffer from the Dutch disease, or what other people call the natural 
resource curse.  Countries rich in commodities or natural resources tend to lack sustained 
economic growth and development, with masses of impoverished people. The society 
becomes more dependent on only one product. Ecuador’s economy has peaked at 
different points in history, having three notable “booms”: cacao beans, banana, and oil. 
Natural resources, however, have been both a blessing and a curse. Throughout history, 
Ecuador has been an exporter of primary products, but it has not yet become 
industrialized. In Ecuador: De Banana Republic a la No República (Ecuador: From the 
Banana Republic to the No Republic 2009), current President Rafael Correa, writes about 
how Ecuador, a country that produces cacao beans imports chocolate, and a country that 
is an oil exporter, imports gasoline.  
Throughout economic history, Ecuador’s economy has relied mainly on primary 
products including cacao, bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. Developed nations have 
benefited from the latter as they can purchase raw materials at lower prices and convert 
them into industrialized goods for the growth of their economies. Today, Ecuador’s 
economy is focused on the production and export of crude oil. However, the country’s 
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continual reliance on crude oil, a primary-raw product, has caused Ecuador to suffer from 
the Dutch disease, which impedes broad-based economic development. 
The	  Cacao	  Heights	  
 
 Ecuador’s economy peaked at the end of the 19th century with the export of cacao 
beans. By the end of 1866, cacao beans exports exceeded five million dollars. In addition 
to cacao beans, other primary products also emerged: ivory nuts, coffee, leather, and 
rubber. Demand for cacao and other tropical products had increased in the global market 
due to available funds from the North American and European populations. Ecuador had 
natural conditions of land and a cheap labor force to meet the growing demand for the 
product. The revenues from the exports benefited the privileged social classes of the 
Coastal region who owned the land, a small oligopolistic group. Cacao or the golden seed 
inserted Ecuador to the global economy, helping the country reach an economic 
recuperation. Nevertheless, instead of accumulating capital for the development of other 
economic activities, the revenues were used to expand the rudimentary production of the 
resource, and to finance the elites’ expenditures at luxury-imported goods, fostering 
capital outflow. The industry was very profitable with an uneven distribution of wealth, 
but it was also very vulnerable to competition from other countries that had been former 
European colonies. As other countries entered the industry, surplus increased, pushing 
down the prices (Acosta, 2006).  
The industry began to be crippled in 1914 with WWI. The Hamburg port in 
Germany, used to deliver most of the imported Ecuadorian cacao beans, was closed. 
After WWI, around 1920, the price continued to fall, reducing Ecuador’s revenue. At the 
same time, Ecuador was hit by natural disasters such as floods, droughts, and other 
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plagues that especially afflicted single crop farming. In 1924, cacao prices rose again, but 
because of the plagues, Ecuador was not able to gain back the lost market share. 
Banana	  Boom	  
 
 The production and export of banana saved Ecuador’s economy from falling into 
a depression by the end of the 1940s. There was an improvement from the previous 
experience with cacao beans, because agricultural borders were extended to include small 
and medium banana farms, allowing the agricultural class to rise. Once again, foreign 
demand impelled the specialization in banana production, which affected Ecuador’s 
economy and society. Being an agricultural product, Ecuador had the natural conditions 
for banana production, just as it happened with cacao.  
When WWII ended, a combination of structural events improved Ecuador’s 
comparative advantage. The state played a key role during this boom. In 1950, the Sucre 
(Ecuador’s former currency) was devaluated in order to make the country’s exports more 
competitive. Unlike during the cacao boom, the state reinvested the gains obtained from 
the banana exports in other areas of the economy. During this time, government spending 
on infrastructure increased, attempting to aid the industrialization. The government 
intervention aided the rise of the middle class. The government-spending component of 
aggregate demand increased, especially on roads that facilitate national integration. 
Policies that sought an active involvement of Ecuador in the international economy were 
developed, fostering foreign direct investment. 
 The banana era expanded into different zones of the Coastal region aided by the 
improvement in transport infrastructure. It also fostered migration from the Sierra to the 
Coast, speeding the development of cities. The internal market was benefited with the 
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improvement of wage relations, the increase of public works, and the diversification of 
the economy. The latter is an important change from the cacao era monopolized the 
productive activities. At the end of the1950s, difficulties rose as the terms of trade for 
Ecuadorian bananas worsened. In 1964, three thousand banana properties with an average 
extension of 64 hectares existed. However, things were not ideal since there were 
constant conflicts between producers and exporters, which, later on, spiked a regional 
peasant movement. The economic issues peaked between 1964 and 1965, until in 1971 
the commercial balance had a deficit. In the 1990s, the market leaders were one domestic 
company, Noboa 44.1%, and four international ones: Standard Fruit 17.2%, Chiquita 
13.7%, Del Monte 7.8%, and Banacol 4.2% (Acosta, 2006). 
	  The	  Oil	  New	  Rich	  
 
 Ecuador’s oil reserves were rejected when they were first explored during the 
1950s, a time where it was more profitable to obtain the more easily refined oil from 
other regions like Saudi Arabia or Venezuela. Ecuador’s heavy crude oil is difficult to 
refine and punished by the market with a markdown in price. Nevertheless, as presented 
earlier, as those countries began to collude to weaken the power of the international oil 
majors, the companies went desperately seeking for reserves in other places. Ecuador 
became one of those attractive countries when in 1967 the Texaco-Gulf joint venture 
discovered “Oriente” type crude oil in the Amazon region in what became the “Lago 
Agrio #1” oil well, located in near the city of Nueva Loja (Sucumbíos province). As in 
the cacao and banana eras, external needs determined the exploitation of oil.  In this 
period, foreign direct investment grew significantly, peaking in 1971 at 162.1 million 
dollars. The 1970s was a period in which Ecuador entered the world oil market, because 
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of the revenues produced by the export of oil. Because of the high oil revenues, Ecuador 
became attractive for foreign banks, which regarded the country as a “new rich”. 
 During the 1970s, the Ecuadorian economy flourished, given the increase in the 
market price for oil from USD 3.83 per barrel in 1973 to USD13.40 in 1974. Ecuador’s 
increased financial resources, together with the world’s financial expansion, gave the 
country access to credits that the cacao and banana industries had not allowed. As a 
result, there was an accelerated process of indebtedness. The external debt grew from 
USD 260.8 million (16% of the GDP in 1971) to USD 5.87 billion (42% of the GDP in 
1981). By the end of the 1980s, for every USD 100 in exports, USD 71 was compromised 
by debt (Acosta, 2006). Industry was stimulated by the availability of resources, revenue 
from the exportation of oil (known as “petrodollars”), and foreign credits. Even when 
industry developed, the distribution of wealth was uneven due to the lack of planning 
policies for the long run. This industrialization was based on capital-intensive activities 
that worked to satisfy the demand of small privileged groups of society. The oil boom 
had an “unequal and excluding character from the sectorial, regional, and social 
perspectives.” 34  The oil prosperity appeared massive and unexpectedly. Wealth 
accumulated over the previous existent social structures, widening the social gaps. The 
development myth surged as Ecuador did experiment economic growth, but no changes 
in the quality of life of the majority of its inhabitants occurred.  
 In Breve Historia Económica del Ecuador (2006), Acosta describes oil as 
characterized with a clear increase in the internal demand and an accumulation of fixed 
capital (equipment, machinery, and tools) for production. Important infrastructure works 
                                                
34 Larrea, M. (1991). Industria, estructura agraria y migraciones internas en el Ecuador: 1950-1982. 
Quito, Ecuador: FLACSO. 
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were developed, including the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline, the state-owned refinery in 
Esmeraldas, Esmeraldas-Quito-Ambato and Shushufindi-Quito “Poliductos” (pipelines), 
storage and distribution centers, and Paute, Pisayambo, and Agoyán hydroelectric dams. 
Ecuador’s GDP grew at least 8% between 1972 and 1981. The country experienced an 
annual 3.3% growth per capita, the greatest in the twentieth century, even greater than the 
average in Latin American countries (2.3%), Iberian countries (1.4%), USA (1.0%), and 
other advanced countries (1.8%)35. Together with the improvement in GDP, came an 
increase in migration of people towards the north, especially to the USA. 
  The oil industry boomed while military governments were in power. The 
dictatorial political environment allowed, however, an important influx of foreign money 
into the economy. Ecuador had a stable exchange rate of 25 sucres for 1 USD that 
facilitated importing capital goods for the industries and luxury consumer goods. At this 
time in the economy, the government designed a system to aid the private sector through 
the freezing of prices and tariffs of the goods and services from the public sector, like 
those related to energy. The gasoline subsidy, for instance, helped those groups of society 
that consumed the most energy. The import substitution policy implemented was not used 
as a tool against the private sector, but as a way of protecting the industrialization of the 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
35 Acosta, A. (2006). Breve historia económica del Ecuador (2 ed.). Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional. 
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Figure	  4.1	  Price	  per	  Barrel	  of	  WTI	  Standard	  &	  Ecuador’s	  Oriente	  Crude	  Oil,	  
1971	  -­‐	  1989	  
 
 
Note: Elaborated by the author based on information on Appendix 3 
 
In essence, during the oil boom, there was a generalized sensation of Ecuador 
having reached paradise and people thought that broad economic development was soon 
to occur. However, there was also a huge impact on the environment, one of the biggest 
setbacks affecting Ecuador until today. As shown in Figure 4.1, Ecuador’s oil era 
staggered in 1982 due to the fall in the oil prices and the effects of the loans given to less 
developed countries. This period corresponds to the Latin American debt crisis, when 
Latin America’s foreign debt exceeded their earning power and many countries defaulted, 
affecting both the USA and the developing countries. WTI oil price per barrel is higher 
for the majority of years because Ecuador’s Oriente oil has the punishment for having a 
higher viscosity. The price of Oriente oil increased from USD 2.40 per barrel in 1972 to 
USD 35.20 in 1980 and USD 34.40 in 1981, only to fall to USD 32.50 in 1982 following 
a downward trend. OPEC reduced the official price of oil by USD 5.00 worldwide. Crude 
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oil prices continued to fall up to USD 9.00 per barrel on July 1986 (Acosta, 2006). The 
Ecuadorian economy was stagnant, and the foreign banks that had loaned the country 
money were eager to get it back. As a result, new loans were taken to cover up the 
existing ones. Additionally, in 1981 a border conflict with Peru began, so most of the 
International Monetary Reserve was consumed in war equipment. In the following years, 
Ecuador attempted to implement the Washington Consensus’s reform/adjustment policies 
to get out of the crisis. 
Having set and understood the historical and economic context of past reliance on 
primary products, the following is a narrative of that begins in 1990 and concludes on 
March 2014, the moment of writing of this research. The narrative is based on a 
combination of my interview research and other published sources.  
The	  1990	  –	  2014	  Period	  
 
 Over the past twenty-four years, Ecuador has experienced a series of social, 
economic, and political changes. One of the most notable characteristics of the period is 
its political instability. In Ecuador, a president is supposed to remain in office for 4 years. 
Nevertheless, in this period, not all of the Heads of State have been able to complete the 
entire period in office. There have been coup d’états, military juntas, office abandonment, 
impeachments, and corruption. Political instability affects the economy adversely 
because policies, plans, and projects can’t be completed, especially if ideologies differ 
between presidential regimes.   
The country experienced very high inflation periods, which ultimately lead to the 
dollarization in 2000. In 2007, however, things changed when Rafael Correa came to 
power with the so-called “Revolución Ciudadana”, which introduced a radical new 
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ideology, social reforms, and economic policies, aiming to change Ecuadorian society 
with a socialist approach. Correa’s mandate remains a source of controversy, yet it has 
also brought a greater sense of political stability. As of this writing, Correa is still the 
president of the Republic of Ecuador. 
 To better understand the dynamics of politics in Ecuador in the last twenty-three 
years, it is important to know the presidents in power, as well as their political affiliation, 
ideology, and key economic events at different periods. The following timeline briefly 
summarizes this information: 
 
Table	  4.1	  Presidential	  Timeline:	  1990	  –	  2013	  
 
Period  President 
Political Party 
(Political 
Ideology) 
Relevant Facts 
and Events 
Annual 
% GDP 
Growth36 
Energy / Oil 
Occurrences 
August 
10, 1988 
–  
August 
10, 1992 
Rodrigo 
Borja 
Cevallos 
Izquierda 
Democrática 
ID – 
Democratic 
Left 
(Social-
democracy) 
• External debt 
and IMF 
pressures worsen 
• Fiscal reforms 
• Education 
promoted 
• Political 
dialogues begin 
with indigenous 
people 
1988: 5.9  
1989: 1.0 
1990: 3.7 
1991: 4.3 
1992: 2.1 
• Texaco exits 
Ecuador 
• CEPE becomes 
Petroecuador 
August 
10, 1992 
–  
August 
10, 1996 
Sixto 
Durán 
Ballén 
Partido Unidad 
Republicana – 
Republican 
Union Party 
(Right-
conservative) 
• Neoliberal model 
is enforced, 
reducing 
subsidies, 
increasing 
external debt, 
and decreasing 
state 
participation 
• Privatization 
1992: 2.1  
1993: 2.0 
1994: 4.3 
1995: 2.3 
1996: 1.7 
• Small 
international oil 
companies are 
allowed 
• State oil 
monopoly 
(Petroecuador) 
not considered 
ideal 
 
                                                
36 GDP growth (annual %). (n.d.). The World Bank. Retrieved April 4, 2014, from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/all?display=default 
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• Regional 
demands 
increase 
• Pachacutick 
movement 
(Indigenous and 
ethnic radical 
left) appears 
• Cenepa War with 
Peru for 
territorial 
disputes 
August 
10, 1996 
– 
February 
6, 1997 
Abdalá 
Bucaram 
Partido 
Roldosista 
Ecuatoriano 
PRE – 
Ecuadorian 
Roldosist Party 
(Populist 
social-
democracy) 
• Monetary 
reforms 
• Regime based 
on nepotism, 
corruption, and 
intolerance 
• Feb. 5, 1997 
national outrage 
from the 
economic, 
social, and 
political sectors 
from different 
tendencies  
• Bucaram is 
demoted by 
Congress for his 
“incapacity to 
govern” 
1996: 1.7 
1997: 4.3 - 
February 
6, 1997  
– 
February 
9, 1997 
Fabián 
Alarcón 
(Interim 
President) 
Frente Radical 
Alfarista – 
Alfarist 
Radical Front 
(Liberal 
Democratic 
Centre) 
• Interim 
president 
elected by the 
Congress 
1997: 4.3  - 
February 
9, 1997  
– 
February 
11, 1997 
Rosalía 
Arteaga 
(Interim 
President) 
Frente Radical 
Alfarista – 
Alfarist 
Radical Front 
(Liberal 
Democratic 
Centre) 
• First women 
president in 
Ecuador’s 
history 
• Being 
Ecuador’s Vice-
president, 
Arteaga self 
1997: 4.3 - 
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proclaims 
herself as 
President 
• Congress meets 
on Feb. 11 to 
vote on 
Alarcón’s 
permanent role 
as president 
• Not being 
welcomed by 
the Congress, 
Arteaga 
resigned 
publicly outside 
of the 
Legislative 
Palace 
February 
11, 1997 
–  
August 
10, 1998 
Fabián 
Alarcón 
(Interim 
President  
Frente Radical 
Alfarista – 
Alfarist 
Radical Front 
(Liberal 
Democratic 
Centre) 
• Alarcón is 
reassigned the 
interim 
presidency with 
the support of 
Congress and 
the military 
• Unemployment 
is heightened 
•  “El Niño” 
current 
adversely 
affects coastal 
region 
• Constitutional 
reforms that 
allow reelection 
1997: 4.3 
1998: 3.3 
• PetroEcuador 
remains a 
strong 
monopoly 
• Oil price 
decreases, 
worsening the 
deficit 
August 
10, 1998 
–  
January 
21, 2000 
Jamil 
Mahuad 
Democracia 
Popular DP - 
Popular 
Democracy  
(Christian 
democracy / 
Centre-right) 
• Privatization of 
economy 
• Brasilia 
Presidential Act, 
peace treaty 
with Peru 
• Uncontrolled 
inflation 
• Banking crisis 
resulting in 
closing of 70% 
1998: 3.3 
1999: -4.7 
2000: 1.1 
• Removal of 
subsidies to 
gas, diesel, and 
electricity, 
causing 
economic and 
political turmoil 
• Plans to build 
OCP 
(Oleoducto de 
Crudos Pesados 
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of country’s 
banking 
institutions 
• Social and 
indigenous 
discontent 
• Continuous 
devaluation of 
sucre 
• On Jan. 21, 
2000, Mahuad 
is forced to 
resign in 
military revolt 
directed by Col. 
Lucio Gutiérrez 
/ Heavy crude 
oil pipeline) 
January 
22, 2000 
–  
January 
14, 2003 
Gustavo 
Noboa 
Democracia 
Popular DP - 
Popular 
Democracy  
(Christian 
democracy / 
Centre-right) 
• Economic 
policy from 
Mahuad is 
continued 
• Dollarization of 
economy at very 
high exchange 
rates 
• Migration to 
European 
countries, 
especially 
Spain, peaks 
• Privatization is 
pushed forward 
 
2000: 1.1 
2001: 4.0 
2002: 4.1 
2003: 2.7 
• OCP 
construction 
begins 
January 
15, 2003 
–  
April 20, 
2005 
Lucio 
Gutiérrez 
Partido 
Sociedad 
Patriótica – 
Patriotic 
Society Party 
(Populist 
Centre Left) 
• Austerity 
measures in 
food and 
electricity 
implemented 
• Previous 
economic issues 
remained 
• Free Trade Area 
of the Americas 
Debate 
• Dissolution of 
the Supreme 
Court, alleging 
2003: 2.7 
2004: 8.2 
2005: 5.3 
• Conflict with 
Occidental 
Petroleum 
Company 
(OXY) begins 
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bias 
• On April 15, 
2005 protests 
against 
government 
began in Quito, 
leaving it in 
State of 
Emergency 
• Gutiérrez flees 
Ecuador, 
leaving it in 
chaos 
April 20, 
2005  
– 
 January 
15, 2007 
Alfredo 
Palacio 
No political 
party 
affiliation 
(Centre Left) 
• Congress 
appointed 
Palacio to serve 
as president  
• Proposal to 
amend 1998 
Constitution 
• Negotiations 
with USA to 
sign free trade 
agreement 
• Ecuador rejects 
participation in 
Plan Colombia 
2005: 5.3 
2006: 4.4 
2007: 2.2 
• FEIREP oil 
fund is replaced 
by a special 
account in the 
government 
budget named 
CEREPS 
• OXY expelled 
from Ecuador 
• New legislation 
for distribution 
of profits in oil 
contracts 
January 
15, 2007  
– 
 Present 
Rafael 
Correa 
Alianza PAIS 
– PAIS 
Alliance 
(Socialism)  
• Longest lasting 
Head of State in 
last years 
• Increased 
participation of 
state and more 
regulation 
• New 
Constitution is 
developed and 
approved by 
popular 
consultation 
• Separation from 
IMF policies 
• Increased 
percentage of 
GDP dedicated 
to education 
2007: 2.2 
2008: 6.4 
2009: 0.6 
2010: 3.0 
2011: 7.8 
2012: 5.1 
2013:N/A 
2014:N/A 
• In 2009, 
energetic crisis 
pushes for 
rationing 
• In 2010, new 
Law of 
Hydrocarbons 
approved, 
implying the 
renegotiation of 
oil contracts, 
causing many 
companies to 
exit Ecuador 
• Great support 
for 
PetroEcuador 
• Yasuní ITT 
Project 
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• Renegotiation 
of external debt 
• Free trade 
agreement with 
USA rejected 
• New Law of 
Communication
, new Criminal 
code that spark 
discontent 
among citizens 
and attention 
from 
international 
organizations 
• Increased 
relationship 
with countries 
with leftist 
governments 
• Construction of 
Refinería del 
Pacífico “Eloy 
Alfaro” begins 
 
The	  behavior	  of	  crude	  oil	  prices	  
 
 Oil prices fluctuate according to the market’s supply and demand. OPEC sets up 
country production quotas in order to maintain or alter the global price levels. In the past, 
increased surplus has been responsible for the drop in oil prices. The quality of crude oil 
is assessed based on the density and sulfuric content. Petroleum analysts use the API 
(American Petroleum Institute) gravity, an inverse measure of the density of the crude oil 
compared to the density of water, to compare the densities of different types of oil. In this 
sense, crude oil is classified in four groups: 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
 56 
Figure	  4.2	  API	  Gravity	  
 
 
Source:  
RIGZONE - What is Heavy Oil and How is it Formed?. (n.d.). RIGZONE. Retrieved March 18, 2014, from 
http://www.rigzone.com/training/heavyoil/insight.asp?insight_id=184&c_id=14 
 
Ecuador has two types of oil. Oriente crude oil, considered medium, with a 24.1° 
API gravity, and Napo crude oil, considered heavy, with a 19° API gravity. In my 
interview with Economist García, he revealed that, in Ecuador, the price for a barrel of 
crude oil is calculated based on the following formula: 
	  𝐸𝐶  𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒  𝑂𝑖𝑙  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔   𝑁𝑎𝑝𝑜  𝑜𝑟  𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒=   𝑊𝑇𝐼  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  ± 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
 
Where:  
• West Texas Intermediate (WTI) is a type of light crude oil used for benchmark 
pricing. It has low density and low sulfuric content with 39.6° API gravity. WTI 
varies daily according to market forces. 
• Differential calculated monthly based on the assessments of Argus and Platts, “ a 
global provider of energy, petrochemicals, metals and agriculture information, 
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and a premier source of benchmark price assessments for those commodity 
markets.” 37  To calculate the Ecuadorian differential, the previous month’s 
assessment is used. García argued that assessments should not be used, because it 
doesn’t match the market; instead, the differentials should be based on bidding. 
• Premium that varies according to the API gravity of the oil type. Currently, the 
premiums are around USD 0.50 – 0.70. 
Figure	  4.3	  Price	  per	  Barrel	  of	  Crude	  Oil,	  1990	  -­‐	  2013	  
	  
Note: Elaborated by the author based on information on Appendix 338 
 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates how oil prices have been on the rise during the last 
twenty-three years. WTI prices are higher for the most of the years, because it is a lighter 
crude oil, which is only used as a benchmark for Ecuadorian oil. Oriente crude oil starts 
                                                
37 About Platts. (n.d.). Energy Products & Services, Oil, Coal Insight, Natural Gas Shipping, Electric 
Power Methodology Analysis, Metals, Petrochemical. Retrieved March 18, 2014, from 
http://www.platts.com/about 
38 Data for the price of Napo Crude Oil before 2005 was not found 
0.00	  20.00	  
40.00	  60.00	  
80.00	  100.00	  
120.00	  
1990	   1992	   1994	   1996	   1998	   2000	   2002	   2004	   2006	   2008	   2010	   2012	  
Pr
ic
e	  
(U
SD
	  p
er
	  b
ar
re
l)
	  
Year	  
Oriente	  Crude	  Oil	   Napo	  Crude	  Oil	   WTI	  Standard	  
 58 
with a price of USD 20.20 in 1990 compared to USD 24.53 for WTI. However, in 2013, 
Napo crude oil barrel was at USD 92.91, Oriente at USD 97.36, and WTI at USD 97.98.  
In my interview with Dr. Santos Alvite, he explained that, over the years, the gap 
between the WTI and Ecuadorian oil prices has become smaller because of the 
improvement in technology, “refineries have adapted to be able to process heavier crude 
oil, which is why heavy crude oil is performing well in the market.”39 From 1996 to 
1998, the price dropped because OPEC increased the output quotas, underestimating the 
impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. As the graph reveals, oil prices went on a downward 
spiral reaching USD 14.42 for WTI and USD 9.20 for Oriente oil. OPEC cut back the 
production quotas in 1998, but the recovery did not happen until 1999. Regardless of the 
global economic recession that began in 2008, oil prices peaked at USD 99.67 (WTI), 
USD 85.39 (Oriente), and USD 80.79 (Napo). However, the price bubble burst in 2009 
and prices dropped sharply to USD 61.95 (WTI), USD 54.22 (Oriente), and USD 49.95 
(Napo). In the last years starting in 2008, prices have continued to increase which has 
been beneficial for the Ecuadorian economy, as the government’s budget has increased 
considerably. In those years, under the socialist regime of Correa, business deals and 
contracts have changed in nature, which will be discussed further in the next sections. 
Prices are volatile depending on the conditions of the market, especially because oil is a 
commodity. 
	  
 
                                                
39 Personal interview with Santos Alvite (2014) 
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The	  Instability	  Wave	  (1990	  –	  2007)	  
Rodrigo	  Borja	  (August	  10,	  1988	  –	  August	  10,	  1992)	  
 
 Borja, being the candidate from the Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática), 
was supposed to have a socialist political ideology. However, his regime constantly 
shifted and used policies typically associated with the right. When Borja came to office, 
Ecuador had problems left by the previous head of state. Borja applied macroeconomic 
policies that would solve issues in the short run, coupled with liberalization policies. 
Economist Acosta (2006) argues that monetary and exchange rate policies were essential 
tools used to return the economy to equilibrium due to their flexibility and promptness in 
results.  
 Ecuador had increased government revenues due to the increase in oil prices 
because of the Persian Gulf War. In 1990, the government did not renew the Texaco-Gulf 
(the company that had first exploited oil in the country) contract. CEPE (Corporación 
Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana), the state owned company, was transformed into 
Petroecuador. The company became a state monopoly and took charge of managing the 
operations of the SOTE (Sistema de Oleoducto Transecuatoriano), the Trans-Ecuadorian 
oil pipeline network that Texaco-Gulf built in 1972. During my interview, Dr. Santos 
Alvite mentioned that the shift in the management of the pipeline network brought 
inefficiency and syndicalist abuse. Collective contracts by the labor unions pushed for 
higher wages, but not increased productivity, adversely affecting the Ecuador’s booming 
oil industry.  
The government focused too much of its attention on the macroeconomic 
equilibrium, neglecting social and economic development. Even when the country had 
USD 200 million from oil, Borja was not able achieve great economic growth. “The 
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levels of poverty, homelessness, malnutrition, and unemployment deteriorated even 
further. […] The focalization of social services to take care of the needy became part of 
the neoliberal strategy.”40 The World Bank’s prescribed adjustment policies, were costly, 
but regarded as inevitable.  
Borja attempted to handle Ecuador’s eternal problem: the external debt. The 
president had the best intentions and wanted to renegotiate the debt. In 1990, US 
President Bush launched “The Initiative for the Americas”, which Borja and the 
dominant sectors of the economy supported and promoted.  However, debt was not 
renegotiated. In general, Borja’s regime was plagued by intricate, but incomplete 
adjustments (Acosta, 2006).  
Sixto	  Durán	  Ballén	  (August	  10,	  1992	  –	  August	  10,	  1996)	  
 
 Born in Boston (MA), Durán Ballén ran a conservative government. Acosta 
qualifies his economic management as a quasi-orthodox stabilization scheme. The policy 
aimed to attract foreign capital by restraining the exchange rate that allows flexible 
interest rates. By 1994, the inflationary rate had decreased by 25%. The end of 1994 
followed the fixed exchange rate followed by consecutive controlled devaluations of the 
sucre, which continued until 1999. Durán Ballén began the “modernization of the state”. 
The purpose was to change the role that the state played in the economy. The president 
was a huge defender of privatization strategic areas of the economy.  
 Having originally joined OPEC in 1973, under Durán Ballén’s government, 
Ecuador filled a petition to leave the organization voluntarily in 1992. In January of 1993, 
the country officially left the oil cartel. Experts interviewed for this thesis gave different 
                                                
40 Acosta, A. (2006). (pp. 179) 
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theories for Ecuador leaving the country, but most of them agree that it was due to 
political inclinations. In my interviews, Dr. Santos Alvite, former Minister of Energy and 
Mines, and Economist García believe that Durán Ballén’s rightist-privatizing ideology 
was not compatible with OPEC’s Arab countries. The expert believes that Ecuador’s 
decision to leave OPEC was asserted because “the country produced relatively small 
quantities of barrels per day in comparison to big oil nations such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, or Venezuela.”41 During my personal interview with Segundo Rodríguez, who 
worked in Petroecuador for several years, he agreed that being marginal producers, there 
were more disadvantages with Ecuador staying in the oil cartel. Economist Pablo Lucio 
Paredes, who actually worked for the government during Durán Ballén’s office, argues 
the reasons were pragmatic. Paredes talked about two reasons for Ecuador’ exit. The first 
is that Ecuador couldn’t keep up with the maintenance costs associated to OPEC, which 
Eco. García said was simply an excuse from the government during the personal 
interview. The second is that there was no direct benefit from the country’s presence in 
the organization, because there were moments in which the cartel wanted to cut back 
production in order to increase prices, something that was hard to do in Ecuador, given 
that it could benefit from higher market oil prices even without the OPEC membership. 
Dr. Esteban Santos agreed with the latter. All things considered, the experts agree that 
Ecuador left OPEC mainly due to political reasons and because Ecuador’s membership 
had more disadvantages and costs that actual tangible benefits. 
 Durán Ballén’s conservative government was characterized by a series of 
adjustments. One of the most painful episodes was the increase in the price of petroleum- 
based fuels in January 1994. Ecuador’s “extra” gasoline (81 – 87 octanes) increased its 
                                                
41 Personal interview with Santos Alvite (2014) 
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price by 71%. The president used the increase in energy prices as a way of collecting 
money fast for the payment of the debt. The latter was one of the IMF’s conditions to 
approve a loan. The government released a letter of intent to “modernize” the sate 
through the privatization of the electric, communications, and hydrocarbons industries, as 
well as the reform of the social security system, the labor laws and the labor market. 
Petroecuador, for instance, had just been formed in the last presidency as the big state-
owned oil monopoly, which didn’t go with the president’s privatizing ideology just like 
the OPEC membership. Durán Ballén didn’t agree with the idea of having such an 
important area of the economy bestowed in the state. As part of the modernization, 
between 1993 and 1994, he began to dismantle the monopoly by allowing international 
bidding from small private oil companies. Nevertheless, Petroecuador remained 
powerful. “The idea of privatizing Petroecuador existed; Sixto Durán would have done it, 
but he became afraid because oil was very important.” 42  Under this regime, 
Petroecuador’s privatization never occurred. 
Durán Ballén was able to renegotiate the debt using the US’s Brady Plan, which 
aimed to transform the loans to foreign countries into different bonds. Yet, even with a 
renegotiated external debt, the Ecuadorian economic conditions were difficult at the time 
and the efforts to fulfill the new demands of the foreign banks were not recognized. For 
this reason, after five years, the renegotiation was proved to be ineffective. 
The economic issues were aggravated by the Cenepa war from 1995, following a 
territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru. The war cost USD 360 million and the 
losses double the cost of the war (Acosta, 2006). On the other hand, vice-president 
Dahik’s getaway due to his white-collar crime of improper handling of expenses also 
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adversely impacted the economy. As Acosta puts it, Durán Ballén’s economic policies 
were a “chronicle of a crisis foretold”, stimulating speculative financial investments, but 
not production. 
Abdalá	  Bucaram	  (August	  10,	  1996	  –	  February	  6,	  1997)	  
 
 Bucaram is an interesting personality in Ecuador’s history. He nicknamed himself 
“el Loco”, the crazy one, for his eccentric leadership and lifestyle. Bucaram government 
was characterized for extreme liberalization, high levels of corruption, and a neoliberal 
economic policy. In his short period in office, Bucaram attempted to dismantle the state 
by privatizing the state-owned firms. Even when his government was promoted as 
populist, during this period the dominant classes were clearly favored. Acosta stated that 
Roberto Isaías, owner of Filanbanco (the largest bank of Ecuador that later will go 
bankrupt), was the president’s adviser, and the richest man of the country, Alvaro Noboa, 
was the president of the Currency Board. During my interview, Dr. Santos Alvite thinks 
Bucaram was confused at having powerful men from the private sector occupying high 
executive posts, given that the president had a socialist / populist inclination. 
 During this political regime was one of the most important price reforms. The 
adjustment increased the tariffs on public services, completely eliminated the subsidy on 
natural gas for domestic use, implemented collection of fees for public hospitals’ 
services, and energy prices continued to peak. Petroleum based fuels, such as gasoline 
and diesel, continued to escalate like during the last government. The oil industry 
continued to grow strong, and despite Bucaram’s efforts to privatize state companies, 
Petroecuador remained untouched.  
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The president tried to remove the strict adjustments when he saw his government 
faltering, but it was rather late. On February 5th, 1997, a National Civic Strike began as 
the Ecuadorian people filled the streets of the different cities to express their rejection of 
Bucaram’s political regime. That night, the head of state escaped to Panama, where he 
remains in political asylum. On February 6th, Ecuador’s National Congress declared 
Bucaram as “mentally unfit to rule”. 
Rosalía	  Arteaga	  (February	  9,	  1997	  –	  February	  11,	  1997)	  
 
 Arteaga was the vice-president during Bucaram’s regime. Her relationship with 
the president had worsened over time and she was relegated to insignificant posts. 
Bucaram’s distancing, prepotency, abuse, and “machismo” humiliated Arteaga. In the 
same resolution where Congress declared Bucaram’s mental problem, Fabián Alarcón 
was declared “interim president” alleging a constitutional void that impeded Arteaga’s 
rise to power. Nevertheless, Arteaga believed that according to the Constitution, she had 
to assume the presidency. She became the first woman president in Ecuador’s history on 
the night of February 6, when Arteaga signed a decree self-proclaiming president. At the 
same time, Bucaram claimed his dismissal was unconstitutional and the National 
Congress appointed Alarcón. This event is known as “the night of the three presidents”. 
February 7th dawned with three different people claiming the title of head of state. 
(Acosta, 2006) 
 After a discussion between Alarcón and Arteaga, on February 9th, they agreed that 
she would assume the presidency until Congress solved the constitutional void. On 
February 11th, Congress met and voted Alarcón as “interim” president, a title that didn’t 
exist in the country’s constitution at that moment.  Arteaga tried to protest, but without 
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the support of a strong political party, her lack of experience in politics, and a corrupt 
“machista” power, she wasn’t received. Angered at the situation, she wrote a manifesto 
that she read outside the Presidential mansion, quitting her presidency. She continued, 
however, to serve as vice-president for Alarcón’s government.  
Fabián	  Alarcón	  (February	  6,	  1997	  –	  February	  9,	  1997	  &	  February	  11,	  1997	  –	  August	  10,	  
1998)	  
 
 After being appointed president by the National Congress, Alarcón was left with a 
country with economic issues. The fiscal deficit was one of the biggest issued he had to 
face. Alarcón continued the leadership on the neoliberal process. However, his action was 
not what the Ecuadorian people were expecting. His government was plagued with 
corruption and he became famous for having made dishonest deals. Even before he left 
office, Alarcón tried to manipulate the National Constituent Assembly. The constitution 
was reformed in order to allow the reelection of Heads of State. 
 Attempting to please the IMF, Alarcón attempted to apply conservative 
adjustments, which only ended in the increase of the internal and external debt. During 
this period of time, the Asian economic crisis took place, while “El Niño” was hitting the 
coasts of Ecuador. As discussed earlier, the price for the barrel of crude oil decreased, 
and unemployment rose. Alarcón revised the profit margins of the fuel-commercializing 
firm. Problems during this regime sharpened, leaving the economy in trouble for the next 
president.  
Jamil	  Mahuad	  (August	  10,	  1998	  -­‐	  January	  21,	  2000)	  
 
 Mahuad’s regime was characterized by a financial crisis that had been 
foreshadowed since 1992. This president focused on solving the old dispute with Peru, 
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which culminated with the signing of the Brasilia Presidential Act, a peace treaty. 
Mahuad had a center-right ideology and preferred the interests of the dominant groups of 
society. Acosta presents Mahuad’s preference for the private sector with a banking 
example. “While for Filanbanco’s bailout, which belonged to one family, USD 416 
million were given without collateral, for the rehabilitation of Banco de Fomento, in 
charge of agricultural credits, only USD 20 million were destined and asking for a whole 
bundle of guarantees.”43  
For the oil industry, the president first proposed the construction of the Oleoducto 
de Crudos Pesados (OCP / heavy crude oil pipeline) by and for the use of the private 
sector. “Petroecuador didn’t want this to happen, the company wanted the state to build 
the pipeline.”44 With this decision, the president sought an increased participation of the 
private sector in the Ecuadorian oil industry, in conjunction to the state monopoly.  
 As an economic policy, the head of state removed the income tax and 
implemented a 1% tax on the movement of capital. At this time, there was great 
speculation about what will happen with the adoption of this policy. The economy 
reached a critical point when people and companies began to buy dollars, legally and in 
the black market, and sent them abroad. The new tax laws imposed a burden on the 
middle class, while benefitting the higher classes and the big companies. Mahuad 
increased the prices of petroleum-based fuels, the electric and phone tariffs, and the 
added value tax from 10% to 12%.  
  Ecuador’s banking crisis began on March 8th 1999 with a banking holiday that 
lasted seven days. On the 15th, bank deposits, savings accounts, checking accounts, and 
                                                
43 Acosta, A. (2006). (pp. 188) 
44 Personal interview with Santos Alvite (2014)  
 67 
certificates of deposit, both in dollars and sucres, were frozen. According to an IMF 
Working Paper by Luis Jácome45, Ecuador entered a recession where the economic 
activity decreased by 8%, unemployment levels rose and the country suffered from 
hyperinflation. Attempting to solve the economic crisis, a floating exchange rate was 
adopted. The Central Bank of Ecuador kept printing money, but the sucre devaluated 
almost 195%. A private consulting firm was hired to assess the situation, since the 
Superintendence of Banks was said to have conflict of interest with the big banks. The 
banking crisis caused 70% of the banks to close.  
 The collection of events caused turmoil and protests, including the indigenous 
populations, which jeopardized the stability of Mahuad’s government. In an attempt to 
gain back the trust of the people, the president worked with the leftist-socialist sectors of 
society, re-implementing the income tax, decreasing petroleum-based fuels’ price, and 
establishing stricter sanctions for tax evasion. In August 1999, with the support of the 
IMF and the US Department of Treasury, Mahuad defaulted on the external debt. Acosta 
criticized that the latter event together with a vote against Cuba, and the authorization for 
the establishment of a US military base Manta (coastal city in Manabí) helped Mahuad 
please the IMF and cemented relationships with the USA. By the same token, as a last 
resort, Mahuad announced on January 9th 2000, the adoption of the US dollar to replace 
the sucre at an exchange rate of 25,000 sucres for USD 1. This was a terrible decision, 
given that at the beginning of his regime the exchange rate was 5,500 sucres for a dollar. 
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Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization at Work. IMF Working Papers. Retrieved March 19, 2014, 
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 On January 21st 2000, protesters filled the streets. The military led by Col. Lucio 
Gutierrez, with the support of the indigenous confederation CONAIE (Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador), executed Ecuador’s first coup d’état in its 
democratic era. The morning of January 22, realizing that the military junta was unable to 
govern, Mahuad’s vice-president took power. 
Gustavo	  Noboa	  (January	  22,	  2000	  –	  January	  14,	  2003)	  
 
 Being Mahuad’s vice-president, the Congress promoted Noboa to Head of State, 
after the military junta led by Gutiérrez drove out Mahuad. The first move of the 
president was to ratify Ecuador’s dollarization, wiping of the traces of the sucre, which 
had been the national currency for approximately 115 years. Noboa’s management shared 
Mahuad’s rightist views and implemented adjustments to speed up the adaptation to the 
dollar. The privatization of the public firms was pushed even forward and a revision of 
the social security system started, both supported by the IMF. In the end, the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the Washington Consensus in general supported Ecuador’s 
improvised dollarization as a structural adjustment. The IMF demanded the overcoming 
of the bilateral and commercial external debt moratorium, and the increase in the prices 
of oil derivatives.  The World Bank also issued a series of recommendations for the 
country, which, overall, supported those from the IMF. 
 Following the dollarization, Noboa pushed for a renegotiation of the external 
debt. Nevertheless, Ecuador’s economic paying conditions were not taken into account. 
“There were no contingency clauses for a decrease in GDP, or the increase of the interest 
rates in the world market, or a decrease in global oil prices, or another “El Niño” 
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storm.”46 On the other hand, as a consequence of the crisis caused by the dollarization, 
migration to European countries, especially Spain, increased. The latter phenomenon 
continued throughout the years and it was typical for low-income families to try to 
migrate illegally with the help of smugglers.   
 The bank crisis problem continued. Noboa was not able to recover the money that 
Mahuad used for bailouts. The non-performing loans from the nationalized banks were 
not collected. Filanbanco, which initially received USD 414 million during Mahuad’s 
regime in 1998, ended up receiving a total of USD 1,400 million when it was 
nationalized. Noboa issued an extra USD 300 million in government bonds to save the 
bank, but the bank had to close. Filanbanco’s operations were a total failure, since it had 
gone bankrupt twice under, both, private and public ownership. During Noboa’s 
government, the free market speech was popular, but in reality, there were many 
contradictory economic policies, such as the nationalization of banks. 
Noboa is famous for an economic reform named “Ley Trole 1”, a fundamental 
law for the economic transformation of Ecuador. The law ratified the official 
dollarization, eased labor market, privatized the telecommunications and electricity 
industries, and authorized a private firm to build and manage OCP, the new pipeline that 
Mahuad had initially proposed. Petroecuador was not content about the decision of 
leaving such an important project for the industry in the hands of a private firm. In my 
interview with former Petroecuador employee, Rodriguez commented, “Although the 
project is profitable, the pipeline has too much capacity, and until now only about 50% of 
it is used.” OCP, starting operations on November 14th 2003, allowed the private sector to 
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 70 
grow “from 77.9 million barrels in 2003 to 120.3 million in 2004.”47 Even with the 
underutilization, the new pipeline was beneficial to the Ecuadorian economy.  
Lucio	  Gutiérrez	  (January	  15,	  2003	  –	  April	  20,	  2005)	  
 
 Gutiérrez, a former military colonel who led Mahuad’s coup d’état, became the 
president because Ecuador’s people sought desperately for a change. When the president 
first rose to power, he promised to govern for all Ecuadorians. If sharing and caring for 
the poor, and fighting corruption, social injustices and impunity were leftist, then he was 
leftist; but if generating profit and promoting production was rightist, then he was 
rightist. 48 However, his government was one of the most corrupt and immoral in 
Ecuador’s history, including rumors about drug trafficking funding his political 
campaign. Many accused his regime of being a dictatorship. Gutiérrez did not keep the 
promises made during the political campaign and increased oil prices. People turned to 
the streets to reject the anti-populist measures. Seeking the support of the military, the 
head of state put key people in the military as Ministers and other positions in the public 
sectors, including Petroecuador. 
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Figure	  4.4	  Oil	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  operated	  by	  oil	  companies	  in	  Ecuador,	  2003	  
 
 
Source:  
Sebastian, M. S., & Hurtig, A. (2004). Oil exploitation in the Amazon basin of Ecuador: a public health 
emergency. Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública.  Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.scielosp.org/scielo.php?pid=S1020-49892004000300014&script=sci_arttext 
 
Up to this point, ever since Durán Ballén opened international bidding for private 
international oil companies, many big firms had concessions for the development of oil 
blocks in the eastern side of the country (Amazon region). Figure 4.4 shows the 
distribution of oil blocks among different private companies in 2003 when Gutiérrez 
assumed power. The companies include Perenco (UK-France), Agip (Italy), 
OXY/Occidental (USA), Repsol-YPF (Spain-Argentina), and Vintage Petroleum (USA). 
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Gutiérrez actually began analyzing the creation of a free-trade agreement with the USA. 
However, Petroecuador owned and managed the block concessions, remaining solid and 
strong. In 2004, trying to act nationalist, Gutiérrez decided the invalidity of OXY’s 
contract (Block 15), which resulted in a lawsuit with the company. The court settled in 
favor of OXY, demanding Ecuador to pay USD 75 million for damages in July 2004. 
Ecuador did not want to pay because it disagreed. It was until 2007, when the 
government gave up on the case and had to pay the amount settled in 2004 plus interest, 
which totaled, approximately, USD 153 million.49 
The difficulties continued under this regime. Public opinion believed that 
Bucaram, from Panama, was actually governing the country through Gutiérrez. The latter 
proved to be true to a certain extent, given that the president was processing Bucaram’s 
absolution and return to the country. In the midst of social, political, and judicial 
uncertainty, the municipalities of Ecuador’s main cities (Cuenca, Guayaquil, and Quito) 
called the people to protest the dictatorial decisions of the president. Gutiérrez retaliated 
with an “anti-protest” where he actually paid people to participate and act as if they 
supported him. The president had such a problem with the public opinion that he tried to 
pass the “Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones” (Organic Law of Telecommunications) 
that gave him absolute control over telecommunications.   
In 2005, the people became tired of the government’s different controversies and 
issues, especially the people in the capital, Quito, which led to the “Rebelión de los 
Forajidos” (Rebellion of the Outlaws) from April 13th until the 15th. The “forajidos”, as 
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Gutiérrez called them, was Quito’s middle class in a series of street protests with pots and 
pans asking for the president to leave. On April 15th, through the Executive Decree 
#2752, Gutiérrez declared the National State of Emergency. The decree dissolved the 
Supreme Court, and suspended some basic Civil Rights for the citizens: “the freedoms of 
opinion and speech, the inviolability of households, the right to travel freely throughout 
the Ecuadorian territory, and the freedom of congregating.”50 The president later realized 
the Decree was absurd and removed it. However, the protests didn’t cease in the 
following days and even the Military retired their support. Finally, on April 20th, the head 
of state trapped in the Presidential Mansion surrounded by forajidos, escaped in a 
helicopter from the army. Congress quickly met to remove the president from office for 
dereliction. Gutiérrez sought asylum in the Brazilian embassy until he obtained the safe-
conduct to leave the country.  
Alfredo	  Palacio	  (April	  20,	  2005	  –	  January	  15,	  2007)	  
 
 Being the vice-president during Gutiérrez’s regime, Palacio took charge of the 
presidency after the chaotic event. Originally a medical doctor, Palacio had been the 
director of IESS (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social – Ecuadorian Social Security 
Institute) and Minister of Health during Durán Ballén’s government. As vice-president, 
he faced budgetary breaches in the areas under his control (Science, Technology, and 
Universal Health Insurance). Even though Rafael Correa, the vice-president’s adviser, 
had created a mechanism to use part of FEIREP (Fondo de Estabilización e Inversión de 
los Recursos Petroleros - Stabilization and Investment Petroleum Resources Fund) for 
                                                
50 Pino, A. (n.d.). Crnel. Lucio Gutierrez. 
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Palacio’s areas, the executive argued that these oil funds were primarily destined to pay 
the external debt. 
 As president, Palacio announced the end of the dictatorship. His promises 
included improving the country’s situation respecting the separation of powers, to 
analyze the free trade agreement with the USA, to revise the Supreme Court situation, 
and to stop the oil concessions. However, the country desired that all of the legislators 
leave Congress and, once again, took it to the streets on May 2005. Palacio attempted to 
apply political reforms with different mechanisms that allowed him to know the opinion 
of the citizens.  He asked the TSE (Tribunal Supremo Electoral – Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal) to call for a national vote for the creation of Constituent Assembly, to reform 
the existing constitution, but Congress did not allow this petition.  
Finishing what Gutiérrez had begun, Palacio terminated OXY’s operating contract 
in May 2006, transferring the operations of Block 15 to Petroamazonas, which was 
actually a branch of Petroecuador. The reason behind the entire feud was that OXY had 
sold a part of the oil field to Canada’s Alberta Energy Corp. without having the 
appropriate authorization. Critics argue though “Palacio was under pressure from 
indigenous groups to expel the company for allegedly exploiting natural resources with 
no benefit for poor local communities in the Amazon region.”51 Dr. Santos Alvite reveals 
that this event planted an anti-MNC sentiment in society. Even though relationships with 
the USA suffered with the exit of OXY, Palacio continued the negotiations for the Free 
Trade Agreement setting sovereignty standards.  
                                                
51 Schipani, A. (2012, October 9). Ecuador vs US oil: Quito loses a round. InterAmerican Security Watch. 
Retrieved March 19, 2014, from http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ecuador-vs-us-oil-quito-
loses-a-round/ 
 75 
 Former vice-president adviser, Rafael Correa, was promoted to Minister of 
Finance. Correa eliminated the FEIREP oil fund because he though it was a mechanism 
that favored the interests of those who held public debt government bonds. The fund was 
transformed into a special account in the government’s budget called CEREPS (Cuenta 
de Reactivación Productiva y Social – Productive and Social Reactivation Account). 
Correa also created FEISEH (Fondo Ecuatoriano de Inversión en los Sectores Energético 
e Hidrocarburífero – Ecuadorian Fund for the Investment in Energy and Hydrocarbons 
Sectors) aiming to strengthen the energy and oil industries. Correa was very skeptical of 
the free trade agreement. He rejected the advice from the IMF and increased 
collaboration with other Latin American countries, especially with Venezuela. He issued 
government bonds at lower interest rates, of which Venezuela bought almost half. Correa 
resigned after the World Bank withheld a loan accusing the country from making 
changers in the FEP (Fondo de Estabilización Petrolera – Oil Income Stabilization Fund). 
His resign reduced the credibility of the Palacio’s government.  
 After Correa left, the president started discussions on reforming the Law of 
Hydrocarbons, since the state was only keeping 20% of the profits. On May 2006, 
Palacio’s passed Law # 42, which established that at least 50% of the profits from oil, 
which was selling at extraordinary high prices, would have to be paid to Petroecuador. 
	  
The	  End	  of	  the	  Instability	  Era	  
 
 
 The period of seventeen years had many important changes. The country’s 
political ideology, which started as rightist and conservative with Borja and Durán 
Ballén, began to slowly shift to the left with socialist undertones, especially during the 
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last government. Political instability was definitely a characteristic of this period with 
Bucaram’s incapability to govern, Arteaga and Alarcón’s dispute of the presidency, 
Mahuad’s coup d’état, and Gutiérrez’s escape. Ecuador faced an economic crisis, where 
policies kept changing as presidents came and went. The country indeed needed a 
change. Luckily, the price for the barrel of oil kept increasing with time. By the end of 
the period in 2007, the barrel of oil had gone up to USD 57.01 (Napo) and USD 61.84 
(Oriente). High oil prices benefited the country as it could remain profitable and provided 
constant sources of revenue. By the same token, the period began with a positive attitude 
towards private international companies for the development of oil fields, but with 
Palacio’s revision of the Law of Hydrocarbons and OXY’s forced exit, the attitude 
towards foreign oil companies had reversed. Political instability ended when Rafael 
Correa marked the beginning of a new era: La Revolución Ciudadana (The Citizen’s 
Revolution). 
La	  Revolución	  Ciudadana:	  Rafael	  Correa	  (January	  15,	  2007	  –)	  
 
 Correa first became involved in politics during Palacio’s regime, first as adviser 
and then as Minister of Finance. The president obtained his Bachelors degree in 
Economics while in Ecuador, but continued to pursue a Masters degree in Belgium, and a 
second Masters and PhD in Economics at the University of Illinois in Urbana-
Champaign. Correa soon started an intense and heavily planned political campaign 
promising revolutionary change, targeting the popular sectors and the indigenous people. 
Finally, on November 26th 2006, he won the second electoral round with 56.4% of the 
votes. Since this date, Correa has already served three presidential terms and will remain 
to be Ecuador’s head of state until 2007.  
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First	  Presidential	  Term	  (2007	  –	  2009)	  
 
  
 Correa promised to end corruption in politics and to continue implementing 
socialism emphasizing the fight for social justice under his political motto “Hasta la 
victoria siempre” (Until the victory always). Having a radical and revolutionary ideology, 
Correa didn’t agree with the Washington Consensus’s adjustments and announced that he 
would not allow the IMF to dictate Ecuador’s economic policy. Correa constantly 
criticizes the neoliberal policies of previous governments. In this sense, the head of state 
believes Ecuador’s dollarization was a big mistake because it took away the country’s 
ability to use monetary policy as a macroeconomic tool. The president has taken some 
very different approaches in terms of foreign relations. Ecuador distanced itself from the 
USA by not signing the free trade agreement and not renewing the lease for the USA’s 
military base in Manta. The country also distanced itself from Colombia as well due to 
political disagreements over how to fight FARC, a terrorist group from that country. On 
the other hand, Correa admired Hugo Chávez, who was then the president of Venezuela. 
As promised in the political campaign, Correa pushed for a Constituent Assembly, which 
congress approved on February 2007. By April 15th of that year, Ecuadorians voted in 
favor of forming a Constituent Assembly. On September 30th, the country elected the 
people that were going to compose the Assembly; Correa’s political party had 80 of the 
130 available seats (61.5%). After eight months, a new constitution. Again, on September 
28th 2008, Correa held a referendum where Ecuadorians ratified the pass the constitution. 
Every Saturday morning until now from 10 AM until 1 PM, Correa delivers the “Enlace 
Ciudadano” (Citizen’s Link), broadcasted in the majority of radio stations and TV 
channels. In these broadcasts, he generally talks about new laws, the progress of his 
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projects, but he also takes time to make fun of the opposition, calling them “pelucones”52. 
Correa is also known for having constant conflict with print and broadcasted media. Even 
though the country is under a democratic regime, the president has already revoked the 
broadcasting rights of many radio stations. Two TV broadcasting companies that used to 
belong to the Isaías family (previous owners of Filanbanco) were confiscated. National 
and international groups have protested against the state’s actions with no success. 
During this presidential term, the president also promoted the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, 
aiming to maintain the crude oil reserves underground in exchange of monetary 
retributions from other countries. Correa also began relationships with China for oil 
exploitation purposes. The president’s management of the oil industry will be discussed 
in detail later.  
 
Second	  Presidential	  Term	  (2009	  –	  2013)	  
 
 
 In 2009, after approving the new Constitution, the head of state called for 
presidential elections. Not surprisingly, Correa was reelected, again with a great number 
of legislators from Alianza PAIS (Correa’s political party) in the National Assembly. The 
Citizens’ Revolution continued with a Socialism of the 21st century ideology. In this year, 
Ecuador was hit by an energy crisis, which forced the country to experience energy 
rationings. Months later, in January 2010, protests began against large-scale mining as 
the indigenous people felt that Correa had abandoned them. The government stopped 
them using force. In July of the same year, the head of state approved a reform in the Law 
of Hydrocarbons that aimed at nationalizing oil production, which is further discussed in 
the next sections. The control and regulation against the media continued. In 2007, the 
                                                
52 A term President Rafael Correa popularized referring to the conservative aristocracy. 
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government only controlled one radio station, but by 2011, the government had four radio 
stations, two newspapers, four magazines, and five TV channels. On May 7th 2011, 
Correa called for another referendum; this was the eighth since he had been in power. 
This time the vote was on a set of questions related to judiciary reform. In this year, 
business deals with China kept increasing. The country had loaned Ecuador large sums of 
money at preferential interests rates, in exchange of oil reserves.  
 September 30th 2010 is a very important date for this government; it is known as 
“the day that democracy triumphed”. After the president passed a bill that ended giving 
bonuses as part of promotions for the National Police, they went on strike, creating 
national chaos. There are many theories about what actually happened that day. However, 
the official verdict, meaning the one released by the government, is that Correa angered 
at the occurrences, challenged the police to kill him and they held the president hostage. 
After a violent encounter between the military and the police that resulted in a national 
state of emergency, the military rescued the president and took him from the presidential 
palace. In his victory speech, the president stated that a coup d’état had been attempted 
but failed.  
 
Third	  Presidential	  Term	  (2013	  –)	  
 
 
 Rafael Correa had already been in power for six years, when presidential elections 
were held on February 2013. Once again, Correa triumphed and was reelected. This 
regime is fairly new and only few policies have been implemented. The National 
Assembly passed the Organic Law of Communications, which increased state regulation, 
reduced freedom of speech, and prohibited monopoly structures in the media. The law 
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was very controversial and caught the attention of the international eye. In terms of oil, in 
July after evaluating the progress of the Yasuní-ITT initiative, Correa announced the 
Initiative failed and the ITT fields would be exploited.  
Correa’s	  Oil	  Politics	  
 
	  
OPEC	  
 
 
 One of the first things that the Correa did with the oil industry was to renegotiate 
the reentry of Ecuador in OPEC. Venezuela’s president, Chávez, actually advised Correa 
to rejoin the organization. Ecuador had originally abandoned the oil cartel under the 
presidency of Durán Ballén who had a more conservative approach. The experts I 
interviewed for the thesis agreed the reasons for the exit and the reentry were mostly 
related to political ideology. In my interview with García, he argued, “Correa, being the 
head of a leftist government, is trying to defend and nationalize the country’s natural 
resources”. During my interview with Dr. Esteban Santos, he said that there is a benefit 
associated to belonging to a big oil organization, Ecuador benefits from accessing a 
system of international oil pricing, which opens the door to many other markets. Segundo 
Rodriguez mentioned in his interview that OPEC is composed of countries that not only 
produce oil, but also share a similar leftist ideology. In my interview, Economist Paredes 
expressed his belief that Ecuador requested membership because of two main reasons: to 
strengthen the South-South relationships and to gain political voice in the North-South 
conflict, given that OPEC is the center for that conflict. Nevertheless, as Dr. Santos 
Alvite commented, Ecuador’s participation in the oil organization remains minimal. By 
the same token, Figure 4.3 shows that during the years that Ecuador was not part of the 
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organization, that is 1992 to 2007, OPEC was unable to maintain high prices in the world 
oil market. By contrast, when Ecuador rejoins the oil cartel, OPEC’s influence had 
resulted in higher prices. In this sense, Ecuador also renewed its membership with OPEC 
as a way to be supported by the oil magnates and be able to sustain higher prices on the 
raw material. All things considered, the decision to return to OPEC was primarily 
political. 
	  
Law	  of	  Hydrocarbons	  Reform	  
 
 
 After Durán Ballén allowed international oil companies to exploit Ecuador’s oil in 
1993, until 2010 most of the companies had “participation contracts”. Under these 
contracts the state receives part of the oil produced and the private company stays with 
the rest, the company pays the exploration, development and exploitation costs. The 
state’s participation is decided on each contract, but Sergio Vélez revealed that originally, 
the state kept only 20% of the revenues. However, as seen in Figure 4.3, oil prices 
rocketed during 2005, and Palacio passed a reform that required for companies to pay 
50% of the oil profits to Petroecuador. A nationalization of the oil industry had begun. In 
July 2007, however, President Correa, not happy with the reform, through the Executive 
Decree #662, mandate the state should keep 99% of the oil profits, but the percentage 
was dropped to 70% on December of the same year. The international oil companies 
were not pleased with the arrangement. By the same token, in 2008, in the new 
Constitution, the state was declared the sole owner of the natural resources of the country, 
including oil.  
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Later on, in July 2010, the Reforming Law to the Law of Hydrocarbons, which 
aimed at increasing the state control of the industry, was passed and approved. The first 
adjustment gave 120 days to the existing foreign oil companies to modify the 
participation and service contracts to match the service contracts described on Article 
1653 of the New Law of Hydrocarbons; else the contracts would end. On November 23rd, 
when the allowance term finished, AGIP oil (Italy), ENAP-SIPEC (Chile), Andes 
Petroleum (China), Petroriental (China), and Repsol-YPF (Spain-Argentina ratified the 
service contracts until 2025 by accepting the reforms. However, Petrobras (Brazil), 
Canada Grande (Canada), EDC: Energy Development Corporation (USA), and CNPC: 
China National Petroleum Company (China) didn’t accept the new conditions and left the 
country. Petroamazonas and Petroecuador absorbed their oil blocks.  Figure 4.5 is a map 
key (translated by the author) that explains the distribution of oil blocks as of August 
2013; it accompanies the map on Figure 4.6: 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
                                                
53 From the Law of Hydrocarbons updated to May 2013: “Contracts, where qualified, national or foreign 
legal entities, aquire service obligations with the Secretariat of Hydrocarbons for the exploration and/or 
hydrocarbon exploitation with their own financial resources, in areas designated for that; the companies 
will invest capital and use the equipment, machinery and technology necessary for the performance of the 
contracted services. If the company finds oil in the area assigned it is entitled to a fee for net barrel of oil 
produced and delivered to the state. The fee, which is the net profit for the contractor, will be fixed in the 
contract taking into account investment amortization, costs and epxesnas, and a reasonable profit according 
to the risk aquired. From the oil production profits, the Ecuadorian state will keep 25% of the gross 
revenues as margin sovereignty. From the remaining value , transportation and marketing costs incurred by 
the State will be covered. Once these deductions are taken, the fee for services rendered will be covered.” 
(Translated by the author)	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Figure	  4.5	  Oil	  blocks	  distribution	  in	  Ecuador	  Map,	  August	  2013	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Figure	  4.6	  Oil	  blocks	  distribution	  in	  Ecuador	  Map,	  August	  2013	  
 
 
Note: Modified by the author based on Mapa de Bloques Petroleros del Ecuador. (n.d.). Secretaría de 
Hidrocarburos. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from http://www.hidrocarburos.gob.ec/mapa-de-bloques-
petroleros/ 
 
Figure 4.6 shows a map of how the oil blocks are distributed among different 
companies. Under the new constitution, the state owns all of the oil blocks; however it 
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also dominates the exploitation of the majority (1, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20, 21, 28, 31, 
44, 48, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 78, 86) through Petroamazonas – EP (Empresa Pública – 
Public Company), marked in the map with the lime green, light gray, and bright turquoise 
colors. Private companies hold two blocks at the most, due to the changes in the Law of 
Hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, all the oil blocks marked in orange (22, 29, 70, 71, 72, 73, 
79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87) are still available for bidding, which means that they haven’t even 
been explored yet. Also on the map, below blocks 16, 31, and 43 lays the Yasuní 
National Park, the source of controversy for containing the ITT oil fields, which will be 
covered in the next sections.  
Furthermore, the state wanted to revalue Ecuador crude oil by controlling the 
destiny of the exploited oil, so under the new law, the “Strategic Alliance” agreement 
eliminated intermediary purchasers of oil. In this manner, crude oil is only sold to final 
consumers, state-owned companies, and big refineries all over the world54.  
 
The	  Chevron	  Case	  
 
After 26 years in the country beginning in 1964, President Borja didn’t renovate 
Texaco’s contract in 1990. Oil contracts have clauses indicating that once the concession 
is finished the company is responsible for cleaning the land and making sure no 
hazardous waste stays in the exploited area. In 1993, however, the indigenous people 
living near Texaco’s former block sued the multinational in a Federal Court of the state 
of New York for environmental damages during its past operations. The effects are not 
only over the environment, but also over the health and culture of the inhabitants of the 
                                                
54 Petroecuador EP (2010). El Petroleo en Ecuador. Archivo Petroecuador EP. (pp. 55) Retrieved March 
22, 2014, from http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/001138.pdf 
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area. Texaco, aiming to stop the judicial process, signed an exoneration agreement in 
1998, cleaned up part of the damage caused, and asked for the case to be transferred to 
Ecuadorian courts.  
In 2001, Chevron bought Texaco and was forced to face the accusations, since the 
case remained pending. As of 2003, the case remained open with no solution but now 
under the Court of Justice from Sucumbíos (a province in Ecuador’s Amazon region); 
Chevron argued that they had kept their part of the deal, but the Ecuadorian counterpart 
blamed the company for covering up the pools contaminated with toxic wastes. The case 
was in court for eight years. On 2011, after analyzing scientific reports and investigation, 
the Sucumbíos Court ruled in favor of Ecuador’s Amazon, demanding a payment of USD 
18 million for the damages caused. Chevron didn’t accept the sentence and took the case 
to Ecuador’s Supreme Court, which only ratified the previous decision. So far, the state 
had not intervened in the case. The multinational accused the Ecuadorian government of 
manipulating the courts, and took the case to the permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague (Netherlands). This time, President Correa intervened by trying to catch 
international attention with “The Dirty Hand of Chevron” campaign, where international 
celebrities visit the affected areas and stick their hand in a contaminated pool to verify the 
environmental damage. Pictures of the president and some other celebrities who have 
participated can be found in Appendix 4. At the writing of this thesis, the conflict remains 
open and Chevron still refuses to pay the sanction.   
 
	  
	  
	  
Business	  with	  China	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 Before Correa’s presidency, the government had been very welcoming to foreign 
companies for the oil exploration and exploitation, especially American ones. Things 
changed when Correa became president and decided to steer away from relationships 
with the “Empire”, which is how he refers to the USA as did Chávez. American 
companies slowly left Ecuador’s oil industry, but they were replaced with Oriental ones 
from China. Since then, the one of the government’s priorities is to foster new and 
effective exchange channels that allow bilateral trade55. Confirming the rising relations 
with China, Correa commented, “In 2006, 75% of the Ecuadorian oil went to the USA in 
exchange for nothing. Now, 50% of our oil is compromised to China, in exchange of 
thousands of millions of dollars to finance the development of this country.”56  
 In Ecuador Made in China (2013), Villavicencio, a journalist and political activist, 
criticized the current government’s deals with China and denounced a series of gray areas 
in the contracts with China in the oil and hydroelectric industries. The author presents 
different contracts, bills of landing, e-mails, and letters as evidence of the crooked deals 
with China. Villavicencio, who is currently a refugee in the USA sentenced to prison 
after being charged with espionage by the government, argued: “Under the Made in 
China republic, the revolutionaries hire Chinese dollars at 7.25% interest, charge a 1% 
interest, mortgage the oil, […] and assign the premiums randomly.”57 The current 
government “has forced the state owned Petroecuador to transfer to a semi state foreign 
transnational (Petrochina), a USD 36,000 million business, in exchange of five loans of 
                                                
55 Relaciones bilaterales Ecuador-China. (n.d.). Embajada del Ecuador en la República Popular de China. 
Retrieved March 22, 2014, from http://www.ecuadorenchina.org.ec/ecuador-china 
56 Presidente destaca beneficios de los contratos petroleros con China. (2011, July 6). Revista Vistazo. 
Retrieved March 23, 2014, from http://www.vistazo.com/webpages/pais/imprimir.php?id=16258 
57 Villavicencio, F. (2013). Ecuador Made in China (Second ed.). (pp. 19) Quito, Ecuador: Independent 
publication. 
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USD 7,000 million each given by the Chinese Development Bank.”58 Correa replied that 
the Chinese loans actually represent good deals because they are used to finance projects 
with high profitability and denied that Ecuador’s oil is mortgaged to China. Chinese loans 
are currently financing important projects including the Coca Codo Sinclair Hydroelectric 
project and the construction of Refinería del Pacífico. 
 “All of the Hydrocarbon laws are violated with China, we ceded our power and 
are tied,” commented Dr. Santos Alvite. On the one hand, both Rodríguez and 
Villavicencio accuse the government of assigning the oil blocks to Chinese companies 
randomly, without going through a bidding process where other foreign companies can 
participate. The latter represents a huge loss for the Ecuadorian economy, since bidding 
processes allow selecting the most profitable option, instead of just favoring the Chinese 
just because of the preferential loans. On the other hand, the law forbidding selling the oil 
to intermediaries is violated as well. Villavicencio presents different bills of landing 
proving that since 2007 Oriente and Napo crude oil have been provided to Chevron and 
other American refining companies through Petrochina. The company acts as a reseller of 
Ecuadorian oil to other markets, violating Ecuador’s law of Hydrocarbons.  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Yasuní-­‐ITT	  Oilfields	  
 
                                                
58 Ibid. (pp. 102) 
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Figure	  4.7	  Yasuní	  National	  Park	  and	  the	  ITT	  oilfields	  Map	  
 
Note: Modified by the author based on Guerra Forestal: Sangre por árboles. (2011, November 11). 
Desinformación de las 9. Retrieved March 22, 2014, from 
http://desinformaciondelas9.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/mapa_itt.jpg 
 
 Yasuní National Park is located in the northeastern part of Ecuador, 60% in the 
province of Orellana and 40% in the province of Pastaza. The park is a tropical rain forest 
surrounded by different rivers, ponds, and swamps. Figure 4.7 highlights the location of 
the National Park in the country. In 1989, UNESCO declared the area World Biosphere 
Reserve because its 982000 hectares harbor exceptional biodiversity. It houses “165 
different species of mammals, 150 of amphibians, 121 of reptiles, 80 of bats, 593 of 
birds, 2274 of trees and shrubs, and 280 of lianas. It also has 20% of the world’s birds’ 
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species, 80% of the orchids, and 40% of the mammals from the Amazon region. […] In a 
single hectare of Yasuní 665 species of trees are present, that is more than those in the 
USA and Canada altogether.” 59  Enriching the park with culture, three indigenous 
ethnicities live in the area: kichwa, shuar and huaorani. (See Appendix 5 for pictures of 
the National Park) Besides housing such biodiversity, the park also contains the Ishpingo-
Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oilfields as shown on the right bottom corner of Figure 4.5.  
Inside the park, Petroriental and Repsol-YPF are already exploiting blocks 14 and 
16 respectively. Petroamazonas’s block 31 lies in the ITT border; 80% of the block is in 
the park; but the three existing oil fields are outside the park. Before the change in the 
Law of Hydrocarbons, Petrobras managed block 31, since it is not part of the intangible 
area. Even though no companies were authorized to enter the area, three oilfields have 
been explored since the 1980s, which has allowed determining the Park’s reserves are 
approximately 850 million barrels (20% of Ecuador’s total reserves). Exploiting the ITT 
oil would be result in about 107,000 barrels per day for 13 years, with a declining 
production in the next 12 years. ITT’s crude oil has bad quality, classified as heavy 
(between 13.8° and 15.4°). The latter implies that its quality needs to be enhanced at a 
refinery before being sold to the market. Correa began the construction of Refinería del 
Pacífico, which will be finished in 2015 and could be used to refine this oil. Nonetheless, 
a pipeline must be built to move the crude oil from the Amazon to the refinery in the 
Coast. The exploitation of the ITT oilfields has social, environmental and economic costs 
(Le Quong, 2013). 
                                                
59 Quang, M. (2013). Dejar el petróleo bajo Tierra: la Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT (1st ed.). (pp. 21) Quito, 
Ecuador: Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales. 
 91 
In 2007, to preserve biodiversity and respect the indigenous communities living in 
voluntary isolation, Correa launched the Yasuní-ITT Initiative at the General Assembly, 
committing to maintaining as indefinitely unexploited the ITT block reserves. “This 
would be an extraordinary example of global collective action, that would allow not only 
reduce global warming, which benefits the whole planet, but also introduce a new 
economic logic for the 21st century.”60 However, the Initiative came with the condition 
that the international community financially contributes at least USD 3.5 billion, which 
represents 50% of what Ecuador would lose from oil revenues. The funds would go to a 
capital fund from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Six years later, in 
July 2013, a committee evaluated the Initiative results, which were an economic failure 
given that only USD 367 million were collected. On August 16th, “the world has failed 
us,” Correa responded, also calling the world’s most powerful countries hypocrites. 61 
The president decided to exploit the ITT block. 
“The Initiative corresponds to a utopia conceptually and in practice.”62 In my 
interview with Vélez, he revealed that he never thought the Initiative was possible to 
begin with, since it asked for developed countries to pay Ecuador to keep the oil 
underground. Eco. Paredes argues, “When initially proposed, it was a great opportunity 
for Ecuador to be known for something innovative at a cost of USD 3.5 billion, but now 
that the government says the fields contain USD 40 billion worth of reserves, it all sounds 
like a lie.” Dr. Santos seconded the economist during my interview, and added that part 
                                                
60 ¿Qué es la Iniciativa?. (n.d.). YASUNI-ITT | Crea un Nuevo Mundo. Retrieved March 23, 2014, from 
http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/quees.aspx 
61 Yasuní: Ecuador abandons plan to stave off Amazon drilling (n.d.).  Latest news, world news, sport and 
comment from the Guardian | theguardian.com | The Guardian . Retrieved September 2, 2013, 
from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-abandons-yasuni-amazon-drilling 
 
62 Valarezo, S. V. (2013). Yasuni-ITT Situacion y Perspectivas. (pp. 13) Quito, Ecuador: PROSPEC. 
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of the Yasuní National Park is already being exploited; so not using the ITT block was 
never a reality. When the government announced the construction of Refinería del 
Pacífico, it was very clear the ITT reserves were needed, there’s no other way to justify 
such an investment Eco. Garcia thinks, “Exploiting the ITT reserves is essential to 
maintain Correa’s economic policy based on heavy government spending.” 
Dr. Santos Alvite points out the government already created great resistance to 
keep the ITT reserves underground with the Initiative. Now that the government changed 
the decision, it will be very hard for any company to be able to even try to exploit the 
reserves because the people wouldn’t allow it. As mentioned earlier, Yasuní is rich in 
biodiversity, and in the social and economic aspects. The decision caused huge turmoil 
and many people have taken to protest in the streets. In response, Correa said that if 
enough signatures were collected, he would call for a referendum to vote on whether or 
not to exploit the fields. In 2014, Yasunidos for Life63, an Ecuadorian NGO, took the 
initiative and it has until April 12th 2014 to present 600,000 valid signatures for the 
referendum, which, if approved, would occur in May 2014. At the same time, however, 
the municipalities of the Amazon region have a counter campaign “Yasuní yes” that 
supports the exploitation. The ITT remain to be a source of conflict. 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
                                                
63 Website for the organization: http://www.yasunidos.org/ 
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Refinería	  del	  Pacífico	  
 
Figure	  4.8	  Map	  of	  Ecuador’s	  Refineries	  
 
 
Note: Modified by the author based on Ecuador Administrative Divisions Map. (n.d.). University of Texas. 
Retrieved March 23, 2014, from http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/txu-pclmaps-oclc-754887586-
ecuador_admin-2011.jpg 
 
 Currently, Petroindustrial is the state-owned company that transforms and refines 
the exploited hydrocarbons. The company manages three refineries: La Libertad, 
Esmeraldas, and Amazonas, which are shown in Figure 4.8 numbered 1 to 3. La Libertad 
refinery, number 1, is located in La Libertad (Santa Elena province). It began refining 
processes in 1967 under the management of the British company Anglo. It has a 
processing capacity of 46,000 barrels per day, and produces gasoline, chemical solvents, 
agricultural oil, and airplane fuel. Number 2 represents the Esmeraldas refinery; built 
between 1975 and 1997, it can process 110,000 barrels per day. This refinery can process 
heavy crude oils and it has the greatest existent capacity. Lastly, number 3 represents the 
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Amazonas refinery, which is actually part of the Shushufindi Industrial Complex that also 
has the Shushufindi gas plant. The Amazonas Refinery began operations in 1987 and can 
produce 20,000 barrels per day. Altogether, the refining capacity sums to 176,00 barrels 
per day. To increase Ecuador’s capacity, on June 2013, Correa announced the 
construction of a new refining facility, the “Refinería del Pacífico  - Eloy Alfaro” 
represented by number 4 on the map. The refining complex is currently under 
construction in El Aromo (Manabí) near Manta, one of Ecuador’s main ports. The 
complex is part of the country’s energy plan, will have 300,000 barrels per day capacity. 
 The government advertises that the project seeks to satisfy the internal fuel 
demand, converting Ecuador into an exporter of refined petroleum products, including 
producing gasoline, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas, jet fuel, polypropylene, benzene, and 
xylene. 64  Jorge Glas, vice-president of Ecuador, mentioned “the project creates 
development for the all Ecuadorians […] It represents a change in the production 
matrix.”65 In 2007, the project had an estimated cost of USD 5 billion, but, at present, the 
projected cost has increased to USD 12.5 billion, making it one of the most expensive in 
Ecuador’s history. Refinería del Pacífico is a joint venture between Petroecuador and 
PDVSA (Venezuela’s state-owned oil company). In this agreement, Petroecuador owns 
51% of the company, and PDVSA the rest.  CNPC (China National Petroleum Corp) will 
also participate in financing the project through loans to the Ecuadorian government has 
loans in exchange of crude oil and other refined oil products. Villavicencio believes “this 
is a bad business for the country: we (Ecuador) put the territory, the best seaport, 51% of 
                                                
64 El Ciudadano (2012, June 9). Refinería del Pacífico avanza en Ecuador. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CbK9uMu5xE 
65 El Ciudadano (2013, July 1). En el Aromo se construye la monumental Refinería del Pacífico. Retrieved 
March 19, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Cj3C247lqo 
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the financing, but we associate with Venezuela that has no money, a Korean company 
designs the project, and China loans the money.”66 In other words, Ecuador’s oil reserves 
are not big enough to justify the construction of a refinery.  
In my interview, Economist García expressed concern over the fact that oil would 
have to be imported and the ITT block would definitely be exploited. The construction of 
a refinery is important for Ecuador’s economy, but Eco. Paredes argues that it will have 
less impact than predicted: “It is said that Ecuador exports cacao beans at low prices to 
import chocolate at higher prices. This vision doesn’t work for oil, because, today, the 
margin between the price of crude oil and refined products is minimal. The cost of oil 
needs to be factored, which, in the end, results in lower profits than expected”. By the 
same token, Dr. Santos Alvite is skeptic about the project; “to be profitable, the refined 
products should be sold at market prices, not at the current subsidized prices. The project 
poses doubts for future generations who will carry the debt acquired with China. 
Refinería del Pacífico is set to be finished in 2017, when Correa ends his third 
presidential term. 
The	  “Revolución	  Ciudadana”	  Continues	  
 
 The current period has been a time of change. Correa began a revolution aimed at 
Ecuador’s development. In the last six years of government, a socialist leftist ideology 
has replaced the neoliberalism from the past governments. Consequently, Ecuador’s 
international relations changed, fostering relations with Venezuela, Cuba, China, and 
OPEC members, while breaking those with the USA. The Constituent Assembly created 
a new Constitution, which the citizens approved. Even though critics argue that Correa’s 
                                                
66 Villavicencio, F. (2013). (pp. 177 – 178) 
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government is totalitarian, there is a sense of democracy as, during this time as president, 
there have been nine referendums. The government also passed reforms to the existing 
laws of Communications and Hydrocarbons. The latter changed contracts in the oil 
industry and the distribution of oil revenues, causing the exit of many international oil 
companies. As a result, Petroecuador is more powerful and solid than during any other 
government. The Ecuador vs. Texaco-Chevron lawsuit has yet to reach a settlement to 
which both parties agreed. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative was launched to protect the 
biodiversity of the National Park, but it resulted in an economic failure, and the 
government announced the exploitation of the ITT block. Experts were skeptical about 
the veracity of the Initiative, because, at the same time, the construction of Refinería del 
Pacífico began. The project, planned to culminate in 2017, is important for Ecuador’s 
economy as it has the potential of making the country an exporter of refined petroleum 
materials instead of just crude oil; however, it demands high volumes of crude oil that 
would imply the use of the ITT block and importing crude oil from other countries. 
Activists do not support Correa’s decision to exploit the ITT block in the Yasuní National 
Park, which has resulted in an effort to collect enough signatures to ask for a nation wide 
referendum. For now, the Citizens’ Revolution continues as Correa’s third term will end 
in 2017. 
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Chapter	  5.	  The	  future	  of	  Ecuador’s	  Oil	  Industry	  
 
 
As a developing country, Ecuador is a victim of the Dutch disease, as a product of 
crude oil production, which, coupled with the country’s political instability, have not 
allowed broad-base economic development. In this sense, the lack of economic 
development is derived from the Dutch disease and the political instability. The Dutch 
disease comes from the continual reliance on crude oil, and other primary products, as the 
backbone of the economy over the years. In fact, regardless of the political ideology of 
the government, the oil dependence has only been heightened. By the same token, 
political instability has adversely impacted the Ecuador’s economy. The fact that the 
country had ten presidents in the last twenty-four years is proof of this situation. 
Bucaram, Arteaga, Mahuad, and Gutiérrez were not able to complete their four-year term. 
Constantly changing presidents adversely affected Ecuador’s economic situation, 
especially because policies are not allowed to develop completely, i.e., each Head of 
State had different ways of approaching the economy, removing what the previous leader 
had done. Given oil ‘s importance for the economy, the government has always tried to 
control and influence the industry according to their ideology. The crude oil industry 
changed from welcoming and prioritizing the interests of international companies, to the 
current era of nationalization where the interests of the country come first. In the period 
studied, 1990 to 2013, the presidents’ ideologies have led to political interventions that 
have shaped Ecuador’s oil industry and its future trajectory. In this manner, political 
interventions have affected Ecuador’s oil industry to a great extent. 
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Political instability plagued the country from 1990 to 2007. Corruption and 
dishonesty were prominent problems in politics that have caused many presidential 
regimes to end. Ecuadorians tend to revolt when the government supports corruption or 
doesn’t listen to the citizens’ opinions. As mentioned earlier, due to a series of events -- 
coup d’états, office abandonment, and forced removal -- ten different presidents governed 
Ecuador from 1990 to 2013. Borja opened the period not renovating Texaco’s oil 
contract, instead granting Petroecuador, the state owned Oil Company, some type of 
monopoly power over the industry. Durán Ballén quit OPEC because his rightist political 
ideology was not in agreement with membership in an oil cartel. Additionally, the costs 
were higher than the benefits of the membership. This president was also free market 
oriented which opened the door to international companies interested in Ecuador’s oil. 
Bucaram, a populist president, followed, but Congress declared him incapable of 
governing. Arteaga self-proclaimed president, but she was dismissed after two days and 
Alarcón took power. While the presidential mess occurred, world market prices for oil 
dropped, distressing the Ecuadorian economy. Mahuad received a country in crisis with 
different problems including alarming rates of inflation, which lead to a banking crisis 
and culminated with the dollarization of the economy. The latter caused an economic 
crisis given that the dollarization occurred at very high exchange rates (USD 1 = 25,000 
sucres). A coup d’état forced Mahuad to leave the presidency. Noboa resumed the 
government and built Mahuad’s OCP pipeline project through and for private firms. Even 
though Petroecuador didn’t agree and criticizes its underutilization, the pipeline helped 
the oil private sector to grow. Later on, Gutiérrez attempted to implement a quasi-
socialist regime. OXY’s contract was terminated, a decision Palacio ratified after 
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becoming president when the “forajidos” expelled Gutiérrez. The political instability 
ends when Correa leaves the academia to become president. 
 Rafael Correa, the current president, has proved to be a radical ruler. He 
advertises the Citizens’ Revolution as a socialist approach to achieve Ecuador’s 
economic development. His government causes controversy, especially among the people 
who disagree with his political views. Correa rejoined OPEC, both because of economic 
and political advantages derived from belonging to an organization that encourages a 
South-South strategic alliance. After rewriting the Constitution, the country began a 
nationalist shift. Reforms in the Law for Hydrocarbons changed business and oil wealth 
distribution between private companies and the state. Petroecuador became increasingly 
important and was stronger than in any other period. The unsettled Texaco-Chevron 
lawsuit arose since the company had not cleaned the oilfield it had used as it agreed in the 
contract. As a result, Correa started “The dirty hand of Chevron” campaign to gain 
international attention. The president moved away from business deals with the USA, 
improving its relations with Venezuela. Also, Ecuador began business deals with China, 
after the Asian country loaned Ecuador large sums of money to finance different 
development projects, such as Refinería del Pacífico. 
Experts question how Ecuador will ever be able to pay back the loan, adding that 
the country’s crude oil is mortgaged to China. Similarly, in 2007 the Yasuní Initiative 
was launched aimed to protect the National Park rich in biodiversity by not exploiting the 
ITT block, in exchange of compensation from the international community. In 2013, after 
the Initiative didn’t raise enough funds, paradoxically, Correa announced the exploitation 
of the block, causing distress in the citizens, who, in turn, started campaigns to stop the 
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decision and raise international awareness. At par, the construction of Refinería del 
Pacífico began, which would require the exploitation of the ITT block and the import of 
oil from other countries, given that Ecuador’s reserves don’t justify such a project. The 
refinery is an attempt to convert Ecuador in an exporter of petroleum-based products, not 
only crude oil. Despite the controversy, Correa is working towards Ecuador’s economic 
development.   
On the other hand, a paradox arises between developed and developing nations 
when talking about crude oil prices. Taking a look at Figure 4.3 from Chapter 4, during 
the years that crude oil prices were relatively low, i.e., 1990 to 2005, in addition to the 
political instability, Ecuador experienced financial pressures with an increasing external 
debt and even a banking crisis. In contrast, this was a period of economic prosperity for 
developed nations such as the USA. When crude oil prices began to escalate starting in 
2006, Ecuador’s economic situation began to improve and the government was able to 
spend on projects aimed at economic development. Developed nations, however, were 
adversely affected by the higher prices and, even though energy prices are just a part of 
their economies, many countries entered a financial crisis. This demonstrates that higher 
crude oil prices benefit developing nations, but not developed ones, and vice versa.  For 
this reason, crude oil prices present a paradox when it comes to considering the benefits 
of high or low prices.  
Currently, Correa is trying to implement an import substitution policy in Ecuador. 
During his three regimes, he has increased tariffs for imports in an attempt to encourage 
the consumption of nationally produced goods. In this manner, the policy aims to give 
local producers both an incentive and an advantage over imported goods, as the local 
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ones become cheaper. Market-oriented economists who believe that import substitution 
should only be used to jump start the economy during short periods of time, criticize this 
approach especially since it will be seven years since it was applied in Ecuador. Results 
are mixed, but the approach definitely goes against the absolute advantage theory, since 
Ecuador is not as efficient as other countries would be. In this case, a dilemma over 
consumer versus local workers arises.  
In addition, Ecuador is currently undergoing a period where the president’s 
radical policies are mostly affecting the middle class. For instance, the government has 
increased taxes for private companies and for the higher social classes, but some of the 
tax policies are adversely affecting the middle class. This is an attempt to redistribute the 
wealth, trying to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, but, again policies such as 
heavy taxation and the so-called “bono de desarollo humano” (human development 
bonus). The latter bonus currently at USD 50 and it is only given to people living in 
poverty according to the government’s definition67. In Ecuador, as in many other LDCs, 
it is very hard to look past the short term. This is actually one of the biggest problems 
associated with economic development. Broad based economic development needs 
policies and changes that will have long lasting impacts for the long term. Ecuador needs 
to look past the short term and begin thinking about a sustainable future, which I will 
discuss later. 
On the other hand, Ecuador has a lack of human capital. The country has a lack of 
public quality education institutions at all levels. Brain drain is an important issue, since 
people who have the opportunity of studying abroad typically do not come back to the 
                                                
67 This topic is very complex and would require an entire research project in order to understand it 
completely, but it has criticism associated with creating dependency and doesn’t really provide a long-term 
solution. 
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country. In this sense human capital flees to other countries, instead of people coming 
back and working for the development of the country. Nevertheless, Ecuador is trying to 
address the issue by providing scholarships to some of the best universities in the world, 
conditioned on the students’ return to the country for twice the length of time they 
studied abroad. In my opinion, this presents a solution to the lack of quality education 
available domestically and to the brain drain. However, at the same time, there remain a 
lack of opportunities and incentives for the private sector to develop. Currently, Correa 
favors the public or state owned companies, making competition difficult for the private 
sector. The government should try to balance the economy by helping both the private 
and public sectors. 
From my analysis of the period’s economy, I deduce that oil price levels also 
affect the political stability of Ecuador. Oil is a big component of the economy, especially 
of the government’s budget. From 1990 to 2007, the periods where political insatiability 
reigned, oil prices were relatively low, peaking around USD 55 during 2007 when Correa 
assumed the presidency. The previous presidents attempted to rule a heavily indebted 
country in economic distress, with high inflation, and low government budgets, so there 
was only so much that they could do. When Correa rose to power, however, world oil 
prices became incredibly high (around USD 95), increasing the government’s budget, 
hence, allowing greater expenditure in various projects. In my opinion, this is one of the 
reasons why Ecuador’s politics have been stable in recent years. However, evidence 
shows that oil prices are very volatile over the longer term, meaning they could decrease 
at any point in time. As the experts that I interviewed agreed, if this were to happen, the 
Citizens’ Revolution would fall and Ecuador’s economy would enter into an aggravated 
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crisis. Ecuador’s political instability has a chain effect destabilizing the country’s 
economic, finance, social, and legal environment, which in turn discourages foreign 
direct investment, also contributing to the delay in economic development. 
	  
Ecuador:	  an	  oil	  country?	  
 
Ecuador not only possesses oil, but oil is a large part of its economy. In 2011, 
49.75% of Ecuador’s exports68 and 41% of the government’s budget were comprised of 
crude oil. The following figures69  represent Ecuador´s GDP by selected economic 
activities, and GDP growth for the years 1990 to 2012; for a complete breakdown of GDP 
by all economic activities refer to Appendix 6.  
 
 
                                                
68 Products exported by Ecuador (2011). (n.d.). OEC: The Observatory of Economic Complexity. Retrieved 
March 24, 2014, from http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/ecu/all/show/2011/ 
69 Two graphs are presented because data available for Ecuador from 1990 to 1999 are in sucres, the 
official currency of that period. After the dollarization in 2000, the US dollar became the new official 
currency, so data after this year is expressed in US dollars. 
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Figure	  5.1	  GDP	  by	  Economic	  Activity	  and	  GDP	  Growth	  (in	  thousands	  of	  1975	  
Sucres)	  1990	  –	  1999	  
 
 
Note: Elaborated by the author based on information on Appendix 670 
 
                                                
70 Data about for oil and mines, and oil refining was not available separately as in Figure 5.2 
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Figure	  5.2	  GDP	  by	  Economic	  Activity	  and	  GDP	  Growth	  (in	  thousands	  of	  2007	  
US	  Dollars)	  2000	  –	  2013	  
 
 
Note: Elaborated by the author based on information on Appendix 671 
 
As shown by Figures 5.1 and 5.2, oil has remained a very important component of 
Ecuador’s GDP throughout the years. When looking at the data in Appendix 6, it is 
noticeable that the production of crude oil has remained constant at around 9% to 12%. 
Oil refining, however, as shown in Figure 5.2 with the lime green, has not been a very 
strong component of GDP, which reflects the fact that Ecuador primarily produces the 
raw product. Crude oil is sold to refineries in the developed nations to produce the 
petroleum-based products, and Ecuador purchases the industrialized oil , which is a major 
part of the causes for the country’s Dutch disease. Ecuador’s stagnant level of 
                                                
71 As of the moment of writing of this thesis, the official report for 2013 data is not available yet. 
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industrialization can be noticed by observing at the manufacturing component of GDP for 
both graphs. The oil component of GDP has remained constant, while in 1990 
manufacturing was 15.45% of GDP, showing a downward trend that fell to 11.98% of 
GDP in 2012. Ecuador still suffers from the Dutch disease and has not been able to 
industrialize properly to achieve broad-based economic development. 
Other important economic activities that are important to emphasize include 
agriculture, services, and construction. Observing at Figure 5.1 and 5.2, agriculture and 
fishing was a big component of GDP during the 1990s, but it has lost terrain during the 
2000s, a sign that Ecuador is relying less on this activity with time. Services and 
construction, on the other hand, have gained importance as both industries continue to 
grow through the passage of time. 
The same graphs also show Ecuador’s GDP percentage growth reveals through 
the period of study of this thesis. During the 1990s, Ecuador had a steady growth from 
1% to 3%, peaking in 1991, 1994, and 1997.  In 1991, after Borja ended the contract with 
Texaco, Petroecuador began to benefit from the oilfields that had been previously 
exploited by the multinational. During 1994, Durán Ballén applied different reforms but 
also allowed foreign direct investment from small international oil companies. The year 
1997, however, is very curious because that was the time when Ecuador had three 
presidents (Bucaram, Arteaga, and Alarcón), but Ecuador was still able to grow by 4.3%. 
This is probably related to the stable oil prices that OPEC controls; this year is a 
particular example of how OPEC price manipulation was beneficial for Ecuador, even 
when it was not a member of the cartel. During Mahuad’s regime, in 1999, the country 
experienced a negative growth of -4.7%, mostly due to the banking crisis and continuous 
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devaluation of the sucre. After the 2000 dollarization, the Ecuador’s GDP growth rate 
began to improve. In 2004, the economy grew by 8.20%, partly because the new OCP 
pipeline began its operations, increasing private oil activities in the country. Even though 
the economy didn’t grow as much in 2009 (0.6%), Rafael Correa has achieved relatively 
high growth rates compared to other heads of states. In 2011, Ecuador reached a growth 
rate of 7.8%, which is higher than that of Latin America (4.5%) and the World (3.8%). In 
2012, Ecuador’s growth rates remained above Latin American and World growth rates72. 
The latter shows that Correa’s administration is actually working towards economic 
growth, which is one step on the road to development.  Nevertheless, looking at the 
growth and Ecuador’s situation overall, I conclude that even when growth occurred in the 
Ecuadorian economy, the potential GDP was dampened, given the country’s political 
instability together with the reliance on crude oil. 
However, oil-producing countries are not all the same. For instance, Ecuador 
can’t be compared to Venezuela, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the world’s oil giants. First of 
all, Ecuador’s 8.24 billion barrels proved reserves are almost negligible compared to 
other big oil exporters. Even though oil is the backbone of the economy, Ecuador only 
exploits and sells crude oil, which corresponds only to the first stage of the industry. 
Refinería del Pacífico, although heavily criticized, is an attempt to venture into the 
refining stage, but it will not be completed until 2017. As Dr. Santos stated, at present, 
“Ecuador is not an oil country, it only owns oil”. The nation still has a long way until it 
reaches the level of oil development in all its stages of other oil-producing countries. 
                                                
72 Banco Central del Ecuador (2014). Presentación Coyuntural Marzo 2014. Estadísticas 
Macroeconómicas, 5 - 6. Retrieved April 2, 2014, from 
http://www.bce.fin.ec/index.php/estadisticas-economicas 
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Ecuador needs to solve its political instability problem and diversify its economy as well, 
using the oil revenues to develop other industries.  
Impacts	  
 
 In short, oil is the cause for the Dutch disease in Ecuador. In the short run, oil 
brings wealth and some economic development. In an economic sense, oil is a symbol of 
progress; its revenues are always beneficial, given Ecuador’s heavy dependence on this 
non-renewable resource. Oil also helps sustain the government expenditure, which has 
dramatically increased during Correa’s regime. The current government is focused on 
keeping Petroecuador strong and using the oil revenues to achieve economic 
development. As a result, most of the revenues are used to finance projects aimed at this 
goal, such as the Refinería del Pacífico. Nevertheless, many of the experts expressed 
concern about the government’s over-spending, given that they predict oil reserves to last 
for 20 to 30 more years, but factoring in the ITT block. Nevertheless, oil exploration 
stopped in 2005 because of the renegotiation of contracts. In my interview, Economist 
Paredes was skeptical about running out of oil reserves in the next twenty years; he 
commented, “it is just a matter of continuing oil exploration”.  
On the other hand, during my interview with Sergio Vélez, he brought a very 
important point to the discussion when mentioning that the presence of the oil companies 
changes the Amazon region. The process of oil extraction is dangerous and harmful for 
the tropical rainforests of the Amazon. In Ecuador, oil extraction is one of the most 
damaging industries for the environment, as proven by the Chevron issue where oil 
deposits were exhausted and the traces of oil exploitation were not cleaned up as the 
contract had requested. The industry is also the cause of many health hazards, water and 
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air pollution, decreased biodiversity and damage to the environment in general. Similarly, 
oil extraction not only affects the ancestral Amazon territory, but also the lives of 
indigenous people living in voluntary isolation. Besides the health hazards posed, the 
traditional lives of Ecuador’s indigenous tribes are altered when modern companies 
invade their territory, many times disrupting their lifestyles. In times where the 
government moralizes social inclusion, the oil industry continues to prevent indigenous 
inclusion.  
 In such a complex global industry, the long run is harder to predict, especially 
when most of the oil is tied to the Chinese loans. Eco. Paredes mentioned that the 
negative side of things tends to show up in the long run.”73 As long as oil continues to 
power the world’s economies, someone will always be interested in exploiting Ecuador’s 
oil. When the industry started, the USA was interested; now China is involved. The 
future trajectory of the Ecuadoran oil industry will depend on who is the president in 
power and the corresponding political ideology. Part of the resource curse is that 
countries become increasingly dependent on their primary natural resource, exactly 
Ecuador’s case with oil. Besides the environmental, political, and social implications, one 
of the biggest problems with oil worldwide is its price volatility. It is hard to predict how 
the oil market will behave in the next decades. In the recent years, market prices for oil 
have remained high, given that global demand is greater than global supply. If prices 
continue to be at the current high level (around USD 90), Ecuador’s heavily reliant oil 
economy will survive for as long as it has oil reserves, i.e., 20 to 30 years. However, if 
the price of the commodity falls, Ecuador’s dollarized economy would be in trouble. 
Monetary policy is not possible since the country dollarized during Mahuad’s 
                                                
73 Personal interview with Paredes (2014) 
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government. Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution development plan would fail since the 
government’s budget relies heavily on oil revenues. Eco. Paredes prediction is that “if oil 
prices fall, the government will seek international companies interested in risky 
investments, just as it was before 2005, prioritizing the private sector.” In this sense, the 
government would encourage companies to seek for new oilfields to exploit, but the 
contracts would also need to become attractive and fair for Ecuador’s state and the 
companies. The latter would imply a shift away from the socialist ideology. 
Future	  Scenarios	  
 
Given the volatility of crude oil prices, Ecuador’s reliance on this resource, and 
the historical political instability, I have reflected about some possible scenarios that 
could predict what will happen with Ecuador’s oil industry in the next couple of years. 
There are three scenarios that I consider possible: the first is very optimistic, the second is 
very pessimistic, and the last one is a mix of both perspectives. 
 If oil prices continue at the current high levels, then Ecuador will continue to rely 
on the resource. In this optimistic/ideal scenario, the Refinería del Pacífico could be 
completed on time and would increase the volume of exports of petroleum-based 
products, declining the reliance on imports especially of gasoline and diesel. In this 
manner, Ecuador would change its production matrix and increase consumer welfare at 
the same time. Oil contracts would be slightly modified so that both Ecuador and private 
international companies will be benefitted in a fair manner. In the remaining time of 
Correa’s term, the country would reach political stability, fostering an economic, 
financial, and legal environment that is attracts foreign direct investment, allowing the 
country to prosper. In the social aspects, the oil revenues would be used to create 
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different projects that decrease unemployment and promote social inclusion, improving 
social aspects (like health and access to quality education), and working towards the 
development of the country. By the same token, the government would use the resources 
to jump-start other industries such as tourism that can be of benefit for the economy but 
are also environmentally friendly. The government would not exploit the ITT oil fields in 
the Yasuní National Park; instead it would invest money in building research facilities 
that allow the study of the biodiversity in the park, its conservation, and how we can use 
the plant species for medicinal purposes just as the local indigenous tribes do. Lastly, 
given that Correa is already in his third term, in 2017, the country would host democratic 
elections, allowing another head of state to rise to power, but this leader would recognize 
the popular support to continue the projects from the previous president. 
 In contrast, a more pessimistic perspective involves things going wrong. President 
Correa’s policies in this scenario would become too radical, and Ecuador would begin to 
follow Venezuela’s path. The new refinery would not be completed on time and there 
would be problems with Ecuador’s ability to repay the Chinese loans. As a result, China’s 
strong drive for oil would bring more Chinese companies to Ecuadorian territory to 
exploit the mortgaged oil in an attempt to recover the loans. At the same time, the 
increased oil production would decrease oil prices, causing greater incentives to cheat 
among OPEC members. In this manner, Correa would exploit the ITT oil fields, in an 
attempt to increase Ecuador’s oil production and to finance the economic deficit with 
China. In this sense, the country’s reliance on oil would be heightened more than ever. 
The revenues, however, in this scenario would not be used for the development of any 
other industries or the improvement of social conditions, sinking the country deeper in 
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the Dutch disease. Correa would lose credibility because of failing to deliver on different 
promises to the citizens. The different events would cause turmoil and discontent, putting 
the country in a critical situation. Protests would arise, asking for Correa to leave office, 
repeating Ecuador’s political instability. The country would then enter a period of 
economic recession and uncertainty, making Ecuador unattractive for foreign investors.  
 The two scenarios described above are very extremist and shifted to either side of 
the spectrum. However, in my opinion, a mixed scenario is more likely to occur given the 
country’s current situation. Simply looking at the issues that have occurred since the 
signature collection to save the Yasuní National Park together with Correa’s speech 
announcing that “Ecuador needs the money from Yasuní to overcame poverty”74, I 
believe that the decision to exploit the ITT oil fields is pretty much set. Ecuador will not 
value the importance of Yasuní’s biodiversity, prioritizing economic interests. Refinería 
del Pacífico will be completed by 2017, but it will not have the impact that the 
government advertises. By this I contend that Ecuador will not change its production 
matrix, thus remaining an exporter of crude oil as a raw product. The refinery, however, 
will benefit local consumers only. Correa will remain president and he will push the 
National Assembly to change the constitution so that he can be a candidate for the 2017 
elections. His charisma and persuasion abilities will increase his popularity and he has 
great chances of winning the elections, to start a fourth term. The latter could be 
beneficial for the country, as it will bring political stability and continuity to the 
development policies. As in any other political regime, there will be controversies and 
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corruption involved. The country will begin its process to development, but until Ecuador 
doesn’t diversify its economy, not a lot of progress will be made. After all, the Dutch 
disease and the political instability are the reasons why broad based economic 
development doesn’t occur in the South American country.  
On	  the	  road	  to	  sustainable	  development	  
 
 Sustainability is thinking about the long term future from a social, environmental, 
and economic perspective. Ecuador must begin to take decisions based on sustainability. 
As new sources of energy appear and oil becomes scarce, the oil industry will begin to 
decline. Countries like Ecuador whose economy depends on the black gold, will be 
adversely affected. In general, simply being an oil exporter is not quite sustainable. 
Hopefully, with the construction of the new refinery, Ecuador may be able to change its 
production matrix and export refined petroleum products, instead of just raw material. 
Going along the lines of a change in the production matrix, Segundo Rodríguez and Dr. 
Santos advised that Ecuador should be concentrating the oil revenues on developing other 
industries, such as ecotourism, since the country’s culture and history, accompanies the 
diverse landscapes of the four different regions.  
 For many years, Ecuador has been dedicated to the production of commodities or 
raw materials. Yet, if the country is ever going to develop, a change in the production 
matrix must occur. Ecuador can’t remain an exporter of raw materials; it has to continue 
the industrialization process and begin to export finished goods. Refinería del Pacífico is 
advertised as an attempt to do so, but the project won’t be completed until 2017, so its 
impact can’t be assessed yet. Changing the production matrix goes along the lines of 
sustainable development.  Besides creating dependency, the extractive oil industry is very 
 114 
destructive for the environment and the Amazon’s ecosystems where the majority of 
oilfields are located. As a country, Ecuador needs to develop other industries so that it is 
not over reliant on oil. As exemplified with the Texaco-Chevron issue, the exploitation of 
crude oil causes permanent damages to the environment, which will adversely affect the 
future generations’ capacity of satisfying their own needs. Sustainable decisions have to 
be made considering a triple bottom line approach (people, planet, and profit), to ensure 
that future generations don’t inherit a country with less opportunities, economic crisis, 
broken ecosystems, health hazards, and reduced biodiversity. I believe changing the 
production matrix in a way that respects society and the environment, but also generates 
profits, that is to say, implementing sustainable development is one of the solutions on 
the process for Ecuador’s development.  
Being sustainable implies thinking about the future generations. Exploiting the 
ITT block in the Yasuní National Park, for instance, would not be a sustainable option, as 
it would destroy and alter such a biodiverse ecosystem, almost unique all over the world. 
A dilemma arises, however, as Correa mentioned, “Ecuador is a poor country. We still 
have children without schooling. We need health care, decent housing. We lack many 
things. What would suit the country most would be to exploit the resource. But we also 
understand our responsibility in the fight against global warming, the cause of which is 
the burning of fossil fuels. […] (But) we cannot be beggars sitting on a sack of gold.”75 
Correa is right to a certain extent, but once again, it sounds like Ecuador’s development, 
as a country, is still heavily reliant on one resource. In this matter, changing the 
                                                
75 Wallace, S. (2013). Rain Forest for Sale. National Geographic Magazine, January. Retrieved March 28, 
2014, from http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/01/125-yasuni-national-park/wallace-text 
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production matrix and using the oil revenues to develop other industries would actually 
help the country rely less on such a volatile resource. 
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Chapter	  6.	  Conclusions	  and	  Open	  Questions	  	  
 
 Upon completion of my study, there are a couple of comments and challenges that 
I consider valuable sharing. I thought getting experts talking about the oil industry and 
such a controversial issue as the Yasuní-ITT would be challenge, but, to my surprise, all 
of the professionals were willing to help with my research and share their time, expertise, 
knowledge, and opinions. It was amazing to be able to interview some people that are 
renown in Ecuador and that I particularly admire. The interviews were very helpful at 
enriching my knowledge about the topic. On the other hand, I must admit that finding 
sources readily available in English was definitely challenging. There is a lack of 
bibliography that is not in Ecuador’s official language, on the different topics covered 
throughout the thesis, especially for the time before President Correa. Even the interviews 
were conducted in Spanish. At times, it was hard for me to translate ideas and thoughts, 
especially if technical terms were involved. By the same token, finding accurate 
information about the evolution of prices posed a challenge, especially for historical data 
on Ecuador’s Napo and Oriente crude oils. I had to consult different multiple sources and 
compile my own set of data for the purpose of this study.  
In my opinion, oil, the black gold, represents power. Whoever controls the oil 
industry possesses the power, in this case Ecuador’s government. The state should not 
have total control of the industry. Currently, the government, through Petroecuador, 
exploits, produces, and dominates the oil industry. A government’s job is to regulate 
industries, but it can’t be judge and jury at the same time. The current situation does 
create inefficiencies, since the state will definitely take biased decisions that favor their 
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preferences, which are not always in the best interest of the country’s industry.  The 
government does a very good job at establishing regulations, but it can’t be a direct part 
of the actual business. The lack of honesty in Ecuador’s public sector leads to corruption. 
The government places people who they trust and who support the political ideology in 
high executive positions. In this sense, oil jobs in the public sector become politicized 
instead of placing people with an oil and managerial expertise. The government is not the 
ideal administrator for the oil industry, as a regulator, it does a much better job.  
On the other hand, one of the limitations for the study is derived from the fact that 
politics are subjective. Authors of books and articles consulted were clearly biased by 
their political ideologies. Total scientific neutrality doesn’t exist, however, I tried to look 
for sources that represent both sides of the spectrum, attempting to represent a more 
objective position. Despite the efforts to remain objective, I also have a certain political 
ideology that may have affected some of the opinions vested in the present thesis. In 
future studies, maybe more empirical data can be consulted, even trying to get the more 
experts from the public sector to include their opinion as well. Another limitation of the 
study, specially for the last government, is that many of the changes to the oil industry are 
still in the quality of projects, so their real impact can’t be measure yet, this is the case 
with the business deals with China, Chevron case, Yasuní-ITT oilfields, and Refinería del 
Pacífico. In this sense the thesis still poses questions that continue to be unanswered: 
• How much longer will world crude oil prices remain at the current high levels? 
• How will the Chinese loans affect the oil industry and future generations in 
general? 
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• Is the Chevron case ever going to reach a settlement that both parties agree with, 
and, if so, how much longer will it take? 
• Will the government respect the people’s choice on the exploitation of the ITT 
block, or will it prioritize economic interests? 
• When the Refinería del Pacífico begins its operations in 2017, how will the 
industry be affected? 
o Will Ecuador actually become an exporter of petroleum-based products, 
i.e. change its production matrix, with the construction of the Refinería del 
Pacífico? 
• Who will be Ecuador’s next president and how will his/her political ideology 
intervene in the oil industry? 
• What is the future of Ecuador’s oil industry? 
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El Ciudadano (2012, June 9). Refinería del Pacífico avanza en Ecuador. Retrieved March 
19, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4CbK9uMu5xE 
El Ciudadano (2013, July 1). En el Aromo se construye la monumental Refinería del 
Pacífico. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Cj3C247lqo 
Vice Ecuador (2014, February 8). La Mano Sucia de Chevron. Retrieved March 30, 2014, 
from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdBhx8pHYz4  
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Appendix	  1:	  The	  Structure-­‐Conduct-­‐Performance	  Paradigm	  
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. (1990). Introduction. Industrial market structure and 
economic performance (3rd ed., p. 5). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
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Appendix	  2:	  Expert	  Interviews	  (Resumes	  and	  Guide)	  
 
Luis	  Alfredo	  García,	  MS.	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  January 8, 2014 
Place:  Hernando de la Cruz N32-66 y Ave. Mariana de Jesús. Quito - Ecuador 
Time:  4 PM 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years 
! Political, economic, and social impacts 
! Relevant events that should be noted 
o How has the oil industry evolved throughout the years? 
! Short-run and long-run impacts during each administration 
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil? 
o How has the relationship with other countries changed throughout these 
years? 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o Should the government intervene in the industry? 
o What impacts does oil exploitation have on the economy? 
o How does oil exploitation work in the private sector? 
o How is the price for crude oil decided in Ecuador? 
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007? 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
o What should be done with the reserve? 
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
 
LUIS ALFREDO GARCÍA C. 
 
 
INFORMACIÓN GENERAL. 
 
• Nacionalidad: Ecuatoriano 
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• Idiomas: Inglés and Español 
 
EDUCACIÓN. 
 
• Primaria: Eugenio Espejo  
• Secundaria: Sebastián de Benalcázar (1963-1969) 
• Pregrado: Universidad Central del Ecuador. Facultad de Economía. (1969-1975). 
Graduado con honores. 
• Especialización: Elaboración & Evaluación de Proyectos de Inversión. Nueve 
meses a tiempo completo. 1976. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo. Graduado 
con Honores. 
• Posgrado: Colorado School of Mines. Master of Science in Petroleum 
Economics. 1977-1979. Golden-Colorado. USA. 
 
EXPERIENCIA LABORAL. 
 
• Directorio General de Hidrocarburos. (1973 – 1976) Quito, Ecuador. 
o Economista Junior:  1973 
o Economista I: 1975 
o Economista II y Jefe de la Unidad de “Evaluación de Transacciones”: 
1976. 
• Ministerio de Energía. (1979-1983) Quito, Ecuador. 
o Jefe de la unidad de Asuntos Internacionales  
o Asesor del Ministro en Comercio Internacional de Hidrocarburos. Dicha 
unidad fue creada por mi persona, y mis tareas incluyeron la elaboración 
de reportes técnicos acerca del Mercadeo Internacional de Hidrocarburos 
para altas autoridades del sector energético.  
o Delegado ecuatoriano en múltiples reuniones internacionales: 
! OPEC en Viena (Austria) como parte de diferentes comités y de la 
comisión económica.  
! Jefe de la Delegación ecuatoriana en varias reuniones en 
Latinoamérica. 
! OLADE (Organización Latino Americana de Energía) como 
representante del país 
• CEPE - Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana. (1983-1988)  
o Asesor técnico del Comité de Mercadeo Internacional 
o Jefe del Departamento de Estudios de Mercado 
o Jefe del Departamento de Producción 
o Jefe del Departamento de Petróleo 
o Director de Mercadeo Internacional 
o Gerente del área Mercadeo Externo-Interno 
o Jefe de la Oficina de Mercadeo Internacional en Taiwan 
• Naftomar Shipping Co. (1989) 
o Agente comercial del acuerdo comercial monopolista para la explotación y 
distribución de gas licuado de petróleo al mercado ecuatoriano 
• TRIPETROL Oil Trading. (1990-1998) 
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o Encargado de las cuentas de comercio de crudo y derivados de Petroperu, 
Petrobras, Enap. Repsol, PDVSA y otras del Caribe y América Central. 
o Tripetrol manejaba el 80% de las exportaciones de Crudo Oriente bajo 
convenios con Petroecuador. 
• Anglo. (1999) 
• Coastal y El Paso. (2000-2002) 
• Shell Trading (US) Co. & Shell Western Supply and Trading Ltd. (2003-
2014)  
o Agente Comercial 
! Negociar con EP-Petroecuador y Flopec. 
! Preparar información del comercio internacional para Petroecuador 
y otras compañías productoras de petróleo. 
! Identificar oportunidades de negocio dentro del sector energético 
ecuatoriano. 
 
INFORMACIÓN DE CONTACTO. 
 
o Dirección de Oficina: Av. Orellana E9-195 y Av. 6 de Diciembre. Edif. 
Alisal de Orellana. Piso 10. Of.1002. 
o Teléfonos:  (5932) 3819-934 / 942  
o Fax:    (5932) 3819-950 
o Celular: (5939) 99734-592. 
o E-mail:  lagc.trading.ec@andinanet.net / afredogrc@yahoo.com 
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Pablo	  Lucio	  Paredes,	  Ph.D.	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  January 9, 2014 
Place: Avenida Vía Láctea, Universidad San Francisco de Quito. Casa Corona, Facultad 
de Economía. Quito - Ecuador 
Time:  5:30 PM 
 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years 
! Political, economic, and social impacts 
! Relevant events that should be noted 
! Evolution of political ideologies 
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil? 
! How has the oil industry evolved along the years? 
o What impacts does oil exploitation have on the economy? 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o Should the government intervene in the industry? 
o How has the relationship with international oil companies changed? 
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007? 
! How is Ecuador´s relationship with other OPEC members? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007? 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
o What should be done with the reserve? 
• Refinería del Pacífico 
o How are China and Venezuela involved in the project? 
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future? 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
 
PABLO LUCIO PAREDES FERNANDES 
 
Golondrinas 137 – Urb. Campo Alegre – Monteserrin. Quito, Ecuador 
Teléfono: (593) 2259694 
Celular: (593) 983516318        
Email:pabloluc@uio.satnet.net 
 
Doctor en Economía con 28 años de experiencia en: 
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• El área académica, especialmente en el campo de la Macroeconomía: Universidad 
Católica / ESPOL / IDE / USFQ 
• En el área de la Consultoría con múltiples trabajos para instituciones y empresas 
nacionales e internacionales 
• En el área empresarial: socio inicial de la revista EKOS Economía, Colegio 
Terranova, Executive Forums capítulo Ecuador 
• En el área de la comunicación: programas de TV “Usted y su dinero” y 
“Economía para todos”, programa de radio “Economía de la Vida Diaria”, 
programa de radio sobre fútbol, editorialista del diario El Universo, colaborador 
de diversas revistas y medios. 
• En publicaciones que se detallan  más adelante  
 
FORMACIÓN 
 
1985 Doctorat en Economie Appliquée – Institut d´Etudes Politiques 
Paris 
1981 Maitrise et DEA en Physique Nucleaire – Universite Paris  
 
1974 Bachiller Colegio Americano 
 
 
EXPERIENCIA 
 
Experiencia como Profesor 
  
• Universidad Católica Quito Economía – Modelización Micro y Macroeconómica 
(1985-1992) 
• ESPOL Instituto de Economía Guayaquil  Economía – Varios Micro y 
Macroeconómica (1997-2005) 
• IDE Quito y Guayaquil -  Director de Investigaciones y Publicaciones -  Entorno 
Macroeconómico (1998-2008) 
• Universidad San Francisco Quito Director del Instituto de Economía y Profesor 
(2009-Hasta la presente) 
 
Logros alcanzados y estrategias aplicadas (siempre la misma estrategia): 
 
! Cumplimiento 
! Calidad 
! Respeto 
! Humildad 
! Publicar para compartir con los demás 
 
Área de Conocimiento 
 
• Ciencias sociales,educación comercial y derecho 
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• Ciencias sociales y del comportamiento 
• Economía 
 
Idiomas 
 
• Inglés 
• Francés 
 
Producción Científica 
 
• Trabajos publicados en revistas (2008-2013) 
o Revista Koyuntura (USFQ) de la cual soy editor:  
o #1 Marzo 2009- Crisis de liquidez en el Ecuador y el mundo 
o #4 Junio 2009 - Deuda Externa ¿se paga? ¿Es ilegítima? 
o #8 Diciembre 2009 - Economía 2010 
o # 9 Enero 2010 - 2000/2009: una mejor década pero falta 
o #16 Noviembre 2010 - El choque de trenes en el mundo 
o #19 Marzo 2011 – Mirada al 2011 
o #21 Mayo 2011 - 15 Años de Comercio Internacional 
o  #27 Febrero 2012 – La Economía del Deporte y los Derechos de TV  
o #29 Junio 2012 – La economía desde el 2007 
o #33 Marzo 2013 – Apuntes sobre el mundo actual 
o #35 Julio 2013 – Las Ciudades Libres 
o Revista Polemika (USFQ) de la cual soy editor: 
o #1 Junio 2009 – La crisis mundial: mirar los excesos más que la caída 
o #2 Noviembre 2009 – Educación: el poder estatal omnipresente 
o #4 Junio 2010 – Los “fantasmas” del liberalismo 
o #7 Junio 2011 – El deportes es más que el deporte 
o #8 Octubre 2011 – Política: entre la necesidad y el abuso 
! Libros (2008-2013) 
o En Busca de la Constitución Perdida - Julio 2008 
o De la No República a la No República – Abril 2010 
o La Revolución Ciudadana … tanto para tan poco - Enero 2013 
! Libros (hasta el 2008-) 
o Cimas, Abismos y Tempestades de la Economía - 1998 
o El Libro de la Dolarización - 2000 
o La dolarización ¿un amor eterno? - 2005 
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Segundo	  Rodríguez,	  MBA.	  B.E.	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  January 10, 2014 
Place: Av. America N22-148 y Ramirez Davalos. Edif. SAA Tercer oiso Oficina 306. 
Quito, Ecuador. 
Time:  10:45 AM 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years 
! Political, economic, and social impacts 
! Relevant events that should be noted 
o How has the oil industry evolved in this period? 
o How has Petroecuador changed in the period? 
! Short and long term impacts of the administration 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o How is Petroecuador´s relationship with other foreign companies? 
o How does oil exploitation work in the public sector? 
o How is the price for crude oil decided in Ecuador? 
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007? 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
o What should be done with the reserve? 
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future? 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
 
SEGUNDO M. RODRÍGUEZ ACOSTA 
 
Nacionalidad: Ecuatoriano 
Idiomas: Español, Inglés (80%) 
Dirección: Av. América N22-148 y Ramírez Dávalos (Sector U. Central) Quito, 
Ecuador. 
Teléfonos: (593) 2547200 – (593) 2549286  
Celular: (593) 999-834921 
E-mail: srodrigueza50@hotmail.com / smrodriacosta@gmail.com 
 
Perfil: 
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Profesional de alto nivel, con un serio compromiso con la honestidad, ética profesional y 
excelencia en la dirección y ejecución de planes de desarrollo de campos y proyectos 
petroleros y productivos con alta calidad, que excedan expectativas. 
 
Información Personal: 
 
Docente Universitario con más de 35 años de experiencia en las Cátedras de Matemáticas 
e Investigación Operativa. Además de estar capacitado para dictar en pre y pos grado, las 
cátedras de Matemática, Investigación de Operaciones, Diseño y Evaluación de 
Proyectos, Gerencia y Gestión de Proyectos. 
 
Formación Académica: 
 
• Oct. 2008 – Jul/2009 UNAM – CUAED (Mexico DF) 
o Diplomado en “Formación del Docente en Educación a Distancia” 
• Abril – Diciembre/2007 (U. Central del Ecuador) 
o Diplomado en “Docencia Universitaria” 
• 1999 – 2001 (U. Central del Ecuador) 
o Magíster en Administración de Empresas, MBA 
o Tesis: “Propuesta de Modelo de Evaluación de Impactos en la 
Contratación sobre Exploración y Explotación de Hidrocarburos para 
optimización de los Ingresos del Estado Ecuatoriano” 
• 1987 – 1989 (E. Politécnica Nacional) 
o Egresado del Postgrado (Maestría) en “Ingeniería Industrial” 
• Enero – Abril/1978 (Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo) 
o Diplomado en “Supervisión de Montaje y Operación de Plantas 
Criogénicas de gas natural” 
• 2000 – 2001 (ESPE) 
o Diplomado en “Gestión del Aprendizaje Universitario” 
• 1969 – 1976 (U. Central del Ecuador) 
o Ingeniero de Petróleos 
o Tesis: "Levantamiento Artificial por Bombeo Eléctrico Sumergible" 
(Campo Sacha) 
• 1963 – 1969 (Instituto Nacional “Mejía”) 
o Bachiller en Humanidades Modernas, Especialización Físico- Matemático 
 
Experiencia Profesional: 
 
• May 2002 – a la fecha 
o Consultoría en ingeniería de reservorios 
• Sep/2001 – May/2002 
o Petroproducción (Alianzas Operativas) 
• Nov/1994 – Ago/2001 
o Petroecuador (Adm. De contratos) 
• Ago/1980 – Oct/1994 
o Petroproducción (Ing. De Yacimientos) 
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• Ene/1978 – Ago/1980 
o CEPE (Planta de Gas – Shushufindi) 
 
Las principales actividades y funciones que estuvieron bajo mi responsabilidad durante 
los períodos de tiempo antes citados, entre otras son las siguientes: 
 
• Construcción, montaje, fiscalización y arranque de la Planta Criogénica de Gas 
Licuado de petróleo (LPG) de Shushufindi.  
• Evaluación de perfiles eléctricos y radioactivos a hueco abierto y entubado y 
diseño de programas de pruebas iniciales de producción.  
• Estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos para desarrollo de campos nuevos, así 
como para optimización de producción de campos explotados.  
• Estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos para evaluación de Reservas y 
optimización del comportamiento de producción y de los factores de 
recuperación.  
• Simulación matemática de yacimientos.  
• Análisis y evaluación Técnica de Planes de Desarrollo, Planes Quinquenales, 
estudios de  simulación de yacimientos, etc., propuestos por las Contratistas con 
diferente modalidad  contractual para la exploración y explotación de 
hidrocarburos.  
• Análisis, evaluación y aprobación de Planes de Actividades y Presupuestos 
anuales de Compañías  de prestación de Servicios.   
 
Entre las empresas que he participado como contraparte de PETROECUADOR en los 
diferentes estudios de Ingeniería de Yacimientos y Proyectos de Desarrollo, constan: 
 
• AGIP Oil Ecuador B. V. 
• City Investing Co. Ltda. 
• Energy Development Corporation (E.D.C.) 
• Kerr – McGee Ecuador Energy Corporation, Ecuador Branch 
• Occidental Exploration and Production Co. 
• Repsol - YPF Ecuador. 
• Vintage Oil Ecuador S.A.  
 
Experiencia Docente: 
 
• Sep/1974 – a la fecha (U. Central – F.C. Administrativas) 
o Matemática 
o Investigación Operativa 
o PPTC 
• Ene/1995 – Sep/2001 (ESPE – F. Ingeniería Comercial) 
o Investigación Operativa 
• Oct/1991 – Abr/1993 (ESMIL – F. Administración) 
o Investigación Operativa 
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Menciones Honoríficas: 
 
• Premio "Mejor Egresado (Estudiante)" de la Promoción 1975-1976 de la 
Escuela de Geología, Minas y Petróleos, Facultad de Ingeniería. 
• Premio "Mejor Trabajador de PETROECUADOR – AÑO 1996" como 
Funcionario de la Unidad de Administración de Contratos. 
 
Publicaciones: 
 
• Octubre 2011.- Texto: “Enseñanza - Aprendizaje de la Investigación Operativa – 
Volumen 2”. ImpresoresMYL. Quito. 325p. Contenido: Programación Lineal, 
Modelos de Transporte y Asignación, Teoría de Colas (Líneas de Espera), 
Simulación Matemática. 
• Mayo 2011.- Texto: “Enseñanza - Aprendizaje de la Investigación Operativa – 
Volumen 1”. ImpresoresMYL. Quito. 235p. Contenido: Modelos de Optimización 
de Precios, Teoría de Decisiones, Control de Inventarios, Redes Pert-Cpm. 
• Septiembre 1993.- Edición del Texto: "Investigación Operativa: Programación 
Lineal"; aprobado por el Consejo Académico de la Facultad de Ciencias 
Administrativas de la Universidad Central del Ecuador.  
• Julio 1983.- Participación con el trabajo "Levantamiento Artificial para el Campo 
Bermejo" en el III Congreso Ecuatoriano de Ingenieros Geólogos, de Minas y 
Petróleos.- Quito.  
• Noviembre 1980.- Participación con el trabajo "Deshidratación del gas en Plantas 
Criogénicas" en el II Congreso Ecuatoriano de Ingenieros Geólogos, de Minas y 
Petróleos.- Quito.   
 
Capacitación Cronológica: 
 
• Junio 2012.- Seminario Taller de “Herramientas de Gerencia de Proyectos”, 
Corporación Elite – Project Management Institute (PMI).- Quito.  
• Marzo 2012.- Seminario Taller de “Fundamentos de la Gerencia de Proyectos 
basada en el PMBOK”, Corporación Elite – Project Management Institute 
(PMI).- Quito.  
• Abril 1999.- Primer encuentro de “Simulación Matemática de Reservorios”, 
Fundación Geociencia, Ingeniería en Geología Minas y Petróleos, Universidad 
Central.- Quito.  
• Febrero 1999.- Advanced Forum on “Extended Reach and Horizontal Drilling”, 
por Arco Oriente Inc..- Quito.  
• Agosto 1998.- Curso de “Negociación Avanzada” dictado por el Dr. Claudio 
Creamer, Universidad San Francisco y PETROECUADOR.- Quito.  
• Septiembre 1997.- Curso de “Negociación Básica” dictado por el Dr. Claudio 
Creamer, Universidad San Francisco y PETROECUADOR.- Quito.  
• Julio 1991.- Curso sobre "Weltest User Course" dictado por la compañía ECL-
Bergeson (Intera).- Quito.  
• Julio 1991.- Curso sobre "Log Evaluation & Clan Log Analysis" dictado por la 
compañía ECL-Bergeson (Intera).- Quito.  
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• Noviembre 1990.- Curso sobre "Calidad de Gestión" dictado por la compañía 
Venezolana Ceprozul.- Quito.  
• Julio1990. –Cursotitulado "Producction Optimization of Oil and Gaswells by 
Nodal Systems analysis" dictado por el Dr. Kermit E. Brown y la compañía 
Ricthisarm.- Quito.  
• Abril 1990.- Curso titulado "CO2 Flooding" dictado por el Dr. Sammi H. Raza, 
de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.- Tulsa-Oklahoma-USA.  
• Abril 1990.- Curso titulado "Waterflooding" dictado por el Profesor Mr. Jerry D. 
Neil, de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.-Tulsa-Oklahoma-
USA.  
• Febrero 1990.- Seminario sobre "Pozos Horizontales" dictado por la compañía 
Halliburton (HRS).- Quito.  - Marzo 1989.- Curso titulado "Improved Oil 
Recovery (Enhanced) Unit I and II" dictado por el Dr. Charles R. Smith - Oil and 
Gas Consultants International.- Calgary – Alberta - CANADA.  
• Noviembre 1988.- Curso sobre "Toma de decisiones bajo incertidumbre" dictado 
por los Profesores Walter Smith V. y Armando Galindo, Instituto Mexicano del 
Petróleo (IMP) y Colegio de Ingenieros Químicos del Guayas.- Guayaquil.  
• Abril 1988.- "Séminaire sur l'INJECTION MISCIBLE DE CO2", dictado por la 
Compañía Francesa BEICIP.- Quito.  
• Agosto 1987.- Curso titulado "Análisis de núcleos" dictado por los Profesores 
Robert E. Carlile y Mihai Vasilache, Instructores de Texas Tech University-
Houston en la Escuela Politécnica.-Guayaquil.  
• Noviembre 1986.- Curso titulado "Improved Oil Recovery Unit I and Unit II" 
dictado por el Profesor Dr. Charles R. Smith de la compañía Oil and Gas 
Consultants International.- Denver-Colorado-USA.  
• Febrero 1986.- Curso sobre "Estadística Multivariada" dictado por el Ing. Pierre 
Kummert, Asesor Técnico de CEPE, en el Centro de Capacitación.-Quito.  
• Octubre 1985.- Curso titulado "Introduction to reservoir engineering" dictado por 
los Ings. Fred Brinkman y Don Sobocinski, compañía Exxon Production 
Research.- Quito.  
• Enero 1983.- Curso sobre "Estadística Matemática", Centro de Matemáticas de la 
Universidad Central.- Quito.  
• Noviembre 1982.- Curso titulado "Applied Reservoir Engineering Problems" 
dictado por el Profesor Mr. G. W. Tracy de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants 
International.- Santa Bárbara-California-USA.  
• Octubre 1982.- Curso titulado "Applied Reservoir Engineering" dictado por el 
Dr. Charles Smith de la compañía Oil and Gas Consultants International.- Santa 
Bárbara-California- USA. 
• Otros de diferente especialidad en la ingeniería de petróleos, y de especialización 
Académica y pedagógica, desde 1977 a 1982.  
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Esteban	  Santos,	  L.MA.	  LL.M.	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  January 10, 2014 
Place: Avenida Amazonas N35-89, Edificio Amazonas 4000, 5to piso. Quito, Ecuador 
Time:  5:00 PM 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Summary of the political ideologies that have governed Ecuador starting 
on 1990 
! Important events 
o How have relationships with other countries changed in terms of 
commerce? 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o Should the government intervene in the oil industry? 
o How is Ecuador´s relationship with other foreign companies? 
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007? 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
o What should be done with the reserve?  
• Refinería del Pacífico 
o How are China and Venezuela involved in the project? 
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future? 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
 
ESTEBAN RAMIRO SANTOS LÓPEZ 
 
Celular: 098902868 
E-mail: esantos@izurietamorabowen.com / er.santos@udlanet.ec 
 
IDIOMAS: 
 
• Inglés (Nativo) 
• Francés (Nativo) 
• Español (Nativo) 
• Italiano (Bajo) 
• Portugués (Bajo) 
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ESTUDIOS: 
 
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
(IHEID)&LAW FACULTY UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA. GINEBRA, SUIZA (2010) 
• Ganador de la beca completa de estudios Hans Wildsforf (Fundación ROLEX) 
2009-2010  
• Título de Master of Laws (LL.M.). Geneva Master in International Dispute 
Settlement (MIDS). 
UNIVERSIDAD ANDINA SIMÓN BOLÍVAR (UASB) (2009) 
• Master of Arts (M.A.) Magíster Internacional en Integración. Mención en 
Negociaciones Económicas Internacionales.   
UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO (USFQ) (2008) 
• Abogado, 
• Sub-especialización en Relaciones Internacionales.  
INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DEVELOPPMENT 
(HEI). GINEBRA, SUIZA (2007) 
• Programme d'été sur des études d'OMC: Curso intensivo en de Comercio y 
Derecho Comercial Internacional, enfocado en la Organización Mundial del 
Comercio (OMC). 
UNIVERSIDAD DE SALAMANCA, ESPAÑA (2005) 
• Cursado cuarto año de estudios en Derecho  
EXPERIENCIA LABORAL: 
IZURIETA MORA BOWEN ESTUDIO JURÍDICO (Empleador actual) 
• Abogado. Director del Departamento de Arbitraje & Mediación • 
www.izurietamorabowen.com 
UNIVERSIDAD DE LAS AMÉRICAS (UDLA) 
• Profesor: Cátedra: - Teoría Política Contemporánea. (Marzo 2012) - Negociación 
II (Agosto 2012) 
• Organismos Internacionales (Agosto (2012) 
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE PICHINCHA (CAP) 
• Expositor: Seminarios formación de Mediadores (Sep 2011 hasta la presente) 
LARREÁTEGUI, MEYTHALER & ZAMBRANO ABOGADOS. (Oct2010- abril2011) 
• Abogado. Área de especialización litigio civil, Arbitraje y Mediación. 
CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN, CÁMARA ECUATORIANO-
AMERICANA DE COMERCIO (AMCHAM) (Marzo 2011 hasta presente)  
• Secretario Arbitral 
CENTRO DE ARBITRAJE Y MEDIACIÓN, CÁMARA DE COMERCIO DE QUITO 
(CAM-CCQ) (Septiembre 2008 hasta presente) 
• Mediador del Centro.  
UNITED NATIONS 14th
 
SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PALACIO 
DE LAS NACIONES; GINEBRA, SUIZA. (Julio 2010) 
• Delegado representante de la República del Ecuador ante el Consejo de Derechos 
Humanos. 
ESTUDIO JURÍDICO TERÁN, VELÁSTEGUI & VEGA. ABOGADOS. (2008- 2010) 
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• Abogado en libre ejercicio en calidad de Asociado del estudio. 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DE LA COMUNIDAD ANDINA (Enero 2007-Agosto 
2009) 
• Asistente de Magistrado, despacho de la República del Perú. • Área de 
especialización, Propiedad Intelectual, elaboración de proyectos de sentencias 
entorno a Interpretaciones Prejudiciales. 
 
Otros Estudios, Docencia y Seminarios: 
 
• Profesor: Seminario-Taller Formación de Mediadores. Programa organizado por 
el Colegio de Abogados de Pichincha con el aval de la Universidad San Francisco 
de Quito. 2011 
• V y VI Conferencia de Arbitraje Internacional: Quito, 2011, 2012. 
• ICC International Commercial Mediation Competition 2010: Representante 
del Master of International Dispute Settlement (MIDS). Cámara de Comercio 
Internacional, CCI, Paris, Francia. 2010. 
• 9th annual International Mediation Interest Group (IMIG) meeting: 
Organización Mundial para la Propiedad Intelectual. OMPI. Ginebra, 2010. 
• Managing Risks and Getting Results: How to use Mediation Effectively in 
International Business Disputes. Cámara de Comercio Internacional, CCI, Paris, 
Francia. 2010. 
• Foundation for International Arbitration Advocacy FIAA: workshop on 
international advocacy. Ginebra, Suiza. 2010. 
• Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA): New Developments in International 
Arbitration. Berna, Suiza. 2009 
• Justice and Politics: Conferencia Juez Mohamed Bennouna con ocasión de la 
declaración unilateral de independencia de Serbia sobre la Republica de 
Montenegro. Palacio de la Paz, Haya, Holanda. 2009. 
• Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) Conference: Resolución de controversias bajo el 
presente tratado. Bruselas, Bélgica. 2009. 
• Programa de Litigación Arbitral/ Formación de Secretarios Arbitrales: Centro de 
Arbitraje y Mediación, Cámara de Comercio de Quito. 2009 
• Seminario de Arbitraje Comercial Internacional: Lima, Perú. 2006. 
• Leadership and Staff preparation, Londrinhas, Brasil (2004): Seminario de 
Preparación en técnicas de liderazgo y manejo de conflictos. 
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Fernando	  Santos	  Alvite	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  March 17, 2014 
Place: Skype Interview 
Time:  11:00 AM 
 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years 
! Political, economic, and social impacts 
! Oil management policies of the presidents from 1990 – 2013 
• Rodrigo Borja 
• Sixto Duran Ballén 
• Abdala Bucaram 
• Fabián Alarcón 
• Jamil Mahuad 
• Gustavo Noboa 
• Lucio Gutiérrez 
• Alfredo Palacio 
• Rafael Correa 
o How has the oil industry evolved along the years? 
! Short and long term impacts of the different political 
administrations 
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil? 
o How have relationships with other countries changed in terms of 
commerce? 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o Should the government intervene in the industry? 
o How does oil exploitation affect Ecuador´s economy? 
o How is crude oil price decided? 
o Why did Ecuador exit the OPEC in 1992, only to re-enter in 2007? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o What was really expected from the Initiative in 2007? 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
o What should be done with the reserve? 
o How will be Refinería del Pacífico’s impact the economy? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future? 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
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FERNANDO SANTOS ALVITE 
 
Informal Resume 
  
Fernando Santos A., es Director de LAFARGE CEMENTOS S.A., desde el año 2.005. 
Fue designado a partir de la adquisición del grupo LAFARGE de la planta de cementos 
Selva Alegre en el Ecuador. 
 
 Antes de dedicarse a la actividad del cemento el Dr. Santos trabajó en la industria 
petrolera, tanto en el sector público como privado. Fue Ministro de Energía y Minas del 
Ecuador y por varios años antes asesor jurídico de la Organización de Países 
Exportadores de Petróleo con sede en Viena. En el sector privado fue asesor de 
Occidental, Amoco, Santa Fe, CNPC, y BHP en sus operaciones en el Ecuador. 
  
El Dr. Santos también es árbitro en los Centros de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Comercio de 
Quito y la Cámara de Comercio Ecuatoriano Americana. Fue también Vicepresidente de 
ambas Cámaras. 
 
 El Dr. Santos tiene un título de doctor en jurisprudencia por la Universidad 
Central del Ecuador y actualmente es profesor de Derecho Económico de la Universidad 
de las Américas de Quito. 
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Sergio	  Vélez	  Valarezo,	  Ph.D.	  	  
 
Interviewer: Paúl Andrés Sierra Lana 
Date:  January 0, 2014 
Place:  Isla Floreana y Ave. de los Shyris. Quito, Ecuador  
Time:  9:00 AM 
Interview	  Guide	  
 
• Oil and politics 
o Oil industry in Ecuador for the past 23 years 
! Political, economic, and social impacts 
! Relevant events that should be noted 
o Is Ecuador an oil country, or just a country that has oil? 
o How has oil exploitation affected Ecuador´s Amazon region? 
o How have political interventions affected the oil industry? 
o Should the government intervene in the oil industry? 
• Yasuní-ITT 
o In your book you mention the Initiative as “utopian”, what do you mean 
by that? 
o National considerations about the Initiative 
o International considerations about the Initiative 
o What impacts do you think the change in decision to exploit the ITT block 
will have in the short and long run? 
! How will the indigenous communities of the Amazon be affected? 
o What should be done with the reserve? 
o Is the Refinería del Pacífico the reason why the ITT block is going to be 
exploited? 
• What is you prediction for Ecuador’s oil industry in the future? 
Resume	  
 
(Provided and elaborated by the interviewee) 
 
SERGIO OSWALDO VÉLEZ VALAREZO 
 
Estudios Superiores: Sociología, Ciencias Políticas, Filosofía  
Especialidades: Planificación, Proyectos,  Investigación, Docencia 
Dirección:   París N41-195 y Sena, Sector Jipijapa, Quito 
Código Postal: 170137 
Teléfonos:   593 02 6014760 (Domicilio) / 593 98 226 0130 (Móvil) 
E-mail:   servelez1@yahoo.com / servelez6@gmail.com 
 
ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES: 
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• Doctorado y Maestría en Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, 
1986-1989 / 2008-2009.  
• Licenciatura en Sociología y Ciencias Políticas, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 
1969-1973. 
• Especialización en Planificación Estratégica y Políticas Científicas y 
Tecnológicas, Universidad de Brasilia-Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología 
de Brasil, CNP, Brasil, 1985. 
• Diplomado en Historia Andina, Curso Internacional Avanzado, Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO, 1984. 
• Diplomado en Planificación Estratégica Situacional, Instituto ALTADIR, 
Venezuela, 1989. 
• Diplomado en Administración Cultural, Curso Internacional, OEA-Escuela de 
Administración Pública de Venezuela, 1975. 
 
EDUCACIÓN CONTINUA 
 
• Seminario Internacional “Pluralismo Jurídico y Justicia de Paz”, Instituto de Altos 
Estudios Nacionales-Consejo de la Judicatura, 2012. 
• III Conferencia Ibeoramericana sobre Justicia Electoral, Instituto Internacional 
para la Democracia-TCE, 2011. 
• Seminario “Respuestas del derecho a desafíos del Siglo XXI”, Universidad 
Andina Simón Bolívar, 2010. 
• Curso de Formación Política, Ministerio de Coordinación de la Política, junio-
julio 2009, Quito. 
• Seminario "Nueva Ley orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales", 8-10 Dic. 2009, 
Universidad Andina, Quito.  
• Seminario “La crisis financiera internacional, impacto y salidas para Ecuador y 
América Latina, Asamblea Nacional, Quito, marzo 2009. 
• Cursos y talleres del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, BID, sobre Diseño, 
Ejecución, Monitoreo y Evaluación de Proyectos; Marco Lógico; Políticas y 
procedimientos sobre Adquisición de Obras, Bienes y Servicios de Consultoría; 
Evaluación Ambiental Estratégica; Fortalecimiento y Reingeniería de Procesos, 
2003-2004. 
 
EXPERIENCIA LABORAL 
 
SECTOR PÚBLICO 
 
• Asesor Vicepresidencia del Tribunal Contencioso Electoral, ago. 2011 –  feb. 
2012 
• Secretario General de la Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1992 – 1996. 
• Asesor Parlamentario y Secretario de la Comisión de Racionalización del Estado, 
Congreso Nacional del Ecuador, 1991-1992. 
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• Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología del Ecuador, CONACYT: Técnico en 
Planificación (1985-1987); Jefe de la División de Estudios y Planificación (1988-
1989)  
• Centro Nacional de Promoción de la Pequeña Industria y Artesanía, CENAPIA: 
Coordinador Técnico Nacional, 1990-1991; Jefe del Departamento de Motivación 
y Organización Empresarial, y Jefe Técnico Nacional del Programa de Desarrollo 
Artesanal BID-CENAPIA,: 1979-1982.  
• Universidad Central: Funcionario del Dpto. de Información y Cultura; Biblioteca 
General y Biblioteca de la Facultad de Economía, 1970 – 1979. 
 
SECTOR PRIVADO  
 
• Vicepresidente de la Corporación Ecuatoriana por el Buen Vivir, INCLUIR, 
actual. 
• Director Ejecutivo y Miembro Fundador de la Corporación Ecuatorial 
Amazónica, CEA, 2005.  
• Director Ejecutivo de la Corporación de Estudios Prospectivos y Estratégicos del 
Ecuador, PROSPEC, 2004; 
• Director Ejecutivo, Federación Nacional de Cámaras de la Pequeña Industria del 
Ecuador, FENAPI, 1998-1999;  
• Consultor Independiente: Registro de la Asociación de Compañías Consultoras 
del Ecuador, ACCE, Nº 4483 - IC; Registro del Comité de Consultoría Nº 1-3703, 
1999 - a la fecha;  
• Gerente-Propietario, Empresa ECOPRODUCTOS ANDINOS, 1992-2000 
(producción de panela en polvo).  
 
EXPERIENCIA EN PLANIFICACIÓN 
 
• Coordinador de Planificación del Seguro Social Campesino, agosto 2007 – agosto 
2009. 
• Jefe de Planificación y Proyectos, Dirección Administrativa, Distrito 
Metropolitano de Quito, 2002-2003.  
• Director de Planificación del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente 1997–1998. 
• Especialista y Jefe (E) de la División de Estudios y Planificación,  Consejo 
Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología del Ecuador, CONACYT, 1985-1989.  
• Jefe de Planificación del Instituto Andino de Artesanías Populares, IADAP – 
Convenio Andrés Bello, 1990 – 1991. 
 
EXPERIENCIA EN COORDINACIÓN, DIRECCIÓN Y/O EJECUCIÓN DE 
PROGRAMAS Y PROYECTOS    
 
• Consultor BID - Director del “Programa de Desarrollo de la Frontera Amazónica 
del Norte, AMAZNOR”, (Contrato de Préstamo 1420/OC-EC); y, del “Programa 
de Fortalecimiento de las Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Frontera Norte”, 
(Cooperación Técnica), 2003-2004:  
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• Consultor OEA - Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Coordinador del Proyecto de 
Mejoramiento Productivo de Fincas del Cantón Puerto El Carmen del Putumayo, 
“MEJORFIN”, 2002.  
• Consultor - Coordinador Convenios Internacionales del Ministerio de Medio 
Ambiente, Programa PATRA, Proyecto Shushufindi, 1997-1998. 
 
EXPERIENCIA EN CONSULTORÍA  
 
• Sistematización documental para publicación “ECUADOR: ECONOMÍA Y 
FINANZAS POPULARES Y SOLIDARIAS para el BUEN VIVIR”,  PNUD-
PNFPEES-SECRETARÍA NACIONAL DEL MIGRANTE, Ed. Febrero 2013, 
Quito. 
• Estudio y propuesta de “Creación de Indicadores de gestión y Escenarios 
Prospectivos para la ejecución del Plan de Desarrollo Alternativo y Sostenible de 
la Zona Norte del Ecuador”, Unidad de Desarrollo del Norte, UDENOR, 2005. 
• Estudios de Prefactibilidad (“Desarrollo Binacional e Indígena en la Cuenca del 
Río Napo”, “Parques y Reservas Naturales Binacionales Amazónicas”), para el 
Plan Binacional de Desarrollo Ecuador-Perú, Organización de Estados 
Americanos, OEA - Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo del Perú, INADE - Instituto 
de Ecodesarrollo de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, ECORAE, 2000-2001. 
• Plan Estratégico de Fortalecimiento de la Defensoría del Pueblo y Concienciación 
de Derechos Humanos, PNUD-FLACSO , Proyecto “Apoyo al Plan de Derechos 
Humanos”, ECU/99/AH/17 – ECU/99/006, 2001;  
• Coordinación-relatoría “Seminario Internacional Andino de Gestión del Turismo 
Sostenible y Competitivo”, OIT- Ministerio de Turismo, 2001; 
• Propuesta técnica para “Diagnóstico y Definición de Programas Estratégicos de 
Desarrollo General y Sectorial de la Pequeña Industria Ecuatoriana”, BID - 
Ministerio de Industrias, 2000, (ejecutado) 
• Consultoría para elaboración “Programa de Proyectos Productivos”, y 
organización del  “Simposio de Políticas Públicas y Acción Social para el 
Desarrollo Humano de los Sectores en Situación de Pobreza”, Fondo de Inversión 
Social del Ecuador, FISE, 1999. 
• Estudio “Situación y perspectivas de la industria en cuero de Cotacachi”, Centro 
Andino de Acción Popular”, CAAP, 1990.  
 
EXPERIENCIA DOCENTE 
 
• Universidad Central del Ecuador: Profesor de las Escuelas de Sociología, 
Economía, Psicología y Trabajo Social, en las materias de: Teorías del 
Subdesarrollo, Antropología Social, Sociología General, Historia Contemporánea 
de América Latina, Introducción a la Lógica, Metodología de la Investigación, 
Planificación del Desarrollo, Diseño de Proyectos, Dirección de Tesis de Grado, 
1974-1993; 
• FLACSO – PNUD – Ministerio de Defensa, Proyecto ECU 94/016: Instructor de 
Derechos Humanos y Ambientales, 1999; 
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• Instituto Nacional de Guerra del Ecuador: Profesor del Curso de Prospectiva y 
Estrategias de Desarrollo, 1996–1997; 
• Preparación y dictado de Conferencias, Cursos, Seminarios. 
 
PUBLICACIONES 
 
• “YASUNÍ-ITT. Situación y perspectivas”, Ed. Centro de Estrategia y Prospectiva 
Ecuador, PROSPEC, Nov. 2013, Quito.  
• "Cultura, ciencia y tecnología en el Ecuador: en pos del Buen Vivir", 2º edición, 
2011, edición digital. 
• “Frontera Norte del Ecuador: perspectivas de desarrollo humano”, 2009, autor, 
edición digital. 
•  “Desarrollo binacional e indígena en la cuenca del río Napo”, autor, edición 
digital, 2002.  
• “Por la cultura, con la cultura, Volvamos a tener Patria”, Programa para la Casa 
de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 2000. 
• "Agonía de la Educación Media", coautor, FESO, 1991. 
• "El sector informal manufacturero en el Ecuador", autor, CIPAD, 1990. 
• “Planificación y Evaluación de la Investigación Científica en la Universidad", 
coautor, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1989. 
• “Memorias del Encuentro Nacional de Investigadores Universitarios en Salud, 
Vivienda, Educación y Empleo”, coautor, Universidad Católica Santiago de 
Guayaquil, 1988. 
• "Cultura, ciencia y tecnología en el Ecuador: reflexiones sobre el presente y 
futuro", autor, Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, 1988.   
• "Los Quichuas del Coca y el Napo", coautor, Universidad Central del Ecuador, 
1969. 
 
Artículos publicados en revistas y otros medios: (últimos) 
 
• “Yasuní-ITT: situación y perspectivas, Revista NOVEDADES 
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 60, dic. 2013, Ediciones Legales, 
Quito. 
• “Derecho, moral y catolicismo”, Revista NOVEDADES JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA 
DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 57, sept. 2013, Ediciones Legales, Quito. 
• “Ética y Tecnología: el polígrafo o detector de mentiras”, Revista NOVEDADES 
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 49, enero 2013, Ediciones Legales, 
Quito. 
• “Premio Espejo: cambio necesario y consecuente”, Revista NOVEDADES 
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 46, octubre 2012, Ediciones 
Legales, Quito. 
• "Vicisitudes del Quinto Poder, Revista NOVEDADES JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA 
DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 16, Abril 2010, Ediciones Legales, Quito. 
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• “Frontera Norte del Ecuador: nuevos horizontes”, Revista NOVEDADES 
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 10, Octubre 2009, Ediciones 
Legales, Quito. 
• “Constitución 2008: del dicho al hecho...”, Revista NOVEDADES 
JURÍDICAS/TRIBUNA DEMOCRÁTICA Nº 1, Enero 2009, Ediciones Legales, 
Quito. 
• “La crisis financiera mundial: caracterización, origen, efectos y alternativas”, 
http://viviendoconfilosofia.blogspot.com/, 2008. 
• “Migrantes: la otra cara del éxito”: WEB ApiaVirtual; 2008. 
 
IDIOMAS 
 
• Español (nativo); inglés y portugués (lectura)   
 
OTRAS FUNCIONES Y ACTIVIDADES 
 
• Participante calificado para la conformación del Consejo de Participación 
Ciudadana y Control Social, Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2009.  
• Consultor de Planes de Negocio, Madrid, España, (Consecución financiamiento 
implementación proyecto Programa de Retorno Voluntario de la Organización 
Internacional de Migraciones, OIM), septiembre 2005-mayo 2006.  
• Asistente de comercialización y diseño publicitario, Empresa “ANDES SIGN”, 
Los Ángeles, USA, junio 2004-agosto 2005. 
• Miembro de la Sección de Sociología y Ciencias Políticas de la Casa de la Cultura 
Ecuatoriana. 
• Presidente de la Asociación de Empleados del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnología, 1988. 
• Presidente de la Asociación de Empleados del Centro Nacional de Promoción de 
la Pequeña Industria y Artesanía, CENAPIA, 1981.
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Appendix	  3:	  Oil	  Price	  History	  1972	  -­‐	  2013	  
 
Year 
Oil Price FOB (USD per Barrel) 
Oriente Crude 
Oil Napo Crude Oil 
Cushing, OK WTI 
Spot Price 
1972 2.40 - 2.46 
1973 4.00 - 3.14 
1974 13.40 - 12.44 
1975 11.80 - 13.88 
1976 12.00 - 13.47 
1977 12.90 - 14.53 
1978 12.50 - 14.56 
1979 23.00 - 21.54 
1980 35.20 - 33.97 
1981 34.40 - 37.07 
1982 32.50 - 33.59 
1983 27.60 - 29.35 
1984 27.40 - 28.87 
1985 25.90 - 27.00 
1986 12.80 - 15.05 
1987 14.20 - 19.20 
1988 12.70 - 15.97 
1989 16.20 - 19.64 
1990 20.20 - 24.53 
1991 16.22 - 21.54 
1992 16.81 - 20.58 
1993 14.42 - 18.43 
1994 13.68 - 17.20 
1995 14.83 - 18.43 
1996 18.02 - 22.12 
1997 15.45 - 20.61 
1998 9.20 - 14.42 
1999 15.50 - 19.34 
2000 24.86 - 30.38 
2001 19.14 - 25.98 
2002 21.71 - 26.18 
2003 26.03 - 31.08 
2004 31.74 - 41.51 
2005 43.21 42.47 56.64 
2006 53.17 48.42 66.05 
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2007 61.84 57.01 72.34 
2008 85.39 80.79 99.67 
2009 54.22 49.95 61.95 
2010 72.67 69.44 79.48 
2011 100.36 92.25 94.88 
2012 99.82 97.21 94.05 
2013 97.36 92.91 97.98 
 
 
The author compiled the different prices were compiled from the following sources:  
 
Acosta, A. (2006). Breve historia económica del Ecuador (2 ed.). Quito: Corporación 
Editora Nacional. 
 
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per barrel). (n.d.). US Energy Information 
Administration. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rwtc&f=a 
 
Estadísticas Petroleras. (n.d.). IDE Perspectiva. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from 
http://investiga.ide.edu.ec/index.php/estadisticas-73/petroleo/394-estadisticas-
petroleras 
 
Oil Market Chronology. (n.d.). Earth-Policy. Retrieved March 16, 2014, from 
http://www.earth-policy.org/datacenter/xls/update67_4.xls 
 
Petroecuador-EP. (2011). Período Enero - Diciembre 2011. INFORME CIFRAS 
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral
/002102.pdf 
 
Petroecuador-EP. (2012). Período Enero - Diciembre 2012. INFORME CIFRAS 
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/peh_docsusogeneral
/002103.pdf 
 
Petroecuador-EP. (2013). Período Enero - Diciembre 2013. INFORME CIFRAS 
PETROLERAS, -. Retrieved March 19, 2014, from 
http://www.eppetroecuador.ec/idc/groups/public/documents/archivo/ep002761.p
df 
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Appendix	  4:	  “The	  Dirty	  Hand	  of	  Chevron”	  Campaign	  
	  
 
  
 
On September 17th 2013, President Rafael Correa visited Aguarico 4 (Orellana province), 
the oilfield that Chevron-Texaco operated. The president denounced the multinational’s 
breach of contract at not cleaning the oil waste pools left in the area. At the oilfield, after 
introducing his bare hand in a contaminated pool, Correa denounced, “This is the dirty 
hand of Chevron”. This event marked the beginning of an international campaign where 
celebrities and activists visit the contaminated site and repeat Correa’s gesture, in an 
attempt to demonstrate the world the damage caused. 
 
 The following are some images from the campaign: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rafael Correa 
Ecuador’s President 
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Antonia Juhasz 
Analyst Expert on Oil 
Impact y Chevron’s 
Malpractices 
Alexandra Costeau 
Researcher – 
Environmental Activist 
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Jean-Luc Melechone 
President of the French 
Left-wing Party  
Mia Farrow 
Actress and Activist 
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These photos are stills from the following video about the campaign: 
 
Vice Ecuador (2014, February 8). La Mano Sucia de Chevron. Retrieved March 
30, 2014, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdBhx8pHYz4
Danny Glover 
Actor, Director, and 
Political Activist 
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Appendix	  5:	  Yasuní	  National	  Park	  in	  Pictures	  
 
The Flora 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Yasuní National Park” by Iniciativa Yasuní-ITT 
From http://yasuni-itt.gob.ec/images/lastNews/5-index.jpg 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Ceiba tree roots at Yasuní” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
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From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=601053186612588&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Yasuní Ecologic Reserve” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio 
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-Yasuni-
ITT_5_976152376.html 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “The waters of the Yasuní” by Ma. Fernanda Silva 2013 
Used with permission from the photographer 
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Photo Credit: “Water Hyacinth” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=601528846565022&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Endless Yasuní Park” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
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From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=582590468458860&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578065.&type=3&theater 
The Fauna 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “The regal moth” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=565840253467215&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578132.&type=3&theater 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Cobalt-winged Parakeet” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=595248687193038&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578057.&type=3&theater 
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Photo Credit: “Pink / Amazon river Dolphin” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=562500187134555&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396578132.&type=3&theater 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Monkey species from Yasuní” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio 
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-Yasuni-
ITT_5_976152376.html 
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Photo Credit: “ Vigilant Black Caiman” by Patricio Terán | El Comercio 
From http://www.elcomercio.com/paper/Imagenes-fauna-flora-Yasuni-
ITT_5_976152376.html 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Green Vine Snake” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=560852053966035&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580339.&type=3&theater 
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The People 
 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Huaorani Community” by Ma. Fernanda Silva 2013 
Used with permission from the photographer 
 
 
 
Photo Credit: “Green Vine Snake” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=566881673363073&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580336.&type=3&theater 
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Photo Credit: “Huaorani Man” by Yasuní-ITT Facebook 
From 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=558230444228196&set=pb.23062608698863
5.-2207520000.1396580340.&type=3&theater
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Appendix	  6:	  GPD	  by	  Economic	  Activity	  and	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate	  
 
Data for 1990 – 1999 in thousands of 1975 Sucres 
 
 
 
Data for 2000 – 2012 in thousands of 2007 US Dollars 
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Economic Activities as a Percentage of GDP 1999 – 2012  
 
 
 
 
 
The data was compiled by the author from the quarterly reports of national accounts from Banco Central del Ecuador. As of 
the moment of writing this thesis, complete official data for 2013 is not available yet. Also, data about oil refining as a separate 
component of GDP was not available for the years 1990 through 1999. 
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Sources: 
 
 
Banco Central del Ecuador (2001). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 39. 
Retrieved April 4, 2014, from contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp 
 Banco Central del Ecuador (2014). Boletin de Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales del Ecuador. Cuentas Nacionales Trimestrales, 85. 
Retrieved April 4, 2014, from http://contenido.bce.fin.ec/home1/estadisticas/cntrimestral/CNTrimestral.jsp 
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Appendix	  7:	  Interview	  Audio	  Files	  
 
 
• 20140107 Dr. Esteban Santos 
o Duration: 47 min 15 sec 
• 20140109 Eco. Pablo Lucio Paredes 
o Duration: 43 min 40 sec 
• 20140109 Soc. Sergio Vélez Valarezo 
o Duration: 1 hr 56 min 30 sec 
• 20140110 Eco. Luis Alfredo García 
o Duration: 47 min 05 sec 
• 20150110 Ing. Segundo Rodríguez 
o Duration: 29 min 39 sec 
• 20140317 Dr. Fernando Santos Alvite 
o Duration 51 min 05 sec 
